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“[N]othing need be added to the present legal rights of the stockholder, 
a single stockholder having already a complete right of action in case of 
expenditure of any portion of corporate funds for political purposes.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Four years ago, in Citizens United v. FEC,2 the United States Supreme 
Court famously held that corporations may spend unlimited sums of        
money on behalf of candidates for federal political office.3  This decision 
paved the way for the rise of “Super PACs,”4 which spent billions of dollars 
in the 2010 and 2012 elections.5  Today, Citizens United remains deeply un-
popular among progressives who decry the growing influence of corporate 
money in politics.6 
Yet, opposition to Citizens United is not simply a matter of politics.  
Proponents of increased shareholder power also have criticized the Citizens 
United decision because it permits a corporation’s management to spend the 
corporation’s money to support political candidates whom most shareholders 
oppose.7  From a shareholder perspective, corporate political spending is 
wrong not due to fears of the excessive power and influence of big business, 
but rather because it could possibly constitute a misuse of corporate funds.  
That is, company executives could essentially misappropriate the corpora-
 
 1. Perry Belmont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, 180 N. AM. REV. 166,  
167 (1905). 
 2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 3. See infra Part II.  A corporation may not coordinate its spending with a can-
didate, however.  See infra Part II.  Further, direct contributions from corporations    
to federal political campaigns remain strictly prohibited, as they have been for over 
100 years.  See Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864-65 (1907) (current version at  
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (bars contributions of money from corporations to      
candidates for federal political office); see also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s 
Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J.  
871, 918 (2004). 
 4. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 5. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate 
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 937 (2013). 
 6. See, e.g., Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Third Anniversary Marked by 
Reformers with Push for Constitutional Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 
2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/19/citizens-united-third-
anniversary_n_2511103.html (describing rallies marking the third anniversary of 
Citizens United). 
 7. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: 
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90 (2010) (“[P]olitical spending decisions may 
be a product not merely of a business judgment regarding the firm’s strategy, but also 
of the directors’ and executives’ own political preferences and beliefs.”). 
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tion’s funds to serve their own political agendas, rather than the corporation’s 
best interest.8 
To allay concerns about management making donations to serve its own 
political ends, leading scholars have proposed revising the federal securities 
laws to require that large, publicly traded corporations disclose certain politi-
cal contributions9 and consult shareholders before making such contribu-
tions.10  If both proposals were adopted into law, they might (in theory11) 
prevent management from making some campaign contributions that are 
wildly unpopular with shareholders.12  However, there are conflicting reports 
in the media about whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
is even considering adoption of the former proposal,13 and there has been no 
indication whatsoever that the SEC plans to take up the second proposal.14 
Even if the SEC promulgates rules requiring greater disclosure of politi-
cal spending by publicly traded corporations, shareholders of such corpora-
tions who oppose political spending still will have no way of preventing it.  A 
corporation’s management – the board of directors and its executive officers 
– have exclusive domain over the corporation’s day-to-day affairs.15  Just as 
 
 8. See id.; see also Winkler, supra note 3, at 873 (explaining that corporate 
political contributions were first banned to prevent “company executives . . . misap-
propriating” the corporation’s funds “to purchase legislation benefiting the executives 
themselves” and to “immunize executives from the oversight of owners,” rather than 
to “help companies’ bottom lines”). 
 9. See generally Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5. 
 10. See generally Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 7. 
 11. However, in practice it is unlikely that shareholders of a publicly traded 
corporation would organize to reject any corporate political contribution.  See infra 
note 19 and accompanying text (describing the “collective action problem”). 
 12. Indeed, research showing that higher political contributions correlate with 
lower revenues suggests that shareholders might broadly oppose political contribu-
tions.  See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Donations: Investment or 
Agency? 4-5 (2008 WFA Meeting Paper, AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972670. 
 13. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., SEC to Propose Rules 
on Corporate Political Spending by April 2013, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ 
2013/01/09/sec-to-propose-rules-on-corporate-political-spending-by-april-2013/, with 
Sarah N. Lynch, White Says SEC Not Now Writing Political Spending Rule, 
REUTERS.COM (May 16, 2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
05/16/us-congress-sec-political spending-idUSBRE94F0PC20130516. 
 14. A similar disclosure proposal has been introduced into Congress.  See Press 
Release, Menendez, Capuano Reintroduce Shareholder Protection Act (Apr. 25, 
2013), available at http://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/menendez-
capuano-reintroduce-shareholder-protection-act-.  However, this bill would seem to 
have little chance of passing the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. 
 15. See, e.g., D.G.C.L. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corpor-  
ation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”). 
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with other ordinary16 business decisions, corporation law provides no    
mechanism for shareholders to play a direct role in deciding whether or not a 
corporation makes political contributions.17  A shareholder who disagrees 
with any management decision generally has three options: elect a different 
board at the next annual shareholder meeting, sell her shares in the market, or 
sue the board for a violation of its fiduciary duties to the corporation – i.e., 
“vote, sell or sue.”18 
 
 16. By contrast, only a few, extraordinary transactions – like a merger of the 
corporation into another corporation – require shareholder approval.  See, e.g., 
D.G.C.L. § 251. 
 17. See Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the Constitutionality of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 1 ELECTION L.J. 361, 368-69 (2002) [hereinafter Joo, 
Corporate Governance] (explaining that a corporation’s board of directors may con-
tribute corporate money to the party of its choice “without consulting shareholders”); 
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 7, at 87 (explaining that “political speech decisions” 
are “governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions” – meaning that “there 
is . . . no role for shareholders”); see also Reza Dibadj, Citizens United as Corporate 
Law Narrative, 16 NEXUS 39, 51 (2011); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 133, 165 (1998) (“Management, not shareholders, makes the determina-
tion of what to say, where to say it and how much to spend.  [C]orporate speech is 
really corporate management’s speech.”). 
 18. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93-105 (1986); Dibadj, su-
pra note 17, at 49.  Selling one’s own shares does not “discipline” management di-
rectly.  However, if enough shareholders sell their shares, in theory the market price 
for the corporation’s stock will decline, thereby increasing the chance that a corporate 
raider will (1) make a tender offer for the corporation’s “undervalued” stock, (2) take 
over the company and (3) fire management.   See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a 
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (explaining how a robust market for 
corporate control can discipline a corporation’s management). 
    “Vote,” “sell” and “sue” are state law remedies.  In addition, federal law permits 
certain shareholders of publicly traded companies to submit proposals on manage-
ment’s proxy form for an up-or-down vote by all voting shareholders.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8 (2013).  However, such proposals generally must be precatory rather than 
mandatory in nature.  See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 3 LAW SEC. REG. § 10.8 (2013) (citing 
SEC no-action letters); see also Joo, Corporate Governance, supra note 17, at 368.  
Further, such proposals rarely win sufficient shareholder support to be taken seriously 
by the board.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 962 & n.133 (explaining 
that proposals regarding corporate political spending are generally defeated, often by 
large margins); Reuters, Starbucks Shareholders Reject Political Contribution Ban, 
CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 30, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-
20/business/chi-starbucks-shareholders-reject-political-contribution-ban-
20130320_1_chief-executive-howard-schultz-starbucks-political-contribution-ban.  
As a result, shareholder proposals are not an effective way to obtain redress for objec-
tionable corporate political contributions. 
    Yet, since the SEC does not specifically require disclosure of corporate political 
spending, shareholders can attempt use such proposals to encourage corporations to 
disclosure their political spending.  See Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2011 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 333, at *1 (Mar. 25, 2011) (allowing such a proposal); see, 
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Voting out the existing board of a publicly traded corporation is a prac-
tical impossibility for all but the largest of shareholders.  Most shareholders 
face a “collective action problem” that prevents them from acting in their own 
interest: they are rationally apathetic and do not engage in costly proxy bat-
tles because the cost of taking action outweighs any financial gains they may 
achieve via electing their own slate.19  As a result, the hand-selected boards of 
most publicly traded corporations run for re-election unopposed,20 which 
means that shareholders cannot simply give their proxy votes to the opposi-
tion candidate.  Moreover, simply withholding one’s vote often is no solution, 
because incumbent directors generally only need a plurality of votes to be re-
elected.21  Even for corporations that require a majority of shareholders to 
elect directors,22 management is permitted to spend corporate funds “in an 
 
e.g., Carey L. Biron, Chevron Rejects Shareholder Demands to Explain Record Polit-
ical Spending, IPS NEWS.NET, May 29, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/ 
2013/05/chevron-rejects-shareholder-demands-to-explain-record-political-spending/. 
    In theory, shareholder proposals also could be used to enact a bylaw prohibiting or 
limiting political contributions.  However, even if such a bylaw were permitted under 
Delaware law (a question that is beyond the scope of this Article), such proposals are 
unlikely to pass due to the collective action problem.  See Paul S. Miller, Shareholder 
Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law, 28 J. L. & POL. 
51, 78-85 (2012). 
 19. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES & CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 154 (4th ed. 2012); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, 
Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 854 (2007); see also 
Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating 
Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 1, 44-45 (2001) [hereinafter Joo, The Modern Corporation] (describing this 
issue in the context of political activity). 
 20. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the 
Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 559 (2005); Joo, The Modern 
Corporation, supra note 19, at 44; Dashka Slater, Resolved: Publicly Traded Corpo-
rations Shall Take Us Seriously, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 12, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes. com/2007/08/12/magazine/12exxon-t.html?pagewanted=all. 
 21. See D.G.C.L. § 216(3) (plurality voting is default rule for electing directors); 
Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political 
Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 468 (2012).  
Even under majority voting, incumbent directors who fail to receive a majority are not 
generally required to resign until a new director is elected.  See id.  As such, some 
have described majority voting as “smoke and mirrors.”  William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & 
Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
459, 486-89 (2007). 
 22. Most Fortune 500 corporations have recently switched to majority voting.  
See Robert Yates & Bimal Patel, ISS Releases 2012 U.S. Board Practices Study, ISS 
GOVERNANCE BLOG, Mar. 2, 2012, http://blog.issgovernance.com/gov/2012/03/iss-
releases-2012-board-practices-study.html. 
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almost unlimited way” in order to drum up support for its slate of directors.23  
As a result, the corporate election process is largely “an irrelevancy.”24 
Selling one’s shares also is an unappealing solution.  Since it is unlikely 
that a small shareholder of a publicly traded corporation has access to non-
public information, once such a shareholder learns of a political contribution, 
that information also presumably will be available to the market.25  If other 
market participants agree that the contribution is bad for the corporation, that 
news will be reflected in the price at which the existing shareholder can sell 
her stock.26  As such, selling merely allows a shareholder to “avoid future 
misuse” of corporate funds “after it has occurred.  It does not prevent misuse, 
or provide any remedy for past misuse.”27 
A derivative lawsuit against management, alleging a breach of the duty 
of loyalty to the corporation,28 is a third way that a shareholder might poten-
tially obtain redress for (or avert future) corporate political contributions.  
However, the scholarly consensus rejects this option out of hand.  Myriad 
scholars have opined – almost always in passing – that a derivative lawsuit 
against the board would fail because the decision to make a political contribu-
tion is an ordinary business decision protected by the potent business judg-
ment rule.29  Yet, until recently, no commentator has undertaken more than a 
cursory inquiry into the issue.30 
 
 23. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the 
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections from Two Resi-
dents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 999 (2013). 
 24. Id.; see also Joo, The Modern Corporation, supra note 19, at 44. 
 25. See Michael Molitor, The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: Rein-
venting Nominating Committees in the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 
11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 97, 143 (2010). 
 26. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 19, at 673 (describing the Efficient Capital 
Market Hypothesis). 
 27. Joo, Corporate Governance, supra note 17, at 368-69; accord Taub, supra 
note 21, at 468; Winkler, supra note 17, at 168; Joo, The Modern Corporation, supra 
note 19, at 57-59 (explaining that the “Wall Street Rule” of shareholders “voting with 
their feet” “allows the shareholder only to escape continued unauthorized use of cor-
porate resources” but does “not put a stop to the activity . . . or provide ay remedy”). 
 28. A suit alleging a breach of the board’s other key fiduciary duty – the duty of 
care – is not really an option.  In theory, the duty of care requires that directors man-
age the corporation with the care of an “ordinarily careful and prudent [person] . . . in 
similar circumstances.”  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 
(Del. 1963).  However, the duty of care is largely unenforceable due to the business 
judgment rule, damage waiver provisions in corporate charters and corporate indem-
nification of directors who breach of the duty of care.  See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 
19, ch. 6; Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and The Expanding 
Duty Of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2007) (“Care . . . essentially trans-
lates into ‘plaintiff loses’ (and even if . . . not . . . , there would be exculpation).”). 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
 30. Indeed, the most thorough treatment of this issue to date appears in a blog 
post. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United, Corporate Political Expenditures, 
7
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Bucking this trend, in 2012 two separate authors published papers urg-
ing that a shareholder could use a derivative lawsuit to successfully challenge 
a corporate political contribution.31  Yet, as described below, these authors’ 
analysis is founded largely on assertion.32  Perhaps as a result, these articles 
have been almost completely ignored by the law reviews; one was summarily 
panned in a single blog post.33 
Although these two authors’ analysis may be superficial, the idea of us-
ing derivative suits to challenge political contributions nonetheless warrants 
careful study before being discarded.  As such, this Article undertakes a de-
tailed inquiry into the theories – waste and self-dealing – that these authors 
propose that shareholders could use to successfully challenge a corporate 
political contribution. 
After a careful review, the first theory – waste – is a loser.  Despite the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s34 seemingly generous treatment of waste suits 
in recent years,35 there is simply no plausible argument that a typical corpo-
rate political contribution satisfies the extremely onerous waste standard.36  
Only a contribution to a deeply offensive candidate with zero chance of win-
ning would qualify.37 
However, the second theory – self-dealing – could be viable in some in-
stances.38  In particular, a corporate contribution in support of a candidate 
 
and the Business Judgment Rule, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 24, 2012), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/citizens-uni-
ted-corporate-political-expenditures-and-the-business-judgment-rule.html. 
 31. William A. Nelson II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative 
Claims of Corporate Waste to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expendi-
tures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134, 135 (2012) (urging that the corporate waste doctrine could be 
used to challenge political contributions); Jonathan Romiti, Playing Politics With 
Shareholder Value: The Case for Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political 
Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. L. REV. 737, 737 (2012) (arguing that politi-
cal contributions might be challenged as self-dealing or waste). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. To date, the only substantive discussion of the arguments advanced in either 
article is a brief blog critique of Nelson’s article by Professor Bainbridge.  See Bain-
bridge, supra note 30. 
 34. This Article focuses principally on Delaware law and decisions of the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery because they are by far the most important sources of state 
corporate law in the United States.  See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS 
CHOOSE DELAWARE (2007), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/whycorp-
orations_english.pdf (nearly sixty percent of all publicly traded corporations in the 
United States are incorporated in Delaware); see also Omari Scott Simmons, Brand-
ing the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1163 (2008) (discussing the Court of Chancery’s “national 
reputation for its sophistication and expertise in handling corporate cases”). 
 35. See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. See infra Part V. 
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who advocates policies that favor the personal financial interests of directors 
(or officers39) over the interests of most Americans might plausibly be 
deemed self-dealing.40  However, this argument is tenuous at best for most 
ordinary political contributions because of the attenuated causal connection 
between a political contribution and any personal financial benefit that direc-
tors might stand to gain from such a contribution.41 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the scholarly consensus probably 
is correct: a shareholder lawsuit to challenge a typical Super PAC contribu-
tion is unlikely to succeed on either a theory of waste or self-dealing.42  If 
shareholder plaintiffs are going to succeed in challenging corporate Super 
PAC contributions, they will need to come up with different theories.43 
* * * * * 
The remainder of this Article is organized into four parts and a brief 
conclusion.  Part II provides a brief background on the Citizens United deci-
sion.  Part III describes derivative lawsuits, the business judgment rule, and 
what little leading scholars have said about shareholders’ ability to challenge 
corporate political contributions using derivative suits.  Parts IV and V, re-
spectively, summarize and critique arguments advanced by two recent au-
thors, that shareholders could challenge political contributions as a breach of 
the duty of loyalty.  Part IV deals with the theory of corporate waste and Part 
V deals with the theory of self-dealing. 
II.  BRIEF BACKGROUND ON CITIZENS UNITED 
A.  The Decision and the Experts’ Reaction 
In early 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, produced a doc-
umentary video entitled Hillary: The Movie.44  The documentary was highly 
critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for the Democratic Par-
ty’s nomination for President.45  Citizens United released Hillary: The Movie 
in theaters and on DVD, and arranged to make the documentary available as 
an “on demand” feature on DirectTV and cable television shortly before the 
 
 39. This Article will use the term “director” (or sometimes, “management”) to 
refer to both directors and officers. 
 40. See infra Part V. 
 41. See infra Part V. 
 42. See infra Part VI. 
 43. One such theory might be bad faith, which is more flexible than self-dealing 
and a lower standard that corporate waste.  See Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political 
Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), current draft 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328991. 
 44. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319-20 (2010). 
 45. See id. at 322. 
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2008 primary elections.46  To promote the documentary, Citizens United pro-
duced various television advertisements.47 
At the time, section 441b of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (BCRA), as amended by BCRA section 203, prohibited corporations 
from spending general treasury funds on “electioneering communications” or 
on speech that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a candidate.48  In 
December 2007, Citizens United filed suit in district court seeking a declara-
tory judgment that, inter alia, BCRA section 441b was unconstitutional as 
applied to Hillary: The Movie.49  The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the Federal Election Commission (FEC), holding that the television 
ads for the documentary violated BCRA’s ban on electioneering communica-
tions within thirty days of a primary for federal election.50  The district court 
also rejected Citizens United’s First Amendment challenge to section 441b, 
holding that the section was constitutional both on its face and as applied to 
the documentary because it was “susceptible of no other interpretation than 
to” attack Clinton’s candidacy for office.51  After losing its appeal to a three-
judge panel of the district court, Citizens United appealed directly to the Su-
preme Court (as permitted by statute).52 
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision, reversed the district court.  It 
held that BCRA section 441b was unconstitutional on its face, thereby strik-
ing down the section’s ban on corporate independent expenditures.53  In sup-
port of its holding, the Court reasoned that the “[g]overnment may not sup-
press political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”54  Ap-
plying strict scrutiny, the Court considered whether section 441b was narrow-
ly tailored to serve a compelling interest.55  The Court held that “[n]o suffi-
cient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit 
or for-profit corporations.”56  Further, the Court rejected the respondents’ 
 
 46. See id. at 319-21. 
 47. Id. at 320. 
 48. An “electioneering communication” is any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication that (1) refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, (2) is 
made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election, and (3) is 
“publicly distributed.”  Id. at 321 (citing 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.29(a)(2), (b)(3) (2009)). 
 49. See id. at 321. 
 50. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281-82 (D.D.C. 2008)   
(per curiam). 
 51. Id. at 279. 
 52. See 558 U.S. at 319; 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
 53. See 558 U.S. at 364-65.  In so doing, the Court overturned McConnell v. 
FEC, in which the Court had recently upheld BCRA section 203’s extension of sec-
tion 441b.  See id. at 365-66 (overruling McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). 
 54. Id. at 365. 
 55. See id. at 362. 
 56. Id. at 365.  In so doing, the Citizens United Court also overruled an-        
other recent case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which had held that 
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argument that protection of individual shareholders’ speech rights was itself a 
compelling governmental interest.57  The Court reasoned that “[t]here is . . . 
little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the 
procedures of corporate democracy.’”58 
However, the Court did uphold certain disclosure and disclaimer provi-
sions in the BCRA,59 reasoning that these were merely incidental burdens on 
speech.60  The Court reasoned that disclosure plays an important role in help-
ing shareholders to protect themselves: 
Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate  
democracy, can be more effective today . . . .  With the advent of     
the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide sharehold-
ers . . . with the information needed to hold corporations . . . accounta-
ble for their positions . . . .  Shareholders can determine whether    
their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest 
in making profits.61 
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens criticized the majority’s reasoning 
that shareholders could protect themselves using “the procedures of corporate 
democracy.”62  Justice Stevens reasoned that shareholders’ ability to use the 
franchise to protect their own speech interests is limited due to the boards’ 
wide-ranging authority.63  Further, he reasoned that derivative suits for breach 
 
political speech may be banned on the speaker’s corporate identity.  494 U.S. 652, 
668-69 (1990). 
 57. See 558 U.S. at 361-62. 
 58. Id. at 361-62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
794 (1978)).  Justice Kennedy’s reasoning here echoed the Bellotti Court’s assump-
tions about shareholder power: “Acting through their power to elect the board of 
directors . . . shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own 
interests.”  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95. 
 59. See 558 U.S. at 366-67.  For example, BCRA section 201 requires that per-
sons who spend more than $10,000 making electioneering communications in any 
calendar year – which would include Super PACs – must disclose the “names and 
addresses of all contributors who contributed . . . $1,000 or more” during a specified 
period.  2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(f) (2012).  See also Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. 
Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Politi-
cal Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 330 (2014) (discussing the emergence of “Super 
PACs” following the Court’s decision in Citizens United). 
 60. See 558 U.S. at 366-67. 
 61. Id. at 370 (internal citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 476 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 63. See id. at 477 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In 
practice, . . . many corporate lawyers will tell you that these rights [i.e., shareholder 
voting and derivative suits] are so limited as to be almost non-existent, given the 
internal authority wielded by boards and managers and the expansive protections 
afforded by the business judgment rule.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of fiduciary duty would be ineffective due to “the expansive protections af-
forded by the business judgment rule.”64 
Numerous corporate law experts have echoed Justice Stevens’ re-
marks.65  Indeed, some leading corporate law scholars have lamented that the 
Citizens United opinion evinces a poor understanding of corporate law.66 
B.  The Result: CEOs Can Cause Corporations  
to Contribute to Super PACs 
1.  Citizens United Leads to Unlimited Independent Expenditures 
As a result of the Citizens United decision, corporations can engage in 
unlimited independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate for election to 
state67 or federal office. As Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy explained at a 
recent symposium: 
Before Citizens United if a CEO of a publicly traded company wanted 
to buy a political ad in a federal election, [she] had to reach into [her] 
pocket and pull out [her] personal checkbook.  . . . But after Citizens 
United [she] can . . . reach into [her] other pocket . . . and pull out the 
corporate checkbook . . . where the bill does not go to [her] house . . . .  
[Thus,] corporate managers can spend what Justice Brandeis used to 
call “other people’s money” in politics.68 
Of course, money in the corporate treasury does not really belong to 
other people (i.e., the corporation’s shareholders).  Rather, it belongs to one 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See infra Part III.B and note 101. 
 66. See, e.g., Symposium: Accountability After Citizens United – Panel           
One Transcript, Panel One: Can Shareholders Save Democracy?, BRENNAN CENTER 
FOR JUST. 15 (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
events/Accoutability%20After%20Citizens%20United%20panel%20one.pdf [herein-
after Symposium] (remarks of Prof. John R. Coates; incorrectly labeled as remarks    
of Prof. Robert Jackson) (“[O]ne thing we can agree on is that the Supreme Court  
was not well informed about corporate law.”); video available at http://www.you 
tube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=-1AA61leLN4 (remark appears at 
58:50 mark). 
 67. Although Citizens United struck down a federal statute, it also effectively 
invalidated state statutes prohibiting independent expenditures.  See Spencer & Wood, 
supra note 59 at 336, n.108 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 399 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part)).  The Court confirmed this in a later decision 
involving Montana law.  See id. at 339 (analyzing Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 
132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam)). 
 68. Symposium, supra note 66, at 1 (introductory remarks of Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy). 
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other person: the corporation.69  However, management’s expenditure of 
funds from the corporate treasury is nonetheless somewhat akin to spending 
“other people’s money” due to two well established corporate law norms: 
First, management has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to make decisions in the 
best interest of the corporation.70  Second, the dominant paradigm in corpo-
rate law (from which there is, admittedly, frequent and fervent dissent71) 
holds that “the best interest of the corporation” is largely synonymous with 
“shareholder wealth maximization.”72 
2.  The Rise of Super PACs 
Although corporations may now make unlimited independent expendi-
tures in support of candidates for state or federal political office, they rarely 
spend money directly to influence elections.  Instead, they generally spend 
through intermediaries, such as Super PACs.  Or, to avoid disclosure, they 
contribute to section 501(c)(4) non-profits that are affiliated with Super 
PACs.73  Super PACs are “independent expenditure-only” entities, meaning 
that they can spend unlimited money in support of a candidate for federal 
 
 69. See 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5096 (2013); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(4) 
(parenthetical needed). 
 70. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“Essen-
tially, the duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and          
its shareholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer    
or controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally.”).  See      
also T.V.I. Corp. v. Gallagher, No. 7798-VCP, 2013 WL 5809271, at *11 (Del.      
Ch. Oct. 28, 2013) (“An officer or director’s duty of loyalty requires them scrupulous-
ly to place the interests of the corporation and shareholders that they serve before 
their own.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 169 (2008) (urging that the answer to the question of wheth-
er state corporation law codes “limit the corporate purpose to shareholder wealth 
maximization” is “not just ‘no’ but ‘hell no’.”). 
 72. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW & ECONOMICS 306 (2d ed. 
2009) (“It is well-settled that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”) 
(citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)).  Cf., e.g., eBay Do-
mestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (reasoning that 
directors of a for-profit corporation “are bound . . . to promote the value of the corpo-
ration for the benefit of its stockholders.”). 
 73. See Sean Sullivan, What Is a 501(c)(4), Anyway?, WASH. POST (May 13, 
2013, 1:51 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/13/what-
is-a-501c4-anyway/; Taub, supra note 21, at 465.  See also, e.g., Dylan Matthews, 
Crossroads GPS and Priorities USA Were Created for the Purpose of Hiding Donors, 
WASH. POST (May 15, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
wonkblog/wp/2013/05/15/crossroads-gps-and-priorities-usa-were-created-for-the-
purpose-of-hiding-donors/ (interview with campaign finance reform advocate       
Fred Wertheimer). 
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political office so long as they do not expressly coordinate their spending 
with any candidate or campaign.74 
The Super PAC is a new player in electoral politics, made possible by 
Citizens United and a subsequent appellate court case.75  In that case, 
SpeechNOW.org v. FEC,76 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
held that a PAC that promised not to make contributions to candidates, par-
ties, or other PACs could accept unlimited contributions for the purpose of 
making independent expenditures.77  The media promptly dubbed these deep-
pocketed spending machines “Super PACs.”78  Once unleashed by Citizens 
United and SpeechNOW.org, Super PACs immediately became major     
players in the 2010 and 2012 federal election cycles79 (and in states’ 2010 
election cycle80). 
III.  DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS TO CHALLENGE CORPORATE POLITICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS: THE SCHOLARLY CONSENSUS 
A.  Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits and the Business Judgment Rule 
In a derivative lawsuit, a shareholder sues in the name of the corporation 
to address an injury to or vindicate a right of the corporation.81  These suits 
are dubbed “derivative” because the shareholder’s right to sue is derivative of 
the corporation’s right to sue.82  Shareholder derivative lawsuits face high 
standing hurdles, including most notably the requirement that the shareholder 
 
 74. See Matthews, supra note 73. 
 75. See Gregory J. Krieg, What Is a Super PAC? A Short History, 
ABCNEWS.COM (Aug. 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/super-pac-
short-history/story?id=16960267. 
 76. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 77. See id. at 695.  See also Spencer & Wood, supra note 59, at 330, 333 n.101. 
 78. See Dave Levinthal, How Super PACs Got Their Name, POLITICO.COM (Jan. 
10, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71285.html. 
 79. See Michael Beckel, Led by Karl Rove-Linked Groups, ‘Super PACs’ and 
Nonprofits Significantly Aid GOP in Election 2010, Nov. 5, 2010, OPENSECRETS.COM 
(Nov. 5, 2010), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/led-by-karl-rove-linked-
groups-nonp.html; Election 2012: Independent Spending Totals, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance/independent-expenditures/totals 
(last visited June 11, 2014).  See generally Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don’t Lie, 
SLATE (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/ 
03/the_supreme_court_s_citizens_united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_cam
paign_spending_.html. 
 80. See Spencer & Wood, supra note 59, at 361 (concluding that, after Citizens 
United, “independent spending increased at twice the rate” in states that had previous-
ly banned independent expenditures compared to states that had not). 
 81. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 19, at 367. 
 82. See id. 
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first make “demand” on the corporation’s board of directors.83  Demand is 
required because the decision whether to file suit on behalf of the corporation, 
like any other business decision, actually belongs to the board.84  While de-
mand is always required in some jurisdictions, in other jurisdictions (such as 
Delaware) it can be excused if a court concludes that making demand would 
have been “futile.”85 
Even if shareholder derivative plaintiff has standing to sue – that is, if a 
court concludes that the shareholder may sue because demand is futile (or, in 
jurisdictions where demand is essentially always required, if the shareholder 
makes demand and the court concludes that the suit may proceed) – every 
shareholder lawsuit faces another major hurdle: the business judgment rule.  
This judge-made rule reflects several policy rationales, including: (1) skepti-
cism that judges are qualified to make business judgments; and (2) the view 
that shareholders have voluntarily hired the directors, not the courts, to make 
business decisions for the corporation.86 
The business judgment rule is often described as a “presumption”87    
(but is perhaps better described as an “assumption”88) that, in making a busi-
ness decision,89 management “acted on an informed basis, in good faith     
and in honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests” of the  
 
 83. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (“In a derivative action . . . to enforce         
a right of a corporation . . . , the complaint shall allege . . . with particularity the ef-
forts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the 
directors . . . and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not 
making the effort.”). 
 84. See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 546-47 (Del. 2001). 
 85. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 86. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (1979) (“[T]he business      
judgment doctrine . . . is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill 
equipped . . . to evaluate . . . business judgments . . . .  [I]nescapably there can be no 
available objective standard by which the correctness of every corporate decision may 
be measured . . . [and] by definition the responsibility for business judgments must 
rest with the corporate directors . . . .  Thus, absent evidence of bad faith or fraud . . . 
the courts must and properly should respect their determinations.”). 
 87. Unfortunately, courts do not agree on how the business judgment rule works.  
Some courts view the rule as a substantive rule of law; others describe it as an absten-
tion doctrine; others treat it as a hybrid.  See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION 
LAW 289-90 (2d ed. 2010); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 243. 
 88. See GEVURTZ, supra note 87, at 243; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 110.  Or, 
perhaps it is most accurately described as “simply a policy of judicial non-review.”  
Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 631 (2000) 
(italics in original).  This Article will nonetheless use the language of presumption. 
 89. Absent an exercise of judgment – i.e., a business decision – the business 
judgment rule does not apply.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 110.  This could, 
however, include a decision to refrain from acting.  See id.  That is to say, only un-
considered inaction is excluded from the ambit of the business judgment rule. 
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corporation.90  Unless a shareholder plaintiff can meet her affirmative obliga-
tion to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, management’s con- 
duct is not subject to challenge as a breach of fiduciary duty under any cir-
cumstances.91  The effect of this rule is to refocus a court’s inquiry into man-
agement’s conduct: 
When courts invoke the business judgment rule, they are . . . convert-
ing the question “Was the standard of care breached?” into the related, 
but different questions of whether the directors were truly disinterest-
ed and independent and whether their actions were not so extreme, 
unconsidered, or inexplicable as not to be an exercise of good-faith 
judgment.92 
That is to say, the business judgment rule instructs courts that, rather 
than look at the quality of the board’s decision (i.e., was the decision negli-
gent?93), the court should look to integrity of the board’s decision-making 
process (i.e., was the decision made in good faith, uninterested, independent, 
minimally informed, and not made in a grossly negligent manner?).94  As a 
 
 90. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 91. See id; accord, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (“In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their 
directors . . . , courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally or uncon-
scientiously executed; or unless . . . the acts were fraudulent or collusive, and destruc-
tive of the rights of the stockholders.”) (quoting Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 
(N.Y. 1888)). 
 92. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 19, at 231; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72,   
at 109 (explaining that the business judgment rule requires a court to “review the  
facts to determine not the quality of the decision, but rather whether the decision-
making was tainted by self-dealing and the like . . . the merits of the board’s         
decision are irrelevant”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as 
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 95 (2004) (“[T]he whole point of the 
business judgment rule is to prevent courts from even asking the question: did the 
board breach its duty of care?”); Johnson, supra note 88, at 631 (describing the busi-
ness judgment rule as “a judicial policy of not reviewing the substantive merits of a . . 
. business decision for the purpose of determining whether directors breached or ful-
filled their duty of care.”). 
 93. In the absence of a business judgment – i.e., when the board faces            
liability for being inattentive to corporate affairs – the duty of care essentially embod-
ies a negligence standard.  JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION LAW 202-03 (2011); see, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 
A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
 94. See RICHARD D. FREER & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, PRINCIPALS OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 263 (2013) (“Under the business judgment rule, courts do not     
address whether a decision was dumb or smart; they do not second-guess business 
decisions.”); see, e.g., Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (“Mere errors of judgment are   
not sufficient as grounds for equity interference[.]”); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 
N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (“[T]he business judgment doctrine . . . bars judicial 
inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and in the exercise       
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result, judges are effectively prohibited from evaluating the merits of rational, 
good faith business decisions.95 
B.  Most Scholars Reject Derivative Suits  
Challenging Political Contributions 
A shareholder lawsuit challenging a corporate political contribution as   
a breach of management’s duty of loyalty would, in all likelihood, be deriva-
tive in nature.  That is to say, the lawsuit presumably would allege that        
the contribution harmed the corporation and/or violated a right that belonged 
to the corporation.96 
Relatively few scholars have written at length about shareholder chal-
lenges to corporate political contributions.  Most scholars who have written 
on the topic have rejected such challenges out of hand – much like Justice 
Stevens did – in brief commentaries focused upon the all-encompassing pow-
er of the business judgment rule. 
For example, in his blog, Professor Stephen Bainbridge analogized     
political contributions to charitable donations by posing the following      
hypothetical: 
Suppose a powerful CEO caused the corporation to make massive 
contributions to her alma mater.  Is that a waste of corporate assets?  
Maybe.  But the plaintiff has a serious problem; namely, that “When 
director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this 
Court will not question rational judgments about how promoting non-
 
of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes.  
Questions of . . . management . . . are left solely to their honest and unselfish decision 
. . . [and] may not be questioned, although the results show that what they did         
was unwise or inexpedient.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Shlensky v. 
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“[W]e do not mean to say that we have 
decided that the decision of the directors was a correct one.  That is beyond our juris-
diction and ability.  We are merely saying that the decision is one properly before 
directors and the motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, illegali-
ty or conflict of interest[.]”). 
 95. Joo, Corporate Governance, supra note 17, at 368 (“Under the ‘business 
judgment rule,’ . . . shareholders [cannot] sue management for any act that can be 
characterized as a good-faith business decision, even if shareholders can show that it 
did not benefit the corporation.  Courts presume that managers’ acts are good-faith 
business decisions, and make it very difficult for shareholders to prove otherwise.  
Thus courts will defer to all but the most egregiously negligent or obviously self-
interested management decisions.”). 
 96. A shareholder could in theory challenge a corporate political contribution as 
a breach of management’s duty of loyalty on the grounds that it violated her own 
individual rights (e.g., the right against compelled speech under the First Amend-
ment).  Such a lawsuit would not be derivative in nature because it does not assert to 
address a harm to and/or vindicate a right of the corporation.  The ability of a share-
holder to bring such a lawsuit is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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stockholder interests – be it through making a charitable contribution 
[or otherwise] – ultimately promote stockholder value.”97 
According to Professor Bainbridge, it will be “damned difficult” for a 
plaintiff challenging this hypothetical charitable donation – or the analogous 
political contribution – to survive a motion to dismiss because “courts will 
require considerable evidence of self-dealing before the business judgment 
rule will be rebutted.”98  In short, Professor Bainbridge argues: 
The basic problem [with shareholder challenges to corporate political 
contributions] is that corporate decisions about political expenditures 
differ neither in kind nor degree from any other decision to expend 
corporate funds.  As such, there is no reason to think courts will – or 
should – treat the former class differently than they treat the latter.99 
The same is true, Professor Bainbridge has urged elsewhere, with regard 
to other corporate political activity, such as taking stances on political is-
sues.100 
Numerous other scholars have made this same point (though never in 
too much detail).101  Indeed, even one of the authors who recently wrote to 
 
 97. Bainbridge, supra note 30 (quoting eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. New-
mark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)). 
 98. Id.  Professor Bainbridge presumably concluded that it would be atypical for 
a court to find “considerable evidence” of self-dealing under the circumstances of a 
normal political contribution, since he did not expand on his “damned difficult” 
comment.  Indeed, Professor Bainbridge has opined elsewhere that charitable contri-
butions – which he likens to political contributions – probably do not often constitute 
self-dealing.  See Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 438 (“[I]t seems doubtful that corpo-
rate philanthropy poses the sort of conflict of interest necessary to justify limiting 
board discretion.”). 
 99. Bainbridge, supra note 30 (emphasis added); accord Robert H. Sitkoff, Cor-
porate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Char-
ters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2002) (“There is nothing special about the agen-
cy problem associated with managerial control over corporate political speech that 
distinguishes it from any other area of managerial discretion.”). 
 100. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is Starbuck’s [sic] Support of Marriage Equality      
a Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Its Shareholders?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM    
(Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2013/ 
03/is-starbucks-support-of-marriage-equality-a-breach-of-fiduciary-duty-to-its-share-
holders.html. 
 101. A few authors have devoted paragraphs or even pages to this topic.  See 
Sabina Bunt Thaler, Citizens United And Forced Speech: Why Protecting The Dis-
senting Shareholder Necessitates Disclosure Of Corporate Political Expenditures 
After Citizens United v. FEC, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 591, 639-40 
(2011) (describing the business judgment rule and the waste standard, and promptly 
concluding that, “[g]iven these director-friendly standards, a claim for waste, prem-
ised on a corporation’s political spending, is . . . unlikely to succeed”); Joo, Corporate 
Governance, supra note 17, at 368 (explaining that a shareholder “would probably be 
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unable to mount a successful shareholder lawsuit challenging” a contribution to one 
political party or another because “[c]orporate law gives the directors’ decision . . . a 
presumption of propriety and a great deal of judicial deference.”); Joo, The Modern 
Corporation, supra note 19, at 70 (“The limited case law . . . suggests that managerial 
decisions regarding election-related spending fall within the business judgment rule.  
In other words, courts presume that election-related spending is intended in good faith 
to serve shareholder interests.”). 
    However, most scholars who have addressed the issue have done so only in pass-
ing.  See, e.g., Jay Kesten, Democratizing Corporate Political Activity 21 (FSU Coll. 
of Law, Law, Bus. & Econs. Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2242107 (noting that, if corporate political spending “were subject only to business 
judgment rule review, the likelihood of liability is virtually nil.”); Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the U.S. 
Should Adopt the British Approach, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 392 (Abol Jalilvand & Tassos Malliaris eds., 2011) (“The idea that . . . 
derivative suits might be successful when so far no modern court has punished a man-
ager for political spending, is completely divorced from reality . . . [C]ourts are very 
deferential to managers under the business judgment rule.”); Dibadj, supra note 17, at 
52 (quoting Torres-Spelliscy); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, Shareholder-
Authorized Corporate Political Spending in the United Kingdom, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 
525, 532-33 (2011) (“[C]ourts historically have denied relief to shareholders who 
have sued companies to protest corporate political spending after the fact.”); Anne 
Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corpo-
rate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 533 (2011) (argu-
ing that derivative suits “do not present a reasonable remedy” for dissenting share-
holders who oppose corporate political expenditures due to the “high costs of such 
suits and their low success rate . . . , even for claims that could survive the business 
judgment rule and the accompanying procedural roadblocks”); Stephen A. Yoder, 
Legislative Intervention In Corporate Governance Is Not A Necessary Response To 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 29 J.L. & COM. 1, 20-21 (2010) 
(“Qualitatively, political expenditures are no different from the many other decisions 
that managers must make every day without direct shareholder involvement.”); Taub, 
supra note 21, at 468 (explaining that, “in most circumstances” suits against directors 
for breach of fiduciary duty “would be fruitless” because of the demand rule and 
because “directors are still shielded by the business judgment rule”); Elizabeth Poll-
man, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Polit-
ical Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 56-57 (2009) (urging that derivative suits 
“based on corporate political spending” are “unlikely to provide relief” due to the 
“hurdles” like the “highly deferential business judgment rule,” which would allow 
directors to “rationalize their conduct of making . . . political contributions as being in 
the interest of the corporation”); Adam Winkler, The Corporation In Election Law, 32 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1264-65 (1998) (“Due to the unbridled discretion embodied 
in the business judgment rule, derivative suits by dissenting shareholders . . . are des-
tined to fail.”) (discussing Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1991)); 
Winkler, supra note 17, at 206 (“[S]o long as the expenditures can reasonably be 
characterized as in the shareholders’ best interests, such expenditures are protected 
from judicial oversight by the business judgment rule.”).  Cf. Mallory E. Mendrala, 
Citizens Divided By Citizens United: How The Recent Supreme Court Decision Af-
fects Small Business In Politics, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 253, 271-72 
(2012) (explaining that shareholders can sue derivatively to challenge political contri-
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urge that shareholders could use derivative lawsuits to challenge corporate 
political contributions also has admitted in passing that the business judgment 
rule is likely to be the downfall for most such suits.102 
C.  The Sparse Case Law on Point 
Only two cases in the past century have addressed shareholder deriva-
tive suits challenging corporate political contributions.103  The cases, Marsili 
v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co.104 and Stern v. General Electric Co.,105 large-
ly support Professor Bainbridge’s contention that such suits are likely to fail 
due to the business judgment rule. 
In Marsili, a California appellate court upheld a contribution made by an 
electric utility to an organization advocating the defeat of a ballot measure 
that would have required advance voter approval of the construction of any 
buildings above a certain height.106  Some shareholders challenged the contri-
bution on the ground that it served no corporate purpose.107  The Marsili 
court disagreed.  Invoking the business judgment rule (under California 
law108), the court reasoned “[t]he law is clear that . . . management . . . [is] 
primarily responsible for judging whether a particular act or transaction is . . . 
expedient for the attainment of corporate purposes.”109  Accordingly, the 
court held that “[n]either the court nor . . . shareholders can substitute their 
 
butions, but pointing out that “most courts . . . apply the business judgment rule” and 
that pleading would be a high hurdle – and then, not opining whether or not such suits 
might succeed). 
 102. See Romiti, supra note 31, at 757-58 (“Although political donations may not 
appear related to a corporation’s day-to-day operations, the reach of the business 
judgment rule is extremely broad; for this reason, rebutting the rule is the most signif-
icant obstacle to a shareholder suit . . . .  [I]n most cases, the business judgment rule 
will shield these decisions as matters of business discretion.”). 
 103. Presumably, this dearth of caselaw is attributable at least in part to the 
longstanding ban on corporate contributions to candidates for federal political office.  
See supra note 3. 
 104. 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
 105. 924 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 106. See 124 Cal. Rptr. at 322. 
 107. See id. at 319. 
 108. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 309(a), (c) (1987) (“A director shall perform        
the duties of a director . . . in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be       
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such care, includ-
ing reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would       
use under similar circumstances . . . . A person who [satisfies this standard] shall  
have no liability based upon any alleged failure to discharge the person’s obligations 
as a director.”). 
 109. Id. at 319. 
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judgment” for the board’s judgment so long as the “board has acted in good 
faith and used its best business judgment.”110 
Similarly, in Stern, a General Electric Company (GE) shareholder chal-
lenged GE’s contributions to its PAC on the ground that the contributions 
were made “to support congressional incumbents without regard to their past 
position on business issues.”111  As in Marsili, the court in Stern invoked the 
business judgment rule (this time, under New York law).112  The court de-
scribed the rule as prohibiting judicial review of board decisions “only upon a 
showing of fraud or bad faith.”113  Finding that plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud 
were not stated with sufficient particularity and that no attempt was made to 
plead bad faith even generally, the Stern court upheld the trial court’s dismis-
sal of the complaint (albeit without prejudice to amend).114 
IV.  CHALLENGING CORPORATE POLITICAL  
CONTRIBUTIONS AS WASTE 
A.  What is Corporate Waste? 
Corporate waste is a “transfer . . . [that] amounts to a . . . waste of corpo-
rate assets.”115  A director’s fiduciary duties obligate her not to waste the 
corporation’s assets.116  There appear to be two ways to establish waste: a 
subjective method and an objective method.117  Either way, whether waste 
 
 110. Id. at 320 (quoting Olson v. Basin Oil Co., 136 Cal. App.2d 543,              
559-60 (1955)). 
 111. Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 473 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 112. See id. at 476 (“[U]nder the New York business judgment rule, the actions  
of corporate directors are subject to judicial review only upon a showing of fraud or 
bad faith.”). 
 113. Id.  In Stern, the shareholder also urged that the contributions in question 
resulted in “no benefit” to the corporation and, as such, amounted to corporate waste.  
Id.  However, the Stern court did not address these allegations because under New 
York law, “allegations of ‘waste,’ standing alone” are not sufficient to overcome the 
business judgment rule.  Id. 
 114. See id. at 477-78. 
 115. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979). 
 116. Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1956) (“As directors the defend-
ants did owe the corporation fiduciary duties not to waste or give away its assets.”). 
 117. Thanks to my colleague Gary Rosin, who first described waste to me in this 
manner.  See also John W. Murrey, III, Excessive Compensation in Publicly Held 
Corporations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 433, 
456-57 (2005) (urging that transfers can constitute waste even when directors made 
payment in good faith). 
    Some courts and commentators appear to disagree that there are two types of waste.  
To them, objective waste appears to be a way of proving bad faith.  That is to say, 
objective waste raises a rebuttable presumption of bad faith, which then    requires the 
court to inquire into the board’s motives.  See, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Meaningful 
Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
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occurred is a fact-specific question118 upon which the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of proof.119 
The remainder of this Part is divided into four sub-Parts.  Sub-Part A 
briefly explains the doctrine of corporate waste.  Sub-Part B critiques –       
and finds seriously lacking – William A. Nelson II’s argument that share-
holders could use the corporate waste doctrine to challenge corporate political 
contributions.  Sub-Part C attempts to rehabilitate Nelson’s proposal by fo-
cusing   on a key point that he fails to develop: that corporate political contri-
butions   differ substantially from corporate donations to charity.  Finally, 
sub-Part D briefly reviews the Delaware case law concerning the corporate 
waste doctrine. 
1.  The Objective Approach to Waste120 
When applying the objective approach to waste, a court focuses on the 
actual benefit to the corporation received from the transaction being chal-
 
REV. 421, 427 (2011) (criticizing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 
1971), and noting that under Sinclair, “a finding of waste is a necessary precondition 
for an examination of motive”); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 
1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996) (describing waste as “a theoretical exception” under which 
“some decisions may be so ‘egregious’” as to lead to liability – but then concluding 
that “to allege that a corporation has suffered a loss as a result of a lawful transaction, 
within the corporation’s powers, authorized by a corporate fiduciary acting                 
in a good faith pursuit of corporate purposes, does not state a claim for relief against 
that fiduciary no matter how foolish the investment may appear in retrospect.”) (em-
phasis omitted). 
    Ultimately, whether there are two types of waste turns on one’s understanding of 
the business judgment rule.  Some view the business judgment rule as having no hard 
floor, so that good faith business judgments by the board, no matter how substantively 
egregious, are absolutely protected.  See GEVURTZ, supra note 87, at 289-90; 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 115 (“inquiry into the rationality of a decision is a 
proxy for an inquiry into whether the decision was tainted by self-interest”).  On       
this view, objective waste is mere evidence of what is actually actionable – bad faith.  
Others recognize that, in rare instances, courts do review the substance of directors’ 
business decisions.  See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 301-02 (2007); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72,         
at 115. 
 118. Michelson, 407 A.2d at 243-44 (quoting Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240, 
243 (Del. Ch. 1954)). 
 119. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 906 A.2d 27, 74         
(Del. 2006). 
 120. The Delaware courts have regularly stated the standard for waste in object-
tive terms.  See infra Part IV.A.1.  However, in other states, such as New York,  
courts appear to hold that waste requires a finding of fraud or bad faith.  See         
Romiti, supra note 31, at 758 n.137 (citing Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 476 
(2d Cir. 1991)).  Such jurisdictions therefore seem to adopt a subjective-only       
approach to waste. 
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lenged.121  Under this objective approach, waste occurs when “no considera-
tion” is received for the transfer in question.122  Of course, if “no considera-
tion” were the extent of the test, the legal standard for waste would be so easy 
to circumvent as to be useless.123  Therefore, even if the corporation receives 
some infinitesimal benefit from the challenged transaction, courts nonetheless 
deem the deal to be waste if it was “so one sided that no business person of 
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received 
adequate consideration.”124  However, if “there is any substantial considera-
tion received by the corporation,”125 the transaction is not waste. 
Under this objective approach, waste is a claim that the transaction in 
question essentially destroyed corporate resources, because no person “in his 
right mind” would conclude that the transaction benefitted the corporation.126  
 
 121. See Brehm v. Eisner, 745 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Vo-
gelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. E.g., a gift of $1 billion in cash in return for no tangible or intangible      
benefit would be rendered permissible if some nearly worthless item – say, an eraser-
less nub of a sharpened-to-the-quick pencil – was exchanged for the cash.  See infra 
note 129 (distinguishing the test for objective waste from the “peppercorn standard” 
in contract law). 
 124. 746 A.2d at 263 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 
342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)).  In an alternative formulation, waste occurs when assets 
are exchanged for “consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the 
range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.”  Lewis v. Vogel-
stein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).  But “[i]f reasonable, informed minds might 
disagree” about whether the corporation received adequate consideration for the 
transaction, then the transaction is not waste.  Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 
183 (Del. Ch. 1993). 
 125. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (quoting Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336).  The full quote 
from Brehm underscores that there are two standards for waste, one objective and one 
subjective: “[A] corporate waste claim must fail if there is any substantial considera-
tion received by the corporation, and . . . there is a good faith judgment that in the 
circumstances the transaction is worthwhile.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Use of the word “and” here seems to imply that either a lack of “any substantial con-
sideration” or the board’s lack of a subjective belief that the transaction was in the 
best interest of the corporation would result in the transaction being deemed waste.  
See also id. at 264 (“Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or 
it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingre-
dient of the business judgment rule.”) (emphasis added). 
 126. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 2:17 n.17 (2012) (“[T]he funda-
mental basis for a waste claim must rest on the pleading of facts that show that the 
economics of the transaction were so flawed that no disinterested person of right mind 
and ordinary business judgment could think the transaction beneficial to the corpora-
tion.”) (citing Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 893 (Del. Ch. 1999)). 
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It is akin to a claim that the corporation simply burned its money.127  Viewed 
this way, waste is a transaction that is irrationally one-sided.128  For this    
reason, although “waste” is sometimes described as being akin to a “gift,” 
only a limited class of gifts meet the standard for waste: Only those gifts 
made for which there is no plausible reciprocal benefit to the corporation (no 
matter how uncertain or intangible), other than perhaps a mere token, truly 
constitute “waste.”129 
Of course, most business transactions involve at least some uncertainty.  
As a result, business decisions that appear to be net present value positive130 
when they are made can turn out to be big losers, costing the company mil-
lions but resulting in little or no income to the firm.131  Such disasters are not 
necessarily waste, though.  When deciding whether management has commit-
ted waste, courts look to facts at the time that management decided to enter 
the transaction.132  Hence, only bets that are irrational when made constitute 
objective waste. 
 
 127. It seems safe to assume that any heat or light that the corporation gained 
from burning cash would not approximate the market value of that money if it were 
spent rather than burned. 
 128. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multi-           
national Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 319 (1990) (“Under the doctrine      
of waste, corporate expenditures are invalid unless supported by some rational     
basis for concluding that the challenged corporate expenditure will in some way bene-
fit the corporation.”). 
 129. As such, waste is a more stringent standard than the contract law doctrine    
of consideration, which deems valid any vanishingly small consideration so long      
as the parties exchanged something of value.  See Haft v. Dart Grp. Corp., No. 13736, 
1994 WL 643185, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1994) (“The legal test of corporate     
waste is more demanding than a peppercorn standard; it asks whether any reasonable 
person could conclude, in the particular circumstances, that the exchange represented 
a fair exchange.”). 
 130. A “net present value” (NPV) analysis compares “the value of a dollar     
today to the value of that same dollar in the future, taking [projected] inflation and 
[expected] returns into account.”  Net Present Value – NPV, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp (last visited June 11, 2014).                 
If the NPV of a potential investment is projected to be positive “it should be accept-
ed”; if the NPV is projected to be negative, the investment “should probably be   
rejected.”  Id. 
 131. E.g., a big-budget movie that costs $100 million to make and brings in $10 
million at the box office. 
 132. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“If . . . there is 
any substantial consideration received by the corporation . . . there should be no find-
ing of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex post that the transaction was 
unreasonably risky.”); Leung v. Schuler, No. 17089, 2000 WL 264328, at *10 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 29, 2000) (“[E]ven if the . . . facts . . . show that in hindsight the considera-
tion was inadequate, that alone will not satisfy the waste standard.”). 
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Objective waste is therefore an extremely difficult standard for a deriva-
tive plaintiff to satisfy.133  It will only be proved “in the rare, ‘unconscionable 
case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.’”134  
Indeed, one prominent jurist has compared the successful waste case to the 
oft-discussed but probably non-existent beast of Scottish legend: the Loch 
Ness Monster.135 
That said, the objective approach to waste provides (at least in theory136) 
a lower limit to the protections of the business judgment rule.137  In applying 
the rule, courts will uphold the board’s good faith business judgments only so 
 
 133. See Kates v. Beard Research, Inc., No. 1480-VCP, 2010 WL 1644176, *5 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“the standard for corporate waste [is] onerous, stringent, extremely 
high, and very rarely satisfied”); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are 
There In Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (2010) (describing the “irra-
tionality or waste” standard as the “most deferential standard of all” in corporate law); 
Hill & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 837 (describing the waste standard as “extremely 
hard for . . . plaintiffs to meet”). 
 134. Disney I, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 263 (Del. 2000)). 
 135. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 
1995) (Allen, Chancellor) (“[T]he waste theory represents a theoretical exception . . . 
very rarely encountered in the world of real transactions.  There surely are cases of 
fraud; of unfair self-dealing and, much more rarely negligence.  But rarest of all – and 
indeed, like Nessie, possibly non-existent – would be the case of disinterested busi-
ness people making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the legal stand-
ard of waste!”); see also Steven C. Caywood, Note, Wasting the Corporate Waste 
Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive 
Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 115 (2010) (describing the corpo-
rate waste standard as “impossibly high”). 
 136. The Delaware Supreme Court has “not foreclose[d] the possibility” that a 
plaintiff could successfully make out a claim for waste.  Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.  
However, the Delaware courts have rarely if ever held any directors liable for waste, 
absent a conflict of interest.  See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 
1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996) (observing that the “theoretical exception” of waste “has 
resulted in no awards of money judgments against corporate officers or directors” in 
Delaware).  Many years ago, a Delaware court might reject retirement benefits for a 
retiring CEO as waste because such benefits constituted additional compensation for 
services already rendered and paid.  See, e.g., Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92 
A.2d 311, 320-21 (Del. Ch. 1952) (voiding “consulting” contract with former presi-
dent intended as compensation for “services previously rendered” as waste).  Howev-
er, such retirement packages are now upheld if not unreasonable.  See Seinfeld v. 
Slager, No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012) (citing 
Fidanque, 92 A.2d at 320-21). 
 137. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Irrationality is the outer limit of the business 
judgment rule.”); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[T]he 
doctrine of waste is a residual protection . . . that polices the outer boundaries of the 
broad . . . discretion afforded directors by the business judgment rule.”). 
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long as they are rational.138  Utterly irrational board decisions, even if subjec-
tively intended to benefit the corporation, are not protected by the business 
judgment rule.139 
2.  The Subjective Approach to Waste 
The subjective approach to waste focuses on the directors’ motivations 
for engaging in the transaction in question, rather than the actual benefit re-
ceived from the transaction.  To use the subjective approach, a derivative 
plaintiff must show that the transaction “cannot be ‘attributed to any rational 
business purpose,’”140 or was “a transfer of corporate assets that serves no 
corporate purpose”141 or “the diversion of corporate assets for improper or 
unnecessary purposes.”142  On this view, waste is a “vestige” of the tradition-
al doctrine of ultra vires (i.e., “beyond the powers”), which prevents a corpo-
ration from acts that deviate from the purpose stated in its charter.143  Like 
objective waste, subjective waste is nearly impossible to prove.144 
3.  Waste is a Breach of the Duty of Loyalty 
Under both the objective and subjective approaches, it seems, waste is 
an act of bad faith.145  Subjective waste constitutes bad faith because it in-
 
 138. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122     
(Del. 2006). 
 139. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 115 (describing the “supposed[] . . . in-
credible stupidity” exception to the business judgment rule) (discussing Litwin v. 
Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 685 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1940)).  But see id. (criticizing this view 
of Litwin, doubting that some decisions are “so dumb” as to not be protected by the 
business judgment rule).  See also Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 
663-64 (Del. 1952) (gift of corporate assets can be challenged as waste even when 
directors honestly believed that gift was made in the best interests of the corporation). 
 140. Disney I, 906 A.2d at 74 (“This onerous standard for waste is a corollary of 
the proposition that where business judgment presumptions are applicable, the 
board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business 
purpose.’”) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
 141. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 142. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979). 
 143. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 896 n.62 (Del.          
Ch. 1999). 
 144. See supra note 135. 
 145. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693, 749 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (“The Delaware Supreme Court has implicitly held that committing 
waste is an act of bad faith.”) (citing White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553-55 (Del. 
2001)), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  However, it has been persuasively argued that 
the issue of whether waste constitutes bad faith is “still not definitively settled.”  Ja-
mie L. Kastler, Note, The Problem with Waste: Delaware’s Lenient Treatment of 
Waste Claims at the Demand Stage of Derivative Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1899, 
1913 (2011). 
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volves acting without regard to or contrary to the best interests of the corpora-
tion.146  By contrast, objective waste raises an inference of bad faith due to 
the utter irrationality of the transaction at issue.147  Either way, since acts in 
bad faith constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty,148 waste apparently consti-
tutes a breach of a director’s duty of loyalty.149 
4.  When Does a Waste Claim “Succeed”? 
Waste, under the standards set forth above, seems nearly impossible to 
prove.  But this does not mean all waste claims fail at the motion to dismiss 
stage.  To the contrary: Even under this exacting standard, it appears that 
twenty-nine percent of waste claims brought in Delaware during the twentieth 
century survived an initial legal challenge such as a motion to dismiss.150  
 
 146. See Disney I, 907 A.2d at 67 (explaining that bad faith exists when a “fiduci-
ary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of 
the corporation”) (emphasis added). 
 147. See White, 783 A.2d at 554 n.36 (“The standards for corporate waste and bad 
faith . . . are similar.  To prevail on a waste claim or a bad faith claim, the plaintiff 
must overcome the general presumption of good faith by showing that the board’s 
decision was so . . . irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment 
of the corporation’s best interests.”).  It therefore seems that the Delaware courts view 
waste as a proxy for bad faith.  See Robert B. Thompson, The Short, But Interesting 
Life of Good Faith As An Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 
545 (2010/11) (describing waste as an example of a “fail-safe mechanism” by which 
courts can intervene if a challenged substantive decision is “sufficiently beyond the 
pale” – allowing courts to find directors liable “where direct proof of disloyalty . . . is 
absent, but the substantive decision seems explainable only as a product of the direc-
tors’ failure to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities”).  But see Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Does Irrationality = Bad Faith?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 27, 
2009), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/04/does-
irrationality-bad-faith.html (urging that irrationality is a proxy for self-interest). 
 148. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he requirement to act 
in good faith is a subsidiary element, i.e., a condition, of the fundamental duty of 
loyalty . . . .  [Upon a] showing of bad faith conduct, . . . the fiduciary duty violated 
by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. If objective waste constitutes bad faith, then good faith is not an entirely 
subjective standard, contrary to the views of an eminent Delaware jurist and his co-
authors, and must have a subjective component as other scholars have contended.  
Compare Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (arguing that good faith is purely 
subjective in nature), with Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate 
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (arguing that good faith must have an objective 
component).  The nature of good faith is beyond the scope of this Article and is ad-
dressed elsewhere.  See Leahy, supra note 43, at __. 
 150. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 141 (summarizing empirical study that exam-
ined Delaware shareholder derivative suits filed between 1912 and 2000, and con-
cluded that, in twenty-nine percent of cases, the claim survived a motion to dismiss 
for failure to make demand or for failure to state a claim, or survived a summary 
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Indeed, a recent student note expresses concern that the Delaware Court of 
Chancery is too lenient in waste cases, allowing them to regularly survive 
beyond the motion to dismiss phase.151 
But even if the Chancery Court has gone soft on waste, is surviving a 
motion to dismiss “victory”?  Perhaps in cases where the complaint alleges 
massive damages, because the defendant board might settle just to avoid even 
the remote possibility of a large judgment.  However, such settlement seems 
unlikely in suits challenging political contributions because of the small 
stakes involved.  A single contribution might only cost the company tens or 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, or perhaps a million dollars at most.  This is 
chump change for the directors of a public company, who are paid around 
$200,000 per year for each board on which they sit.152  Even if a board were 
required to pay a non-indemnified million-dollar verdict, splitting it would 
mean that each director would probably pay less than a typical yearly country 
club fee.  Moreover, it is essentially impossible to win a waste claim on the 
merits after trial.153 
Accordingly, the key question to be asked by a shareholder and her at-
torney in evaluating whether to challenge a corporate political contribution 
under the waste standard is: Can we actually win?  In a lawsuit where the 
actual recovery by the corporation might be limited, surviving a motion to 
dismiss will be a largely symbolic victory, even if the lawsuit results in a 
small settlement.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers are unlikely to expend substantial time 
and effort on a lawsuit for minimal compensation. 
B.  Nelson’s Arguments for Waste and a Critique Thereof 
The first derivative suit advocate, William A. Nelson II, urges that 
“shareholders can use derivative claims of corporate waste to challenge inde-
pendent political expenditures that they believe are detrimental to the corpo-
 
judgment motion, or prevailed at trial or on appeal) (discussing Randall S. Thomas & 
Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility, 79 
WASH. U. L. REV. 569, 608 (2001)). 
 151. See Kastler, supra note 145, at 1914. 
 152. See SERDAR SIKCA, FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC., 2012 DIRECTOR 
COMPENSATION REPORT: NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION ACROSS 
INDUSTRIES AND SIZE 1 (2012), available at http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/ 
2012_Directors_Compensation_Report_NonEmployee_Director_Compensation_Acr
oss_Industries_and_Size.pdf (median 2012 director compensation was $178,000 at 
mid-cap public companies and $229,000 at large-cap public companies). 
 153. Apparently, no pure waste claim has ever resulted in a money judgment in 
the Delaware courts.  See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (contending that waste claims which include no serious allegation of 
a conflict of interest have “resulted in no awards of money judgments” and only one 
“dubious” order for equitable relief in Delaware).  That is to say, the only successful 
claims of waste have been levied at conflicted directors.  See, e.g., Fidanque v. Am. 
Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
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ration.”154  In so doing, Nelson addresses both the subjective and objective 
theories of waste.155  He contends that shareholders should argue that corpo-
rate political contributions constitute waste because they (1) “are in effect 
corporate gifts,” but “are not charitable”; (2) “damage the corporation and 
decrease shareholder return”; and (3) “serve no corporate purpose.”156  Let us 
explore each argument in turn. 
1.  Corporate Gifts, but Not Charitable? 
Certainly a political contribution is a “gift” in common parlance.  After 
all, political contributions cannot be a specific bargained-for exchange – i.e., 
a quid pro quo – because that would constitute an illegal bribe.157  As such, 
there is no “consideration,” in the contractual sense of the word,158 for a polit-
ical contribution.  Thus, Nelson, advancing the objective theory, urges that 
courts might strike down corporate political contributions as “gift[s] . . . com-
pletely unsupported by consideration” – in other words, payments that are “so 
 
 154. Nelson, supra note 31, at 137.  The second author, law student Jonathan 
Romiti, also briefly argues that political contributions might constitute waste, in that 
they are unjustified risks.  See Romiti, supra note 31, at 770 (asserting that “the pos-
sibility of favorable business policies” flowing from contributions are “an illusory 
return” that “would almost never justify” spending corporate funds in “any other 
business setting”); id. at 771 (describing a corporate political contribution as “a lot-
tery ticket” that “carries extremely remote chances of paying out a tangible return” 
and “a significant risk of inflicting damage to that company’s reputation”).  Although 
it is certainly possible that the costs of corporate political contributions greatly out-
weigh the benefits, Romiti offers no empirical support for such a conclusion.  More 
importantly, a business decision does not constitute waste simply because it fails a 
cost/benefit analysis.  Rather, the transaction must be objectively irrational or subjec-
tively without any corporate purpose.  See supra Part IV.A.1 & 2 (describing objec-
tive and subjective waste standards). 
 155. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 155, 164. 
 156. Id. at 155. 
 157. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1013 
(4th Cir. 1998) (“A bribe requires that the payment be made . . . with . . . the intent to 
receive a specific benefit in return for the payment.  In other words, the payor of a 
bribe must intend to engage in some more or less specific quid pro quo with the offi-
cial who receives the payment.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see, 
e.g., Andrew Harris, Rod Blagojevich, on Stand, Denies Charges in Chicago Trial, 
BLOOMBERG (May 26, 2011, 7:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-
26/rod-blagojevich-takes-witness-stand-in-second-chicago-corruption-trial.html (de-
scribing man who was solicited to make a $100,000 campaign contribution to Rod 
Blagojevich, Governor of Illinois, in exchange for Blagojevich signing a 2008 law “to 
divert casino revenues to the horse racing industry”). 
 158. A valid contract requires consideration – that is, “a bargained-for exchange 
of promises or performance.”  In re Vargas Realty Enterprises, Inc. 440 B.R. 224, 
236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Ferguson v. Lion Holdings, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 
484, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
29
Leahy: Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
312 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
unreasonably disproportionate to the benefits created by the exchange that a 
reasonable person would think the corporation did not receive any benefit.”159 
But not all corporate “gifts” constitute waste.  As Nelson recognizes, 
corporate donations to charity are authorized by statute in every state.160  
Courts typically uphold such donations if they are “within reasonable limits 
both as to amount and purpose”161 and “designed to assure a present or fore-
seeable future benefit to the corporation.”162  Further, as Nelson acknowledg-
es, the expected benefit to the corporation need not be direct.163  Moreover, 
while many charitable donations may result in an indirect benefit to the cor-
porate donor, some donations do not.164  Many states nonetheless permit cor-
porations to make such donations, irrespective of any benefit to the corpora-
tion.165  Thus, in many jurisdictions it is perfectly legal for a corporation to 
literally give away property to charity without receiving anything in return – 
a rare departure from the profit maximization norm.166 
Hence, Nelson’s real problem with political contributions seems not to 
be that they are “gifts” in common parlance, but rather that they are different 
from gifts to charity, which courts have upheld.  He maintains that political 
contributions are not like charitable donations because they “are not made for 
the purpose of benefitting the community” and “do not generate good will” 
(as charitable donations do).167  Nelson offers three basic reasons in support 
of these contentions. 
 
 159. Nelson, supra note 31, at 159 (citing Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 
1461 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 160. See id. at 141 (including, as an example, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §           
122(9) (2010)). 
 161. Id. at 144 (quoting Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d        
398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969)); see also infra notes 430-435 and accompanying text   
(discussing Henderson). 
 162. Nelson, supra note 31, at 159 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trs., Inc., 329 
P.2d 398, 402 (Utah 1958)). 
 163. See id. at 144 (quoting Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405 (reasoning that lost in-
come due to a charitable donation was “far out-weighed by the overall benefits” of 
such gift, which, “by benefit[ting] those in need,” providing “justification for large 
private holdings, thereby benefiting plaintiff in the long run.”)). 
 164. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reap-
praisal of Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 967-68 
(1999) (describing three different types of charitable donations). 
 165. See Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder 
Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745, 765 (2000); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: 
Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 579, 603 (1997).  But see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 436 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that “the principles of [Dodge] arguably 
require that corporate philanthropy redound to the corporation’s benefit”). 
 166. See Kahn, supra note 165, at 604-05. 
 167. Nelson, supra note 31, at 160. 
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/2
2014] CORPORATE SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS 313 
a.  Goodwill: The Disclosure Straw Man 
First, Nelson argues that corporations cannot justify corporate political 
contributions as generating goodwill because they often are not reported to 
shareholders or the public.168  This argument is a “straw man,” because under 
the current regulatory regime corporations could easily disclose any or all-
political contributions.  Better yet (from a public relations perspective), cor-
porations could cherry pick and disclose only the contributions that seem 
most likely to generate goodwill among the corporation’s customers and in its 
community and decline to disclose contributions that would destroy (or at 
least fail to enhance) goodwill.  In any event, this argument could soon be 
mooted, at least for publicly traded corporations, if the SEC promulgates reg-
ulations that require that reporting companies disclose some or all political 
contributions.169 
b.  Goodwill: The Target Corporation/MN Forward Debacle 
Second, Nelson posits that (assuming disclosure) charitable donations 
arguably generate goodwill while corporate political contributions do not.170  
Nelson offers no factual support for this argument.  Rather, he argues that 
there are no cases stating that the failure of a corporation to make corporate 
political contributions will result in a loss of goodwill.171 
This argument fails both as a matter of logic and as a matter of history.  
Logically, the absence of affirmative evidence of a fact is not conclusive evi-
dence of the absence of the fact, unless there is good reason to believe that the 
 
 168. Id. at 162. 
 169. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text. 
 170. Romiti makes a similar argument.  See Romiti, supra note 31, at 770 n.221 
(arguing that “corporate political contributions are easily distinguishable from corpo-
rate donations to charity” because, if Target Corporation had contributed “to the 
American Red Cross rather than MN Forward, it is highly unlikely that its customers 
would have boycotted Target’s stores”).  But Romiti’s argument compares apples and 
oranges: a non-controversial charitable organization (the Red Cross) and a controver-
sial political action committee (MN Forward).  Comparing apples to apples would 
require substituting a controversial non-profit organization, such the National Organi-
zation for Marriage Education Fund (NOMEF), which that opposes gay marriage, for 
the Red Cross.  If Target Corporation contributed a huge sum to NOMEF in 2010, 
and the contribution was disclosed, there is little doubt that customers would have 
boycotted Target stores just as they did after Target contributed to MN Forward.  
Thus, it the Target/MN Forward debacle clearly counsels against making any contro-
versial contribution, whether to a charity or to a political action committee. 
 171. Nelson, supra note 31, at 162 (arguing that one court has recognized that “a 
refusal to make charitable donations ‘might bring on the loss of the good will of the 
community . . . [if] other businesses make donations for worthy causes,’” while “no 
case” stating that a lack of corporate political contributions will cause a corporation to 
lose goodwill) (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 87 S.E.2d 139, 
149 (Va. 1955)). 
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fact would necessarily have revealed itself if it existed.172  This is known as 
the “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” or “argument from igno-
rance” logical fallacy.173 
Further, there is good reason to believe that courts simply have had      
no occasion to address whether corporate political contributions generate 
goodwill in the community.  Corporations have been prohibited from mak- 
ing direct political contributions to candidates for over 100 years,174 and for   
a decade before the Supreme Court decided Citizens United corporations 
were prohibited from making independent expenditures.  As a result,           
the flood of corporate money in political campaigns to which progres-     
sives object apparently post-dates Citizens United.175  Hence, modern courts 
simply have not had many opportunities to pass on the validity of corporate 
political contributions. 
In addition, Nelson’s argument seems to be based on a worst-case     
scenario, where a corporation makes an absolutely dunderheaded political 
contribution.  The key example that Nelson proffers in support of his argu-
ment that corporate political contributions do not generate goodwill – Target 
Corporation’s 2010 donation of $150,000 to a Super PAC called MN For-
ward176 – might actually be, in retrospect, the most shortsighted corporate 
political contribution in recent history.  The Target contribution to MN    
Forward – which, in turn, ran TV ads in support of Republican candidate 
Tom Emmer, a conservative legislator running for governor of Minn-       
esota177 – generated enormous controversy among supporters of same-sex 
marriage due to Emmer’s staunch opposition to same-sex marriage.178  (Min-
nesota-based Target was required to disclose the contribution under the 
 
 172. E.g., one cannot logically conclude that “none of my friends eat oatmeal for 
breakfast” simply based on the mere fact that none of one’s friends have said that they 
eat oatmeal for breakfast, unless one regularly discusses breakfast choices with one’s 
friends.  See also, e.g., J.P. MORELAND & W.L. CRAIG, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
FOR A CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW 157 (2003) (explaining that “the failure to observe” an 
elephant nearby is a “good reason to think that there is no elephant” present, but the 
failure to observe a flea nearby is not good evidence that there is no flea present, 
because we would expect to see an elephant but not a flea). 
 173. See id. at 156-57. 
 174. See supra note 3. 
 175. See Michael Beckel & Megan R. Wilson, BREAKING: Election 2010 Out-
side Political Spending Officially Eclipses Such Expenditures from 2004 Cycle, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Oct. 28, 2010), https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
news/2010/10/breaking-outside- spending-this-seas.html. 
 176. Cf. Romiti, supra note 31, at 744-45 (describing Target contribution gener-
ously as a “gamble”). 
 177. Nelson, supra note 31, at 156. 
 178. See id.; see also Romiti, supra note 31, at 742-43 (discussing the Target 
contribution). 
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state’s “nation-leading” disclosure law.179)  The fallout from the MN Forward 
donation included calls for boycotts of Target stores nationwide.180  The val-
ue of Target’s stock also plummeted.181 
But Nelson fails to point out that Emmer (specifically) and opposition to 
same-sex marriage (generally) turned out to be particularly bad bets for Tar-
get to make in Minnesota at that time.  Although Emmer only lost the 2010 
Minnesota governor’s election to Democrat Mark Dayton182 by 8,700 
votes,183 each man garnered less than forty-four percent of the vote due to a 
third-party candidate, Tom Horner, who won nearly twelve percent of the 
votes that year.184  Horner, a well-known former moderate Republican, was a 
serious candidate from the outset, with endorsements from prominent Repub-
licans, Democrats and major newspapers.185  This was largely because Em-
mer – a “bombastic, ultraconservative”186 – was far too conservative for many 
Minnesota Republicans and independents, while Dayton was extremely liber-
al even by Minnesota’s standards.187  In short, Emmer was such a bad candi-
 
 179. See Taren Kingser & Patrick Schmidt, Business in the Bulls-Eye? Tar-       
get Corp. and the Limits of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 11 ELECTION L.J. 21,     
24-25 (2012). 
 180. See id. at 28; Nelson, supra note 31, at 156; Romiti, supra note 31, at 742-
43, n.35. 
 181. See Romiti, supra note 31, at 744 (Target lost $1.3 billion in market capitali-
zation shortly after the debacle). 
 182. Ironically, Target, originally named Dayton Dry Goods Company (and later 
the Dayton Hudson Corporation) was founded George Nelson Dayton, Mark Day-
ton’s great-grandfather.  The financial success of Target and its sister department 
store, Neiman Marcus (formerly Dayton’s) is the source of Mark Dayton’s own for-
tune. 
 183. Elizabeth Dunbar & Tom Scheck, Mark Dayton Declared Winner, Finally, 
MPRNEWS.COM (Dec. 8, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/ 
12/08/emmer-recount-concession. 
 184. See Statewide Results for Governor, MINN. SECRETARY OF ST., 
http://minnesotaelectionresults.sos.state.mn.us/20101102/ElecRslts.asp?M=S&Races
=0331 (last visited June 13, 2014). 
 185. Horner was endorsed by three of Minnesota’s five living ex-govern-          
ors, including two moderate Republicans; the Democratic party’s U.S. Senate candi-
date from 2008; and several major newspapers, including the Minneapolis            
Star-Tribune, the state’s most widely-subscribed (and probably its most influential) 
daily paper.   See Tom Horner, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Horner 
(last visited June13, 2014) (explaining that Horner, the Independence Party candi-
date, was endorsed by “two former Republican Governors, Arne Carlson and Al Quie 
. . . DFL U.S. Senate candidate Mike Ciresi . . . , the Star Tribune, and the Duluth 
News Tribune.”). 
 186. Editorial: Tom Horner for Governor, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE (Oct.    
20, 2010, 2:10 PM), http://www.startribune.com/opinion/editorials/105067929. 
html?refer=y. 
 187. See, e.g., Bill Salisbury, Dayton, Emmer, Horner Give Minnesota Voters 3 
Distinct Choices for Governor, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 12, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.twincities.com/ci_15748757. 
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date that thousands of Minnesotans who identified as Republican voted for a 
third-party candidate (which was by no means unprecedented in a Minnesota 
gubernatorial race188), and he lost to a Democrat who might not have won 
state-wide office if the Republicans had offered a palatable alternative.  In-
deed, Emmer lost despite that 2010 was otherwise a historically good year for 
Republicans in Minnesota: the party gained control of both houses of the 
Minnesota Legislature for the first time since 1972!189 
Supporting Emmer was not the real problem for Target, however.  Even 
worse was Target’s apparent failure to read the prevailing winds – both in 
Minnesota and nationally – concerning same-sex marriage.  In 2011 – just 
months after Target’s donation to MN Forward – the Republican-led Minne-
sota legislature adopted a constitutional amendment that would have banned 
recognition of same-sex marriage in the state if subsequently approved by 
voters.190  However, when the matter was put to a vote in November 2012, 
Minnesotans rejected the amendment, 52.6 percent to 47.4 percent.191  At the 
same time, Minnesota voters swept the unpopular Republican majorities out 
of the state legislature after just one term, giving Democrats full control of 
state government – both houses and the governor’s office – for the first time 
in twenty-two years.192  Then, in May 2013, Governor Dayton signed a bill, 
passed by the majority-Democrat legislature, making Minnesota only the 
twelfth state to legalize gay marriage.193  These changes in Minnesota were 
part of a wave of legislation and ballot initiatives legalizing same-sex mar-
riage that swept across the country starting in 2009 (when Vermont became 
 
 188. Just twelve years earlier, in 1998, Jesse Ventura, a former professional wres-
tler, the Reform Party candidate, “narrowly and unexpectedly” defeated both the 
Democratic and Republican candidates for governor.  See Pam Belluck, The 1998 
Elections: The States – The Maverick; A “Bad Boy” Wrestler’s Unscripted Upset, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/05/us/the-1998-
elections-the-states-the-maverick-a-bad-boy-wrestler-s-unscripted-upset.html?page 
wanted=1; see also Election 98 Ex-Wrestler Elected Governor, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Nov. 4, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 2859558. 
 189. See Martiga Lohn, GOP Takes Over Minn. Legislature After 38 Years, 
MPRNEWS.COM (Nov. 3, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/ 
11/03/minnesota-legislature. 
 190. See Tom Scheck, Minn. Senate OKs Same-Sex Marriage Ban Amendment, 
MPRNEWS.COM (May 11, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/ 
05/11/same-sex-marriage-senate. 
 191. 2012 Minnesota Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico. 
com/2012-election/results/ballot-measures/minnesota/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 192. See Jennifer Brooks, DFLers End GOP Control in Legislature After Two 
Years, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://www.startrib-
une.com/politics/statelocal/177543791.html?refer=y; Bill Salisbury, Minnesota Legis-
lature: Democrats Regain Control, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 7, 2012, 12:01 
AM), http://www.twincities.com/ci_21946122/. 
 193. See Baird Helgeson, Minnesota Ushers in Gay Marriage, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIBUNE (May 15, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/ 
statelocal/207479871.html?refer=y. 
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the first state to enact same-sex marriage into law without a prior judicial 
decision),194 and accelerating in November 2012 (when three states enacted 
same-sex marriage into law in a single month).195  Popular support for gay 
marriage also swelled: By May 2013, for the first time, more than half of the 
country supported legalization of gay marriage.196  In 2013 courts became 
caught up in the tidal wave: In June 2013 the Supreme Court issued two “ma-
jor victories” for advocates of same-sex marriage.197  After (and based upon) 
the Supreme Court’s decision, state and federal courts began to strike down 
bans on same-sex marriage with increasing regularity.198  As a result, alt-
 
 194. Vermont enacted a law providing for gay marriage in 2009.  See Abby 
Goudnough, Gay Rights Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/08vermont.html?_r=0. 
 195. In November 2012, voters in Maine, Maryland, and Washington approved 
same-sex marriage via ballot initiatives.  See Ashley Fetters, Same-Sex Marriage 
Wins on the Ballot for the First Time in American History, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 7, 
2012, 8:37 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/11/same-sex-mar-
riage-wins-on-the-ballot-for-the-first-time-in-american-history/264704/.  Rhode Is-
land and Delaware enacted laws providing for same-sex marriage in May 2013.  See 
Doug Denison, Delaware Becomes 11th State with Gay Marriage, USA TODAY (May 
7, 2013, 9:33 PM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/07/delaware-
gay-marriage/2142703/.  The New Jersey legislature also passed a bill to legalize gay 
marriage in 2012, but Governor Chris Christie vetoed that bill.  See Kate Zernike, 
Christie Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/christie-vetoes-gay-marriage-
bill.html?_r=0. 
 196. See Drew DeSilver, Supreme Court’s DOMA Ruling Comes as Majority  
Now Supports Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2013), http://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/26/supreme-courts-doma-ruling-comes-as-major-
ity-now-supports-same-sex-marriage/ (“A Pew Research Center survey in May found 
that for the first time, more than half (51%) of Americans favored allowing gay men 
and lesbians to marry.”).  This sort of wide-spread political support for gay marriage 
seemed unthinkable just five years earlier when the case against the California ban 
was filed.  At that time, only three states had legalized same-sex marriage and “public 
support of marriage equality was in the high 30s or low 40s.”  Adam Nagourney, 
Court Follows Nation’s Lead, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/06/27/us/politics/with-gay-marriage-a-tide-of-public-opinion-that-swept-
past-the-court.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Chad H. Griffin). 
 197. First, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the parts of the Defense      
of Marriage Act of 1996 that prohibited married same-sex couples from receiving   
the same benefits as married opposite-sex couples. See Adam Liptak, Supreme    
Court Bolsters Gay Marriage with Two Major Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,     
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-gay-marriage. 
html?ref=politics.  Second, the Court declined to decide an appeal from a lower court 
decision that struck down California’s ban on same-sex marriage, thereby effectively 
allowing same-sex marriages in California.  See id. 
 198. Prior to 2013, courts in four states – Massachusetts, California, Iowa and 
Connecticut – had held that prohibiting gay marriage was unconstitutional.  See States 
that Allow Same-Sex Marriage, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx.  Califor-
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hough opposition to gay marriage remains high among social conservatives – 
and (as of this writing) it is still outlawed in thirty-one states199 – if the 
aforementioned bans are all upheld, more than half of the nation’s population 
will live in states where gay marriage is legal.200 
Hence, Nelson’s use of the Target example, while a good cautionary tale 
for boards of directors, probably says little about whether political contribu-
tions are inherently unable to generate goodwill, for several reasons.  First, 
since the backlash against Target occurred because the company made the 
wrong donation at the wrong time in Minnesota politics, there is no reason to 
believe that a well-considered donation would result in the same negative 
publicity.  For example, if Target were headquartered in Utah and made a 
donation to Republican Mitt Romney, a Mormon, in the 2012 presidential 
election, Target presumably would have suffered little or no bad publicity in 
Utah – despite that Romney lost the election – because Romney won Utah by 
a wide margin and Utah is approximately sixty-percent Mormon.201  What’s 
more, if a hypothetical Utah-based Target had donated to the 2012 campaign 
for incumbent Republican governor Gary Herbert – who crushed his Demo-
 
nia’s decision was overturned by a constitutional amendment that was struck down by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013.  See Liptak, supra note 197.  Then, in September 
2013, a New Jersey state court struck down that state’s ban on gay marriage.  See 
Kate Zernike & Marc Santora, Judge Orders New Jersey to Allow Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/nyregion/new-
jersey-judge-rules-state-must-allow-gay-marriage.html.  Since that time, judges in 
eight other states – New Mexico, Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Virginia, Texas, Pennsyl-
vania and Oregon – have struck down state prohibitions on gay marriage as unconsti-
tutional.  See Manny Fernandez, U.S. Judge Strikes Down Texas Ban on Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/us/texas-
judge-strikes-down-state-ban-on-same-sex-marriage.html?hpw&rref=us; Kirk John-
son, Federal Judge Strikes Down Oregon’s Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/federal-judge-strikes-down-
oregons-ban-on-same-sex-marriage.html.  The rulings in several states were stayed 
pending appeal.  The attorney generals of some states, including Pennsylvania and 
Oregon, did not appeal, allowing the rulings to take immediate effect.  See Trip Ga-
briel, Pennsylvania Governor Won’t Fight Ruling That Allows Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/us/pennsylvania-
governor-will-not-appeal-same-sex-marriage-ruling.html?hpw&rref=us&_r=0. 
 199. See Gabriel, supra note 198; Sophia Pearson & Erik Larson, Pennsylvania 
Gay Marriage Ban Thrown Out as Divide Evens, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2014, 11:01 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-20/pennsylvania-gay-marriage-ban-
tossed-as-states-now-evenly-split.html. 
 200. Phillip Bump, If Texas’s Ban Falls, Over 49 Percent of Gay Americans Will 
Be Able to Legally Marry, WIRE.COM (Feb. 26, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www. 
thewire.com/politics/2014/02/if-texas-ban-falls-over-49-percent-gay-americans-will-
be-able-legally-marry/358572/. 
 201. See Matt Canham, Census: Share of Utah’s Mormon residents holds steady, 
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Apr. 17, 2012, 2:25 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/ 
home3/53909710-200/population-lds-county-utah.html.csp. 
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cratic Party opponent Peter Cooke 68% to 28% in the 2012 election202 – then 
it seems plausible that the company might have even gained some goodwill.  
In short, Target’s donation in support of a controversial loser (Emmer) teach-
es little about the wisdom of contributing to an uncontroversial loser (Rom-
ney) or a big winner (Herbert).  In both of the latter situations, a gain in 
goodwill is plausible. 
Second, because the fallout of Target’s decision to support MN Forward 
was national in scope, the situation might have turned out differently – and 
less negatively for Target – if the company ran a different type of store, cater-
ing to a different type of clientele.  As the nation’s second-largest general 
merchandise retailer or discount retailer (after Wal-Mart)203 with a large me-
dia presence, Target presumably appeals to customers from all walks of life.  
People who shop at Target presumably vote for both major parties, Republi-
can and Democrat, and hold a wide range of political views.  As a retailer 
catering to a diverse group of people, Target would be wise not to take public 
positions that would offend perhaps half of its customers.204  However, if 
Target were instead a different type of corporation that catered to a narrower 
band of people – most or all of whom tended to be conservative or at least 
vote Republican – then there is no reason to believe that donating to Emmer 
would have caused Target to lose any goodwill among the people who matter 
most: its customers.205  What’s more, even among retailers, Target was par-
ticularly vulnerable to boycotts due to Minnesota’s “civically engaged pub-
lic”; the fact that “Target had positioned itself as a progressive company” in 
the past and because “[c]ompared to its more down-market competitor, Wal-
 
 202. See Utah Election Results: Governor, UTAH.GOV, http://www.electionresults. 
utah.gov/xmlData/300300.html (last visited June 14, 2014). 
 203. Abram Brown, Wal-Mart: A Business Slump at the World’s Largest Retailer, 
FORBES (May 16, 2013, 8:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/ 
2013/05/16/wal-mart-a-business-slump-at-the-worlds-largest-retailer/. 
 204. See Edward Lotterman, Target’s Politics May Sink to the Bottom Line, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.twincities.com/business/ 
ci_15642678 (Economist Lotterman notes “[n]ot offending the public is more critical 
for retailers than for any other business . . . .  If [customers’] first reaction to the word 
‘Target’ is ‘anti-gay’. . . it is easy to buy one’s toilet paper somewhere else.  Avoiding 
unnecessary public controversy and not taking actions that might compromise one’s 
brand identity are basic principles in marketing.  Public relations experts know and 
teach that consumer reactions to political stances are asymmetric.  They tend to repel 
those who disagree with the stance much more than they attract those who agree.”). 
 205. See Tom Hamburger & Jennifer Martinez, Target Feels Backlash from 
Shareholders, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/ 
19/nation/la-na-target-share holders-20100820 (summarizing opinion of Tara Malloy 
of the Campaign Legal Center that the Target debacle will not necessarily reduce 
corporate campaign contributions by “[e]nergy companies and defense contractors” 
who “have less interaction with the public [and] won’t be subject to the same kind of 
pressure as retailers”). 
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Mart, Target’s market segment has long been higher income customers who 
tend to be more socially aware in their shopping decisions.”206 
Third, the negative publicity and boycotts that Target faced may simply 
have been a matter of bad timing, as Target was the first major Minnesota 
company to disclose its contributions after the state’s new disclosure law 
went into effect in 2010.  In fact, several other prominent Minnesota corpora-
tions – including well-known consumer products companies like 3M and Best 
Buy – gave large sums to MN Forward in 2010, but did not face any of the 
same backlash that Target faced.207 
Ironically, Target’s conduct since 2010 shows precisely why Nelson is 
wrong to argue that corporate political contributions are inherently bad for 
corporations.  Nelson’s argument that political contributions are inherently 
bad for corporations is, at bottom, an argument that corporations should never 
take public stances on political issues.  Yet, since 2010, Target has publicly 
promoted same-sex marriage.  In 2012 alone, the company created a media 
stir by running an ad for its online marriage registry featuring a same-sex 
couple, sold t-shirts on its website to benefit an organization that publicly 
opposed the constitutional amendment that would have banned gay marriage 
in Minnesota, and sold same-sex marriage themed greeting cards in its 
stores.208  While these activities were not corporate political contributions, 
they were clearly intended to show that “Target is not anti-gay”209 and over-
come the negative publicity generated by the 2010 MN Forward debacle – 
despite raising the ire of organizations that oppose same-sex marriage.  Fur-
ther, Target refused to stop making political contributions after the MN For-
ward debacle.210 
Thus, the clear lesson that Target itself took from its 2010 MN Forward 
debacle is not to avoid supporting any overtly political causes, but rather, to 
support the “right” causes in the right ways (i.e., with glossy ads rather than 
political donations).  As a result, although Target was criticized for not going 
far enough to support gay marriage in 2012,211 the company’s public image 
 
 206. Kingser & Schmidt, supra note 179, at 33. 
 207. See id. at 31. 
 208. See Curtis M. Wong, Target Selling Gay Marriage Greeting Cards for Cou-
ples, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2012/07/16/target-gay-marriage-greeting-cards-sale_n_1676356.html. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Kingser & Schmidt, supra note 179, at 31.  Instead, Target convened a panel 
of executives to screen contributions for concerns that may be “important” to employ-
ees, customers and other stakeholders.  Id. 
 211. Proponents of gay marriage criticized Target for failing to officially           
oppose Minnesota’s failed constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage   
and for failing to officially support the state’s subsequent legislation legalizing   
same-sex marriage.  See, e.g., Abe Sauer, Target’s Stance on Gay Rights Takes    
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has gone from anti-gay to gay-friendly in less than three years due to its gay-
friendly advertising.  Moreover, other prominent Minnesota-based corpora-
tions have taken the next step that Target has not and continued to advocate 
on the subject of marriage equality.212  Apparently believing that they are 
now on the correct side of history (or, more cynically, their customers), Min-
nesota-based companies such as General Mills actively opposed the failed 
2012 same-sex marriage constitutional amendment and supported the suc-
cessful 2013 legislation.213 
In sum, one lesson from the Target/MN Forward fiasco could be that 
companies should avoid politics altogether.  But another, just-as-plausible 
lesson is that, if a company involves itself in politics, it better not “get it 
wrong” by making controversial or unpopular political contributions.214 
c.  Tax Deductibility 
Nelson’s third argument about why corporate political contributions dif-
fer from corporate charitable donations concerns tax deductibility.  As he 
correctly explains, political expenditures differ from charitable gifts because 
the latter are tax-deductible under the Internal Revenue Code while the for-
mer are not.215  Further, as Nelson correctly urges, courts that have upheld 
corporate charitable donations have often done so in part due to the tax de-
duction generated by such gifts.216  Nelson therefore argues that, absent the 
tax deduction, corporate political contributions are on far weaker ground than 
charitable donations.217 
This argument fails in part because it is overbroad.  The argument would 
encompass all non-tax-deductible corporate political spending – not just cor-
porate political contributions, but any lobbying as well.  Yet, it would be 
laughable to suggest that lobbying never benefits corporations.  There must 
 
 212. See, e.g., Mike Hughlett & Baird Helgeson, General Mills against Gay   
Marriage Ban, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE (June 14, 2012), http://www.startrib-
une.com/business/159143335.html?refer=y. 
 213. See id.; Mike Hughlett, General Mills Defends Gay Marriage Stance, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/business/ 
171022151.html?refer=y. 
 214. Hamburger & Martinez, supra note 205 (quoting Tara Malloy of the Cam-
paign Legal Center) (“The Target case may just be an example of a corporation doing 
it wrong.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
118, 131 (2010) (referencing the Target example and noting “[m]ost publicly traded 
corporations do not want to be associated with controversial positions on hot-button 
social issues that dominate elections.”). 
 215. Nelson, supra note 31, at 161 (citing I.R.C. § 162 (2006) and IRS, DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS 16 (2011), available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p529.pdf (Corporations cannot “deduct contributions made 
to a political candidate [or] campaign committee.”)). 
 216. Id. at 161-62; see infra Part V.E. 
 217. Nelson, supra note 31, at 161-62. 
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be hundreds of instances where lobbying legislators or regulators have im-
proved a corporation’s bottom line.  For example, large global banks have 
engaged in a massive lobbying effort to water down protections for consum-
ers in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).218  Presumably, the mil-
lions of dollars banks spent lobbying and the resulting changes in the imple-
mentation of Dodd-Frank were well worth the banks’ investments. 
What’s more, Nelson’s argument about tax deducibility fails to grasp 
how tax deductions work.  A tax deduction effectively reduces the amount of 
the gift from the corporation because the government subsidizes part of the 
donation.219  For example, if a corporation donates $1000 to charity and the 
corporation’s marginal tax rate is thirty-five percent, deducting that $1000 
from the corporation’s net income will reduce the corporation’s overall tax 
burden by $350.220  Thus, the effect of tax deductibility is that a gift of $1000 
from a corporation to a charity only “costs” the corporation $650, because of 
the offsetting $350 reduction in the corporation’s tax liability due to that do-
nation.  As a result, the tax deduction that the corporation receives in return 
for a charitable gift is not properly viewed as a “benefit” to the corporation, 
but rather as a reduction in the amount of the gift. 
Hence, while Nelson describes the “non-tax deductible status of political 
expenditures” as “a critical” difference between charitable gifts and political 
expenditures,221 this is simply not true.  Tax deducibility simply means that a 
$1000 donation to charity (again assuming a thirty-five percent tax rate) costs 
the corporation the same amount as a $650 corporate political contribution.  
When comparing the two gifts, there must nonetheless be some plausible 
benefit to the corporation or else each donation would be waste (assuming 
that charitable contributions require a corporate purpose).222 
For this reason, although Nelson is correct to note that two important 
charitable donation cases, Kahn v. Sullivan223 and Theodora Holding Corp. v. 
Henderson,224 turned in part on the tax benefits to the corporation resulting 
from the gift, Nelson misunderstands why tax benefits were important to ren-
 
 218. See Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-Frank, THE NATION   
(Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/174113/how-wall-street-defanged-
dodd-frank. 
 219. See Brian D. Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1561, 1568 (2013) (“In effect, [a tax] deduction is a matching grant from the 
government to the charity: for every dollar the donor contributes, the government 
gives back, say . . . 35 cents, which the donor can then also contribute.”). 
 220. See Brian D. Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 777, 786 n.27 (2012) (“[I]f [my marginal tax rate is] $0.35[,] . . . a 
$1,000 donation . . . [to charity] reduces the amount of tax I pay by $350.”). 
 221. Nelson, supra note 31, at 161-62. 
 222. But see infra Part IV.C.1.g (explaining that charitable contributions may 
require no business purpose). 
 223. See Kahn v. Sullivan (Hammer II), 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991); Sullivan v. 
Hammer (Hammer I), No. 10823, 1990 WL 114223 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990). 
 224. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
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der the donations reasonable in those two cases.  In each case, the deduction 
simply went to the reasonableness of the amount of the donation; it did not 
create a separate benefit.225  Although this same standard is not available to 
measure the reasonableness of the amount of political contributions (as they 
are not tax deductible), the approach could be applied by analogy.226 
2.  Damage to Corporation and Reduced Shareholder Value 
Nelson’s second argument also pertains to the objective theory of corpo-
rate waste.  He argues that “[i]ndependent political expenditures may damage 
corporations, both socially and economically” because “[t]aking controversial 
and highly visible political stands can potentially cost clients and therefore 
lead to financial costs.”227  Moreover, “overt, direct political action by most 
corporations carries with it risks far exceeding the political gains” and the 
corporation’s “image could be tarnished if these contributions or political 
activities go awry.”228 
In addition to offering the possible worst-case scenario example,      
Target’s donation to MN Forward (discussed above), Nelson cites other  
companies that engaged in political spending that led to shareholder pro-
posals targeting such spending.  Tesoro Corporation, for example, spent mon-
ey to support Proposition 23, a “ballot initiative to suspend California’s glob-
al warming law” that ultimately failed.229  Nelson hypothesizes that a share-
holder might successfully argue that Tesoro’s political expenditures         
were waste because the company “derived no net benefit from” the spending, 
since the proposition failed to pass.230  However, money spent in support of a 
losing political cause is not necessarily waste simply because the cause failed, 
so long as the decision to engage in the cause was not irrational at the time it 
was made.231 
Nelson argues further that “empirical studies have shown that corporate 
independent political expenditures correlate with lower shareholder re-
 
 225. See id. at 405 (concluding that “[t]he contribution . . . can be said to have 
‘cost’ . . . some fifteen cents per dollar of contribution, taking into consideration” the 
federal tax deductions, and concluding that this “relatively small loss of immediate 
income” was “far out-weighed by the overall benefits” of the contribution); Hammer 
I, 1990 WL 114223, at *1 (considering the “after-tax cost of” the gift to the corpora-
tion).  Cf. Cox Enters. v. News-Journal Corp., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098, 1111 
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that shareholder had probable cause to conclude that news-
paper committed waste, in part because its charitable spending “exceed[ed] the max-
imum allowed for charitable deductions.”), aff’d 510 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 226. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 165. 
 227. Id. at 155 (emphasis added). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 156-57. 
 230. Id. at 157. 
 231. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text. 
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turns.”232  Perhaps if the scholarly consensus in support of this proposition 
were as well accepted as the scholarly consensus that Tesoro Corporation 
apparently opposed (i.e., that the Earth is warming and mankind is the likely 
cause233), then this argument of Nelson’s would be a winner.  However, other 
scholarly studies not cited by Nelson reach the opposite conclusion – that 
corporate political spending in fact increases shareholder returns.234  Absent 
overwhelming evidence that the studies reaching one conclusion were written 
by crackpot theorists using universally-debunked methodologies, it would be 
imprudent for a layperson to argue that no reasonable person could conclude 
that corporate political contributions could increase shareholder returns under 
any circumstances.  It is by definition reasonable for a layperson to come 
down on either side of a question upon which experts are truly divided. 
3.  No Corporate Purpose 
Finally, Nelson raises the subjective theory of waste by arguing that 
“independent political expenditures have no corporate purpose” and are “ex-
amples of corporate . . . directors using corporate treasury funds to further 
their own personal political goals.”235  Nelson himself offers no factual basis 
whatsoever for this assertion, other than the unsupported assertions of oth-
ers.236  However, other authors have argued persuasively in support of his 
point.  Indeed, one of the strongest objections to corporate political contribu-
tions in the scholarly literature, at least to those advancing a shareholder per-
spective, is an “agency cost”237 problem: Corporate political contributions 
 
 232. Nelson, supra note 31, at 158 (citing finance research); see also Romiti, 
supra note 31, at 764-65 n.179. 
    Nelson argues further, without citation, that independent expenditures “are general-
ly made without any due diligence” about potential effect on the corporation.  Nelson, 
supra note 31, at 158-59.  In the unlikely event that this unsupported assertion is true, 
it certainly could lead management to lose the protection of the business judgment 
rule. 
 233. See Is There A Scientific Consensus on Global Warming?, SKEPTICAL       
SCI.,http://www.skepticalscience.com/global-warming-scientific-consensus-basic.htm 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (“97% of climate experts agree humans are causing      
global warming.”). 
 234. See, e.g., Michael J. Cooper et al, Corporate Political Contributions and 
Stock Returns, 65 J. FIN. 687 (2010); ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & DOUGLAS DOWSON, 
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING: WHY THE NEW CRITICS ARE WRONG (2012), avail-
able at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr_15.pdf.  However, these authors’ 
conclusions are “hotly debated.”  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 7, at 958. 
 235. Nelson, supra note 31, at 162. 
 236. Id. at 155 (“‘Managers may have personal preferences over candidates and 
parties they wish to support that are simply unrelated to the firm’s activities.’”) (quot-
ing Aggarwal et al., supra note 12). 
 237. The agency problem is that corporate managers, who control the cor-
poration’s purse strings, can use corporate funds to further their personal goals rather 
than the best interest of the corporation (i.e., profit maximization).  See ADOLF A. 
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could constitute a misuse of corporate funds – that is, executives essentially 
misappropriating the corporation’s funds to serve their own political agen-
das.238  In fact, surveys indicate that shareholders widely suspect this is man-
agement’s true motivation.239 
The problem with this agency cost-based argument is that, under the 
subjective standard, waste must have no corporate purpose.  As such, it is not 
sufficient to show that corporate executives make corporate political contri-
butions to serve their own political objectives, if the contributions also serve 
corporate purposes.  A political contribution that the board believes will serve 
its own political agenda and also advance the corporation’s interest does not 
constitute waste. 
Unfortunately, Nelson’s own example – Target’s donation to MN    
Forward – reveals the flaws in any argument that corporate political contribu-
tions have no corporate purpose.  In describing MN Forward and              
Target’s donation thereto, Nelson leaves out some critical facts.  First, MN 
Forward is not on its face an anti-same sex marriage organization.  Rather  
the organization describes itself as a “pro-business” organization and “an 
effort by Minnesota job providers to elect a governor and state legislators 
who understand the importance of creating private-sector jobs and economic 
opportunity in our state.”240  The organization’s three main platforms, accord-
ing to its website are: “tax reform,” “spending reform,” and “education re-
form.”241  Searches of the website indicate that it says nothing whatsoever 
about gay marriage. 
In fact, according to MN Forward’s Executive Director Brian McClung, 
the group supported Emmer for governor “because of his position on job 
growth and the state’s economy.”242  Although this statement obviously could 
 
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 68 (1932). 
 238. See Winkler, supra note 3, at 873 (explaining that corporate political corrup-
tion was historically viewed “as a problem of agency costs”); see also Bebchuk & 
Jackson, supra note 7, at 941-42 (urging that the political interests of directors and 
shareholders “often diverge” because directors may be influenced by factors that are 
exogenous to the firm’s performance and because “shareholders do not sort them-
selves [based on their] . . . political preferences.”). 
 239. See Romiti, supra note 31, at 766 (discussing CTR. FOR POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY, CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN 
SHAREHOLDERS 19 (2006), available at http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index. 
php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/918). 
 240. See Who We Are, MN FORWARD, http://www.mnforward.com/who-we-are/ 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
 241. See Issues, MN FORWARD, http://www.mnforward.com/issues/ (last visit-   
ed Mar. 19, 2014).  The website does not appear to have been updated since the    
2012 election. 
 242. Emily Friedman, Target, Best Buy Angers Gay Customers by Making     
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have been a self-serving attempt to protect its donors from political harm, this 
is not necessarily or even likely so.  Some anti-gay rights organizations have 
no qualms about publicly stating their goals and beliefs.243 
Further, there is some objective reason to believe McClung’s statement.  
Although MN Forward spent most of its money supporting Emmer for gover-
nor, not all of the candidates that it supported in 2010 were Republicans – or 
even opposed to gay marriage.  For example, Jim Metzen, a long-time in-
cumbent Democratic-Farmer-Labor senator, is listed among the pro-jobs can-
didates supported by MN Forward in 2010.244  Metzen was among the mi-
nority of senators who voted against Minnesota’s constitutional ban on gay 
marriage in 2011245 and among the majority who voted for the legislation 
legalizing gay marriage in May 2013.246  Clearly MN Forward did not make 
anti-gay marriage a litmus test for its support in 2010. 
More importantly, Target never suggested that its support for MN For-
ward, which in turn supported Emmer, had anything to do with opposition to 
rights of gay individuals.  To the contrary, when the controversy first started, 
Target CEO Greg Steinhafel explained in a letter to the company’s employ-
ees: 
Target has a history of supporting organizations and candidates, on 
both sides of the aisle, who seek to advance policies aligned with our 
business objectives, such as job creation and economic growth.  It is 
also important to note that we rarely endorse all advocated positions of 
organizations or candidates we support, and we do not have a political 
or social agenda. 
Let me be very clear, Target’s support for the GLBT community         
is unwavering, and inclusiveness remains a core value of our          
company. 247 
Further, even when Steinhafel subsequently apologized to the compa-
ny’s employees after the bad publicity and boycotts began in earnest, he 
nonetheless steadfastly explained that the contribution was about economics, 
not social issues: 
 
 243. E.g., the Westboro Baptist Church. 
 244. See Candidates, MN FORWARD, http://www.mnforward.com/candidates/ (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
 245. See Danielle Cabot, Mendota Heights-Area Legislators Oppose Gay Mar-
riage Ban Amendment, MENDOTA HEIGHTS PATCH (May 23, 2011, 5:11 PM), 
http://mendotaheights.patch.com/articles/mendota-heights-area-legislators-oppose-
gay-marriage-ban-amendment. 
 246. See Micheal Foley, Sen. Metzen Votes ‘Yes’ on Same-Sex Marriage Bill, 
MENDOTA HEIGHTS PATCH (May 22, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://mendota 
heights.patch.com/articles/sen-metzen-votes-yes-on-same-sex-marriage-bill. 
 247. Friedman, supra note 242. 
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The intent of our political contribution to MN Forward was to support 
economic growth and job creation.  . . . While I firmly believe that a 
business climate conducive to growth is critical to our future, I realize 
our decision affected many of you in a way I did not anticipate, and 
for that I am genuinely sorry.248 
Obviously, Steinhafel had good reason to lie about why Target’s board 
(or its executive officers) decided to contribute to MN Forward.  Perhaps 
opposition to gay marriage was, in fact, the board’s primary reason for sup-
porting MN Forward and Emmer.  Yet, the board’s primary motivation is not 
particularly relevant to the subjective waste inquiry – even assuming that 
opposition to rights for gay individuals, including same-sex marriage, serves 
no corporate purpose whatsoever.249  Rather, since the relevant legal question 
is whether the donation served “no corporate purpose,” it simply does not 
matter whether the board had the purpose of opposing gay marriage in mind 
when making the donation.  The proper question is whether the board also 
supported MN Forward for the purpose of promoting “economic growth and 
job creation” – and whether promoting “economic growth and job creation” 
serves any possible corporate purpose. 
It surely does.  If the post-2008 recession teaches anything, it is that re-
tail chains depend on customers.  In a down economy – where potential cus-
tomers are out of work, and have less disposable income – the retail chain 
will sell fewer products, probably at lower prices.250  Customers who have 
less pocket money will buy fewer luxuries – and perhaps even fewer “neces-
sities.”  And government intervention in the way of unemployment insurance 
only partly covers workers’ lost salaries, and only lasts for so long.  There-
fore, while a depressed economy that creates few jobs may benefit a corpora-
tion in some ways (by lowering labor costs, for example), it certainly is rea-
sonable to argue that an economy that creates jobs helps retail chains overall. 
 
 248. Tom Scheck, Target CEO Apologizes for Donation to MN Forward, 
MPRNEWS.COM (Aug. 5, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collec-
tions/special/columns/polinaut/archive/2010/08/target_ceo_apol.shtml; see also Ro-
miti, supra note 31, at 742 n.31. 
 249. This author cannot fathom any reasonable argument that opposition to gay 
rights served any corporate purpose for Target Corporation, and subsequent events 
seem to show it was not. 
 250. See Retail Sales Decline in July as Jobless Claims Edge Higher,           
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/ 
aug/14/retail-sales-decline-in-july-as-jobless-claims-edg/; see also Andria Cheng, 
Another Downturn Seen at the Mall for the Holidays: Determined and Cautious 
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4.  Cost-Benefit Analysis and Other Arguments 
Perhaps realizing that he has failed to show that corporate political con-
tributions have no corporate purpose, Nelson ultimately drops this argument.  
Instead, he suggests that courts could “apply a cost-benefit analysis” to eval-
uate corporate independent expenditures.251  Alternatively, he asserts that 
courts could use “a net loss test” to assess “damage to the corporation” from 
such contributions.252 
The problem with these arguments is that they return to the objective 
standard of waste – but cannot meet that difficult threshold.  Engaging in a 
cost-benefit analysis or a net loss test is precisely the sort of close judicial 
analysis of business decisions that the business judgment rule prohibits.  The 
objective waste standard only allows courts to analyze transactions where 
there is no plausible argument that the corporation received adequate consid-
eration.  The objective waste standard is not a vehicle for judicial considera-
tion of whether, on balance, a corporation received enough benefit to justify 
an expenditure. 
Ultimately, Nelson essentially admits this.  In concluding, he states    
that his goal is not to show that corporate political contributions necess-   
arily are waste, but rather to simply suggest arguments that will give share-
holder plaintiffs a “much greater chance of success.”253  Unfortunately,      
few of his arguments offer shareholders much promise of success in bringing 
a waste claim. 
* * * * * 
In sum, Nelson’s objective waste argument is simply an argument that 
some corporate political contributions can be bad for some corporations (es-
pecially when the board makes a bad bet, like Target’s board did) – not an 
argument that all (or even most) corporate political contributions are inher-
ently bad for all corporations.254  Further, Nelson’s subjective waste argument 
is simply that some directors may make corporate political contributions to 
further their own political goals some of the time – not that all directors nec-
essarily do this all of the time.  Shareholder derivative plaintiffs need better 
arguments than this in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 
 
 251. Nelson, supra note 31, at 165. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 172-73. 
 254. Nelson admits this: He states that he has provided “ample evidence that even 
though corporations have the ability to make independent political expenditures, it is 
not always in their best interest to do so.”  Id. at 172 (emphasis added).  But the waste 
standard does not permit courts to second-guess management in this way.  See supra 
Part IV.A.1-2 (describing objective and subjective waste standards). 
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C.  A Better Argument for Waste? 
1.  How Charitable Donations Differ from Political Contributions 
Nelson’s only promising argument seems to be that corporate pol-   
itical contributions constitute waste because they differ from charitable    
contributions (which are upheld if reasonable).  Yet, he offers no compelling 
basis for concluding that political contributions in fact differ from charitable 
contributions.  He fails to articulate any material or inherent differences be-
tween the two. 
In contrast to Nelson, Professor Bainbridge posits (in criticizing Nel-
son), that corporate campaign contributions are no different than corporate 
charitable donations.255  Yet, in his brief blog post256 Professor Bainbridge 
offers little factual support for his position.257  As a result, we ought to in-
quire: Are corporate political contributions inherently different from charita-
ble contributions in a material way, such that political contributions damage 
shareholder value (thereby constituting objective waste) or fail to advance 
any legitimate corporate purpose (thereby constituting subjective waste)?  
The remainder of this sub-Part explores seven ways in which political contri-
butions differ from charitable donations and assesses whether these differ-
ences render political contributions corporate waste. 
a.  Binary, Winner-Take-All Nature of Elections 
While Nelson’s Target example is a poor one, his Tesoro example actu-
ally hints at a good argument.  Nelson urges shareholders to file a derivative 
lawsuit against Tesoro, on the grounds that it “spent $1.5 million” opposing 
California’s Proposition 23 and “received nothing in return”258 because the 
proposition failed to pass.  This is not unusual.  Indeed, it is the way of      
politics!  On average, more than half of all candidates for political office   
presumably lose their election bids.259  As a result, after each election, some 
contributors are arguably left with “nothing to show for” their support of        
a candidate. 
In this way, corporate political contributions in support of a candidate 
for elected office or a ballot initiative (and, to some extent, funds spent lobby-
 
 255. Bainbridge, supra note 30.  Other scholars have made this same point.  Cf. 
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 7, at 117 n.97 (positing that political speech and 
corporate charitable contributions “are, under current law, governed by the rules that 
govern companies’ ordinary business decisions”). 
 256. Bainbridge, supra note 30. 
 257. Extensive research has unearthed no other scholar who has treated this sub-
ject in any depth. 
 258. Nelson, supra note 31, at 159. 
 259. Presumably in our largely two-party system, candidates rarely run for office 
unopposed.  Further, to the limited extent that candidates run opposed, others at least 
occasionally face a third-party opponent. 
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ing for a certain result) differ starkly from the typical charitable contribution: 
political elections are an all-or-nothing proposition.  After each election for 
public office, one candidate wins the election and gains the power of that 
office; the other candidates lose and go home, with no power whatsoever.  As 
a result, in each election, only one candidate’s supporters have a realistic 
chance that their candidate will be able to keep her campaign promises by 
enacting legislation or making policy in some way.  All of the other candi-
dates’ supporters must either await the next election or hope that the candi-
date who they opposed will reach across the aisle when governing. 
Civic, social and educational organizations do not necessarily work this 
way.  They can serve a charitable, social, or educational mandate without 
“defeating” competing organizations, either by besting like-minded organiza-
tions in the battle for scarce resources or by defeating the policy goals of or-
ganizations that oppose their charitable, social or educational goals.  Alt-
hough charities undoubtedly set goals that are uncertain to come to fruition, 
such benefits do not inherently present the same sort of all-or-nothing choices 
that political elections do.260 
As a result, even if some corporations make charitable donations in sup-
port of contingent benefits, those contingencies will rarely be (or at least, are 
not inherently) all-or-nothing propositions.  What’s more, even in those in-
stances where a donation to a charitable organization supports a win-or-lose 
proposition – like class action litigation – the gains from funding that propo-
sition may not be so starkly all-or-nothing as in the context of politics.  All 
litigation does not end in victory for one party and defeat for the other.261 
 
 260. For example, a donation to the medical school still can improve the educa-
tional opportunities for students at the medical school even if the medical school does 
not build the new wing for which the donation was intended; an opera company can 
still use a donation to fund its upcoming production even if the company is unable to 
land the famous tenor it wanted to sing the lead role; an organization that feeds and 
clothes homeless citizens can always use money for some other purpose even if it 
cannot raise sufficient funds to build a brand new shelter; an organization that distrib-
utes a free malaria vaccination in Africa may be able to immunize some children even 
if it cannot obtain the money for a program to vaccinate every child in a particular 
country as planned. 
 261. For example, is a donation to Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to 
support a lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Agency to raise air quality 
standards in a particular city wasted if the suit is dismissed?  Or was a donation to 
fund litigation to challenge the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) wasted simply because the Supreme Court upheld the ACA?  
Perhaps not.  In modern litigation, lawsuits are rarely complete victories or defeats – 
especially when administrative agencies are involved.  (Shareholder derivative suits 
are entirely different matter.)  Rather, whether or not the lawsuit settles or ultimately 
results in a judgment, even when both sides view one side as the “winner” and the 
other side as the “loser,” it is rare that the winner gains everything it sought in the 
litigation and the loser loses everything that it sought to defend.  So, in the hypothet-
ical NRDC v. EPA lawsuit, while the NRDC may not get the EPA to enforce the 
applicable regulation in exactly the desired way, it may “move the ball” somewhat.  
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Although this “winner take all” argument may seem compelling at first 
glance, it nonetheless has flaws.  First, political campaigns are not always 
solely about the election of a particular candidate.  Advertisements in support 
of a candidate may fail to get that candidate elected but may nonetheless in-
form voters’ opinions for future elections.  Indeed, sometimes elections are 
more about raising awareness or laying the groundwork for future elections 
than about winning office.  Politicians may run for the same office again, or 
for different offices.262  It is certainly possible that expenditures made in sup-
port of a politician in one election cycle will help that same politician win in a 
later election.  Or, the expenditures to support one candidate may lead voters 
to vote for a different, like-minded candidate in a future election.  This is 
particularly true with primary elections, where the candidate who loses the 
primary is from the same party and may end up supporting the candidate who 
wins the primary in the general election. 
Second, losing candidates do not necessarily disappear after the election.  
If they already hold a lower elective office, they may remain in that office 
and continue to wield power for many years after failing to win higher of-
fice.263  Or, even if the losing candidate never runs for higher office again, 
she may later be appointed to higher office.264  As a result, a corporate politi-
cal contribution that results in influence over or goodwill from a losing can-
didate or her supporters may benefit the corporation down the road, despite 
that the candidate was defeated. 
Third, this “winner take all” argument proves too much.  Although char-
ities are not typically win-or-lose endeavors, businesses often are.  Businesses 
compete with each other for customers – sometimes winning and sometimes 
losing.  As a result, business decisions, like political contributions, regularly 
result in zero or negative returns to a company.265  Although business out-
 
Further, those who oppose the ACA may view the Supreme Court’s decision to up-
hold the law as a temporary setback rather than a definitive loss, since the holding 
allowed states to opt out of Medicaid expansion.  See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise & Rob-
ert Gebeloff, Millions of Poor Are Left Uncovered by Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/health/millions-of-poor-are-left-un-
covered-by-health-law.html. 
 262. For example, Mark Dayton ran for U.S. Senator from Minnesota and lost in 
1982, then ran again in 2006 and won.  See Mark Dayton’s Career, Minneapolis Star 
Tribune (Dec. 27, 2009, 9:36 PM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/ 
80179727.html. 
 263. For example, John McCain remains in the U.S. Senate after failing to win the 
Presidency in 2008. 
 264. For example, John Kerry remained in the U.S. Senate for nearly a decade 
after failing to win the Presidency in 2004, and was appointed U.S. Secretary of State 
in 2013. 
 265. Thus, Romiti’s expression of doubt that “donating to political campaigns     
is . . . a rational business judgment because the likelihood of getting tangible re-   
turns . . . is inherently speculative” completely fails to understand the nature of busi-
ness decisions.  Romiti, supra note 31, at 758 n.135.  Most if not all business deci-
sions are “inherently speculative”; there are few if any “sure bets.” 
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comes are not necessarily binary, win-or-lose propositions, businesses none-
theless regularly spend large sums of money with little or no financial return.  
This is the nature of business.  Yet, a board does not waste the corporation’s 
assets simply by betting on a project that does not pay off.  Such a standard 
would eviscerate the business judgment rule.  Rather, the waste inquiry is 
whether, in light of the facts known at the time of the board’s decision, it 
made an irrational gamble with the corporation’s money.266  The same ques-
tion could easily be asked for political contributions. 
b.  Zero-Sum Nature of Politics in the Two-Party System 
Donations to one charitable organization do not necessarily harm the in-
terests of a different charitable organization that does not receive the dona-
tion.267  Although there are certainly some divisive political issues – for ex-
ample, abortion or religion in public schools – where social welfare organiza-
tions advocate on both sides of an issue, the vast bulk of charities are not in 
direct competition with each other (other than in the hunt to raise funds).  
Thus, if a corporation donates money to Charity A, while that may disappoint 
Charity B because of the loss of potential funds to “move the ball forward” 
on that charity’s own issue of choice, the funds going to Charity A rarely will 
result in a loss to Charity B’s issue of choice.  Even charitable organizations 
that are competing for scarce resources that have similar missions are not 
actually harmed by a donation to their rival organization.268  For example, it 
would seem that a $1 million gift to education is a benefit to education eve-
rywhere, whether it goes to Princeton or Harvard.269 
Corporate political contributions differ, especially in the United States.  
In our largely two-party system, money given to Republicans is not simply 
unavailable to Democrats; it is money that probably will be used to advance 
an agenda that is squarely at odds with the Democrats’ agenda.  That is to 
say, money spent for the purpose of electing Republican candidates is money 
spent either directly or indirectly for the purpose of defeating Democratic 
candidates and the ideas they espouse.  Accordingly, corporate political con-
tributions in support of a Democratic candidate in a particular election will in 
 
 266. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text. 
 267. For example, none of the charities mentioned above (the hospital, the vac-
cination organization), including the charities engaged in litigation (the NRDC and 
groups litigating against the ACA), would have their interests directly harmed if one 
of the other organizations above received a donation. 
 268. Presumably the NRDC, which engages in litigation in support of environ-
mental causes, is not harmed by a donation to Earthjustice, which engages in litiga-
tion in support of similar causes. 
 269. Obviously, it depends on how the organization’s goals are defined.  If Medi-
cal School A’s goal is to be the number one ranked medical school in the country, 
then certainly a donation to Medical School B will harm Medical School A’s pursuit 
of this goal.  But hopefully most educational organizations define their goals more 
broadly than this. 
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theory cancel out corporate political contributions in support of the Republi-
can candidate in that same election. 
c.  Political Spending is an Arms Race 
Because a dollar spent to elect a Democrat essentially cancels out a dol-
lar spent to elect the opposing Republican, more spending on political elec-
tions does not necessarily result in greater societal welfare (even assuming 
the money is spent on the “best” candidates).  This is another key difference 
from spending on charitable, social or educational institutions.  In theory, 
there is no limit to the amount of societal welfare that can be created by giv-
ing to these types of organizations.  Thus, each dollar spent on charity (if 
used efficiently by the charity) expands societal welfare. There is every rea-
son to believe that $1 million in donations to a charity increases societal wel-
fare more than $1 donated to charity.270 
By contrast, spending on political elections is an arms race.  In each 
election, only one candidate will win office regardless of the overall amount 
of money that is spent on that election.  As a result, in an election between 
Candidate X and Candidate Y, each additional dollar spent to support Candi-
date X does not increase societal welfare.  At best, that dollar simply increas-
es the chances that Candidate X will be elected rather than Candidate Y.  
Hence, unless spending to educate the electorate on the candidates inherently 
promotes societal welfare, 271 the societal welfare resulting from either candi-
date’s victory is necessarily the same whether the candidate spends $1 or $1 
million.  No matter how much money is spent, either Candidate X or Candi-
date Y will be elected, with the benefits that result from that candidate taking 
office.  Allowing deep-pocketed corporations to participate in elections will 
only exacerbate this problem.272 
d.  Elections Are About People, Not Policies 
Another difference between donations to charity and spending on politi-
cal campaigns is that candidates for elective office, by their very nature, hold 
a variety of views.  A corporation that donates to a particular candidate may 
 
 270. For example, every dollar received by the charity that provides immuniza-
tions to poor children (less administrative and fund-raising costs) provides more vac-
cines to poor children.  Presumably the need for such vaccines is sufficiently large 
that every dollar increases the number of vaccinations, and therefore, increases social 
welfare.  The same is true for gifts to medical schools or organizations that feed the 
homeless.  Until every child is vaccinated, until the shortage of medical doctors has 
been met, and until all the homeless are fed, every single dollar increases social wel-
fare incrementally. 
 271. In a world where the same political ads run hundreds of times in battle-
ground states just shortly before a major election, it would seem that we are well past 
the point where each incremental ad expands political awareness. 
 272. See Dibadj, supra note 17, at 56. 
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do so because that candidate’s policies on many different issues, if enacted, 
would benefit the corporation.  But except in the (hopefully rare) case where 
a politician is elected to office with the sole purpose of serving all of the in-
terests of a particular corporation (e.g., “the Senator from Boeing”273), it 
seems likely that the corporation’s interest and the politician’s interests will 
diverge somewhere.274  The corporation that supports that candidate must, if 
the candidate is elected, take the good with the bad.275  This is not necessarily 
true with donations to charity.  Corporations can promote particular narrow 
goals by donating to single-issue organizations, if necessary, or to organiza-
tions that more closely align with the corporation’s policy goals. 
Target’s support of Tom Emmer is a fine example of this.  If Target’s 
management truly supported Emmer solely because they believed that he 
would institute “tax reform,” “spending reform,” and “education reform” – 
and if Target was “not anti-gay” – then Target could have donated to three 
different single-issue charitable organizations that focused on promoting 
those goals. 
By contrast, the benefit from donating to single-issue organizations in-
stead of to Super PACs that advocate on behalf of political candidates comes 
at a cost: elected officials, not charitable organizations, enact legislation and 
make policy.  No matter how much influence a charitable organization has 
over an elected official, it is still one step removed from office.  What’s more, 
charitable organizations to which donations are tax deductible – section 
501(c)(3) organizations – cannot lobby broadly276 for political change, and 
therefore can only promote societal good in other ways.277  Hence, from a 
perspective of “bang for the buck,” it is rational for a corporation’s manage-
ment to decide that spending money to elect a political candidate that sup-
 
 273. See ANN R. MARKUSEN, THE RISE OF THE GUNBELT: THE MILITARY 
REMAPPING OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 163 (1st ed. 1991) (referring to Henry M. 
“Scoop” Jackson’s derisive nickname). 
 274. For example, if a corporation supports a candidate because the candidate 
supports policies that benefit the corporation, a shareholder might still oppose the 
contribution if the shareholder disagrees with the candidate on a different issue and 
feels more strongly about that issue.  See, e.g., Russell Mangas, Citizens United 
Against Dissenting Shareholders, 46 TULSA L. REV. 409, 412-14 (2011) (describing 
an example of this type of scenario). 
 275. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right 
that Big Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 639, 
656-67 (2011) (“[T]he last thing that . . . a corporation [should do] is get involved 
with election campaigns when it is clear that no candidate embodies all the positions –
and only those positions – that are ideal for the firm . . . .  [N]o sensible corporation 
should take that risky step.”). 
 276. Charitable organizations may not devote a “substantial part” of their time    
to political activities such as lobbying and political campaigns.  See I.R.C. §  
501(c)(3) (2012).  However, some charitable organizations do engage in “consi-
derable” political advocacy under the guise of “education.”  See Kahn, supra note 
165, at 638, 644-51. 
 277. See infra notes 407-411 and accompanying text. 
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ports some but not all of its policy goals is a more effective way of spending 
its money than supporting a charitable organization.  Elective officials may 
serve many masters, but they are closer to the actual levers of power.  The 
question is a matter of deciding whether the risk of supporting a politician 
with views on many issues is worth the possibility of a positive result on a 
specific issue – a classic business judgment. 
e.  Politicians Do Not Necessarily Keep Their Promises 
Another difference between political contributions and charitable dona-
tions, according to Nelson, is that political contributions “do not reasonably 
assure that the corporation will receive the benefits contemplated by those 
expenditures” because there is no assurance that a political candidate who is 
elected will follow through on her promises.278  This point about candidates 
not keeping their promises shows promise, but is not well developed. 
Politicians are often accused of changing their positions (i.e., “flip-
flopping”) or not keeping their campaign promises once they are on office.  
By contrast, charitable organizations are rarely if ever castigated for “flip-
flopping.”  Unlike politicians, who conduct polling and are often accused of 
having no core beliefs other than the desire to be re-elected to office, charita-
ble organizations seem to have relatively stable core missions that do not 
change drastically over time.  Yet, absent empirical data, one cannot state 
with certainty that politicians keep promises about how they will act less of-
ten than charities do. 
Still, a fundamental difference in the way that political contributions  
and charitable contributions work suggests that Nelson’s hypothesis is cor-
rect.  Donors to charity can – and often do – require as a condition of the    
gift that the donation be directed to some specific purpose.  For example, 
donations to colleges and universities often are restricted to be used for a 
particular purpose, whether it be to fund a particular scholarship or depart-
ment, to build a specific building wing, or to endow a chair for a particular 
professor.279  These gift restrictions are enforceable by contract or by the 
state’s attorney general.280 
Further, donors to charity can make the donation in exchange for a spe-
cific benefit – for example, the donor’s name being placed on a building at 
 
 278. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 160 (positing that “a political candidate’s plat-
form to get elected could vary drastically from what the politician actually accom-
plishes in office”). 
 279. See, e.g., Kiki Barnes, Donations to U. Grow Increasingly Specific, BROWN 
DAILY HERALD (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.browndailyherald.com/2013/03/05/don-
ations-to-u-grow-increasingly-specific/. 
 280. See Alan F. Rothschild, Jr., Planning and Documenting Charitable Gifts, GP 
SOLO L. TRENDS & NEWS: EST. PLANNING (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chicago, Ill.), Sept. 2007, 
available at https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_ 
practice_area_e_newsletter_home/planningcharitablegifts.html. 
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the university or the donor receiving a ticket to the charity’s annual gala.281  
Although a donor may lose some or all of her tax deduction if she receives a 
quid pro quo benefit from the charity, such a quid pro quo is not generally 
prohibited by law.282  Unlike politicians, charities may sell goods or services 
in order to raise money to support their charitable goals. 
Corporate political contributions are an entirely different matter.  Alt-
hough donors can designate how corporate political contributions must be 
used (e.g., to support a particular advertising campaign), political contribu-
tions must, by law, come with no strings attached.283  Any intended quid pro 
quo, whether stated or unstated, could land both the donor and the politician 
in jail because politicians, unlike charities, are prohibited from selling their 
office.284  This presumably is true not only for direct contributions, but also 
for independent expenditures.  Accordingly, any result that a corporation 
intends to achieve by making a political contribution is necessarily, by law, 
more speculative than any result that the corporation intends to receive in 
exchange for a charitable donation. 
f.  Elected Officials Rarely Act Alone 
Nelson’s comment about what a politician can “accomplish in office” 
also suggests another way in which charitable contributions differ from cor-
porate political contributions: charitable organizations can work alone if they 
wish, but elected officials must by law work together.  Except perhaps on the 
local level, governments in the United States are typically separated into ex-
ecutive, legislative and judicial branches – and often a combination of two or 
more branches working together is required in order to take action.285 
As a result, corporate political contributions in favor of one politician 
may not result in the desired benefit to the corporation – even if the candidate 
wins election to office and keeps her campaign promises – unless the candi-
date is able to convince other elected officials to support her agenda.  There-
fore, even if a corporation made a political contribution to President Barack 
Obama to support his 2012 re-election campaign with the goal of enacting a 
policy that was among the centerpieces of his campaign platform, that corpo-
ration likely has not achieved its goal.  Although President Obama was re-
elected and has attempted to promote some of the policies that he advocated 
in his campaign, little legislation has passed Congress and appeared on his 
 
 281. See id.; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(e) (2008). 
 282. See § 1.170A-1(e). 
 283. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 284. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 285. For example, in order for a federal law to be enacted, the legislature (both 
houses of Congress) must enact the same bill (or must meet in conference to work out 
any differences), the president must sign the bill into law (and perhaps the Supreme 
Court must declare it constitutional, if it is challenged).   See School House Rock: I’m 
Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast Mar. 27, 1976). 
54
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/2
2014] CORPORATE SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS 337 
desk for his signature because the House of Representatives is controlled by 
conservative Republicans.286 
Yet, this goal-oriented lens on corporate political spending is founded 
upon a narrow, and possibly naive, understanding of why businesses make 
political contributions to politicians.  It is widely understood that most corpo-
rations support politicians not to gain passage of specific policies, but rather 
to “buy access” to the politicians once they are in office.287  “Access” essen-
tially means the ability to have the politician listen to your lobbyists when 
they come calling.288  This desire for access, it is argued, fuels the seemingly 
strange practice of corporations donating money to politicians “on both sides 
of the aisle” – i.e., Republicans and Democrats289 – despite that these politi-
cians’ goals may be largely antithetical. 
If “access,” rather than enacting any specific legislation, is the goal of 
most corporate political contributions, then it does not matter if the corpora-
tion’s political candidate of choice is able to enact her legislative proposals or 
not – so long as she wins office and keeps her doors open. 
g.  Charitable Contributions May Require No Business Purpose 
The foregoing analysis is premised on the assumption that charitable 
contributions are just like ordinary business transactions in that they require a 
business purpose; if not, they will be deemed subjective waste.  But in fact, in 
many states (albeit not Delaware), corporate law statutes carve out a special 
place for corporate philanthropy.  In such states “management need not de-
fend charitable giving as serving the interests of the corporation, no matter 
how those interests are defined.”290  Indeed, some states’ corporate law stat-
 
 286. See Jon Perr, The Republicans’ Unprecedented Obstructionism by the Num-
bers, CROOKSANDLIARS.COM (Oct. 13, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://crooksandliars. 
com/jon-perr/republicans-unprecedented-obstructionism-by-numbers. 
 287. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124-25 (2003), overruled by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth 
Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 593 (2005). 
 288. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 119 n.5. 
 289. See Jason Cohen, The Same Side of Two Coins: The Peculiar Phenomenon of 
Bet-Hedging in Campaign Finance, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271, 293 (2006); Tamara R. 
Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2616 
n.151 (2008) (“[A] desire for influence, not principles, surely explains why so many 
corporate donors regularly contribute to both parties.”); Vicki Kemper & Deborah 
Lutterbeck, The Country Club, 22 COMMON CAUSE MAG. 16, 17-18 (1996) (explain-
ing that corporations often make “large contributions to both political parties to guar-
antee access, influence and agenda-setting power no matter . . . which party controls 
Congress”); see, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr., Enron’s Collapse: The Politicians; Enron 
Spread Contributions on Both Sides of the Aisle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/21/us/enron-s-collapse-politicians-enron-spread-
contributions-both-sides-aisle.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
 290. See Fisch, supra note 165, at 765; but see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 165,        
at 436. 
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utes (including New York’s) “explicitly authorize management to make 
charitable donations ‘irrespective of corporate benefit.’”291  As a result, it 
may be “legal and . . . appropriate for corporations to make donations that 
cannot be justified in business terms.”292  As a result, it is “nearly impossible 
to challenge” corporate philanthropy through shareholder litigation.293  In this 
regard, charitable donations “are sui generis within corporate law.”294 
By contrast, no state corporation law statutes known to this author ex-
empt political contributions from the business purpose requirement.  Accord-
ingly, even if courts have perhaps given charitable contributions a “free pass” 
in light of their statutory exemption from the business purpose require-
ment,295 this pass is inapplicable to political activity. 
2.  Evaluating the Argument: Do These Differences Matter? 
Having fleshed out some arguments in support of Nelson’s basic (but 
undeveloped) point that political contributions are different from charitable 
contributions, we now ask the critical question: Do any or all of these argu-
ments support a claim that political contributions constitute waste under ei-
ther the subjective or objective standard? 
a.  Target Corporation and MN Forward/Emmer 
Consider the worst-case scenario of Target’s contribution to MN For-
ward in support of gubernatorial candidate Tom Emmer, described above.296  
Was this contribution waste?  Most certainly not – even if we assume that the 
only benefit to the corporation will result from the candidate being elected to 
office.  The fact that politics is a binary, winner-take-all game does raise the 
stakes somewhat.  However, this does not ultimately mean that no reasonable 
person would bet on Emmer or that, by doing so, Target’s management nec-
essarily acted against the corporation’s best interests.  Rather, the question 
under the objective standard for waste is whether the bet was irrational at the 
time it was made.297  Clearly, Target’s support of Emmer does not satisfy that 
standard.  Emmer ran neck and neck with Dayton and fell less than 9,000 
votes short of election.298  Further, the stakes of the contribution were not 
necessarily known to Target’s board at the time; if in fact the board members 
were supporting Emmer and MN Forward solely due to economic issues, they 
 
 291. Fisch, supra note 165, at 765. 
 292. Id. (emphasis added). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Kahn, supra note 165, at 605. 
 295. See infra Part V.E. (discussing charitable contribution cases). 
 296. See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 297. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 298. See 2010 Minnesota Governor’s Race, POLITICS IN MINN., http://politics 
inminnesota.com/2010-mn-governor-race/ (last visited June 14, 2014). 
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might not have anticipated that their contribution could backfire so badly.  
The decision, terrible in retrospect, cannot be deemed irrational based on the 
facts known to the board at the time.  Regardless of one’s politics, it was not 
utterly irrational to support Emmer.  Nor, as explained above, was there no 
corporate purpose for Target to be supporting (what it viewed as) Minneso-
ta’s economy.  Further, once we relax our assumptions and recognize that a 
corporation could benefit even if the candidate it supports loses, it becomes 
clear that waste is not a viable theory. 
The zero sum nature of politics and the fact that political spending is an 
arms race does nothing to undermine this conclusion.  If Target’s manage-
ment was not irrational to believe that helping elect the Republican candidate 
for governor would benefit Target, the zero sum nature of politics made it 
even more critical for Target to join in the fray and contribute rather than 
stand on the sidelines.  Every dollar that Democrats spent in support of Day-
ton was a dollar that, in theory, undermined the Minnesota that Target’s man-
agement envisioned would be best for Target’s shareholders – a Minnesota 
led by Emmer.  Even if there were other reasonable alternative approaches by 
which Target could have served its goals,299 the close nature of the election 
suggests that it was not irrational to make a contribution, even if that contri-
bution led deep-pocketed Democrats to spend more in response.  Unfortu-
nately, the whole problem with an arms race is that all participants would be 
better off if there were no arms race, but no participant can unilaterally dis-
arm without damaging its position vis-à-vis the other participants.300 
The insight that politicians are people who do not act alone and do not 
always keep their promises also fails to prove that Target’s gamble on Emmer 
was irrational.  Even if we assume that the sole reason that Target supported 
Emmer was its stated reason of supporting jobs for Minnesota’s citizens, the 
fact that Emmer could not enact his agenda alone is not reason to withhold 
support.  Governors can have coattails.  Moreover, the Republicans were in a 
good position – and won decisively – in the 2010 election, taking control of 
both houses.301  In short, if Emmer had won, he would have been in a fantas-
tic position to enact his legislative agenda.  Even if Republicans had not taken 
over the legislature, they would have had a better chance of enacting their 
legislative agenda with a Republican governor than without one.  Further, 
while there is no certainty that Emmer would have kept all of his campaign 
promises if he had won the election, he would have been precluded from 
keeping any of his promises if he had lost the election.  Thus, if a contribution 
to MN Forward would help Emmer become elected, it was rational for Target 
to make a contribution. 
 
 299. For example, a better strategy for Target might have been to keep its powder 
dry in an attempt to promote a détente rather than an arms race among deep-pocket 
corporate donors. 
 300. See Laura Onken, Game Theory and Citizens United, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 517, 527-28 (2011). 
 301. See Minnesota Election Results 2010, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes. 
com/2010/results/minnesota (last visited June 14, 2014). 
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In sum, although political contributions do differ in many ways from 
charitable donations due to the differences between the way political elections 
and charities operate, none of these differences suggest that, by making a 
political contribution, a board of directors has acted irrationally or without 
regard to the best interests of the corporation.  Such a conclusion can only be 
made in hindsight, based on the unfavorable results of the contributions, or 
based on untenable assumptions.  Even though Emmer was an extremely 
conservative candidate, he was not on the absolute fringe; forty-four percent 
of the electorate in Minnesota supported him.302  While perhaps it was not 
reasonable to risk upsetting half of Target’s clientele, reasonableness is not 
the applicable standard for waste.  Only the most rabid partisan would deem 
supporting Emmer to be utterly irrational. 
b.  The Actual Worst Case Scenario: Waste Exemplified 
Although spending money in support of Emmer was not irrational, the 
foregoing analysis suggests that political contributions to some candidates 
could constitute waste.  In truth, Emmer was far from the worst-case scenario 
political candidate.  Indeed, he was not even the worst – in terms of most 
unelectable or farthest from the mainstream – Republican-endorsed candidate 
in Minnesota in recent years.  That honor belongs to Kurt Bills, U.S. Senate 
candidate in 2012.303  Yet, spending money in support of a major-party can-
didate, even a long-shot like Bills, probably is never waste.  Underdog candi-
dates pull off major upsets from time to time.304 
Nonetheless, a contribution to a Super PAC that advocates in support of 
a candidate who is both far outside of the political mainstream and personally 
offensive to most Americans – an American Nazi Party candidate, for exam-
ple – would undoubtedly constitute waste under both the objective and sub-
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Bills, who once advocated that Minnesota adopt its own currency, lost the 
2012 race for U.S. Senate to popular incumbent Amy Klobuchar by nearly one mil-
lion votes, winning about thirty-one percent of votes cast.  See Joe Loveland, How In 
the World Did Minnesota GOPers Screw Up Their Golden Opportunity?, 
MINNPOST.COM (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.minnpost.com/minnesota-blog-
cabin/2012/11/how-world-did-minnesota-gopers-screw-their-golden-opportunity.  
This was the second worst finish by a Republican candidate in modern Minnesota 
history.  See Eric Ostermeier, GOP Bracing for 2nd Worst Finish in MN US          
Senate Race Since Great Depression, SMART POLITICS (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/smartpolitics/2012/10/gopbracing_for_2nd_worst_fini.p
hp. 
 304. For example, in 1992, Paul Wellstone – a “virtual unknown” college profes-
sor who ran a “quirky” campaign – unseated incumbent Minnesota U.S. Senator Rudy 
Boschwitz, whose victory was viewed as “inevitable” at the time.  See GOP’s Bills 
Likens Underdog Minn. Bid to Wellstone, CBS MINN. (July 30, 2012, 7:24 PM), 
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/07/30/gops-bills-likens-underdog-minn-bid-to-
wellstone/.  Knowing of his own underdog status, Bills played up the comparison 
between himself and Wellstone in the 2012 Senate race.  See id. 
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jective standard.  Not only is there a near-zero chance that such a candidate 
would be elected to office, it is virtually certain that most Americans – Tar-
get’s customers – would be outraged if they learned that the company sup-
ported such a candidate.  Thus, while the boycotts that Target suffered were 
certainly possible if Target donated to an organization that opposed gay mar-
riage, an issue on which Americans are divided, boycotts would be near cer-
tain if Target supported a Nazi candidate, since almost all Americans pre-
sumably abhor the views espoused by such a candidate.  A contribution to the 
American Nazi Party would have essentially zero potential upside and a mas-
sive, near certain downside.  This is a paradigmatic irrational transaction.  
This is classic corporate waste. 
D.  What Do the Cases Tell Us? 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that corporate political 
contributions will rarely, if ever, satisfy either the objective or subjective 
standard for corporate waste.  But it would be too hasty to so conclude with-
out first reviewing the relevant case law.  Legal tests divorced from actual 
facts are more prone to manipulation than legal tests analyzed in the context 
of specific facts. 
Unfortunately, the cases Nelson proffers provide little help to derivative 
plaintiffs.  Nelson discusses the two aforementioned305 political spending 
cases, Stern and Marsili.306  However, because neither case held that the cor-
porate political spending at issue was waste,307 neither case will offer much 
comfort to shareholder plaintiffs challenging corporate political contributions 
as waste. 
Cases where the plaintiff claiming waste did survive a motion to dismiss 
(for failure either to state a claim or to make a demand) also offer no support 
for plaintiffs pursuing the waste theory.  Three recent Delaware cases expose 
the limitations of Nelson’s argument: In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Deriv-
ative Litigation,308 Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny,309 and Lewis v. Vogelstein.310 
First, in Citigroup, Citigroup, Inc. shareholders sued the board, alleging 
that its approval of an agreement to compensate the company’s departing 
CEO was waste because the CEO was at least partially responsible for the 
 
 305. See supra Part III.C. 
 306. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 151-53. 
 307. See id. at 153, 154; Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 
1991); Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).  
Indeed, the Marsili court couched its analysis in terms of the ultra vires doctrine, not 
the corporate waste doctrine.  See Marsili, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 318. 
 308. 964 A.2d 196 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 309. 792 A.2d 964 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 310. 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
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company’s recent multi-billion dollar losses.311  The agreement provided the 
former CEO with $68 million in salary, bonuses, and other perks.312 
The Delaware Court of Chancery, applying the objective waste standard, 
held that the plaintiffs’ allegations raised “a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the letter agreement meets the admittedly stringent ‘so one sided’ stand-
ard.”313  In particular, the allegations raised a reasonable doubt as to how 
much of the departing CEO’s compensation from the agreement was in fact 
additional compensation that Citigroup paid in return for non-compete, non-
disparagement, non-solicitation and release of claims agreements, and how 
much of the departing CEO’s compensation from the agreement simply ful-
filled prior contractual obligations.314  The larger the portion of the settlement 
that constituted additional compensation, the more likely it was to be 
waste.315  The court reasoned that the case presented an extreme set of facts 
where the agreement was approved at the same time the company reported 
significant losses and, therefore, raised a reasonable doubt that the CEO’s 
compensation was “so disproportionately large as to be unconscionable and 
constitute waste.”316 
The facts of Citigroup stand in stark contrast to a situation where a cor-
poration contributes to a Super PAC that supports a candidate for elective 
office in hopes that the candidate will win the election and enact policies fa-
vorable to the corporation.  In Citigroup, the company had already decided to 
fire the outgoing CEO and was negotiating his departure package and at-
tempting to head off any legal claims he might file.317  As such, the CEO was 
not providing any future benefit to the company.  Any benefit from settling 
potential claims should have been weighed against the harm to the company 
caused by the CEO, who had overseen the destruction of billions of dollars of 
shareholder wealth.  In short, Citigroup involved a situation where the board 
was acting in hindsight and could see the damage that the CEO had caused 
the company, and nonetheless paid to make him go away without a fuss.  
There was no potential upside to the deal, merely a minimization of down-
side.  Therefore, it was at least plausible for plaintiffs to argue that no reason-
able person would have approved millions of dollars in severance for the 
outgoing CEO. 
Second, in Telxon, shareholders brought a derivative action (later con-
verted to a direct action) against the chairman of Telxon Corporation’s board 
 
 311. See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111-12.  The company had recently announced a 
fifty-seven percent decline in profit from the previous year, and had announced sig-
nificant write downs from sub-prime exposures amounting to $55 billion.  See id. at 
113. 
 312. See id. at 138. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See id. 
 315. See id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See id. 
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and six other directors.318  The complaint alleged that a stock option grant to 
the chairman constituted waste.319  The grant provided the chairman with the 
right to acquire ten percent of the equity of a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Aironet, at $1.86 per share.320  The chairman funded the purchase of the op-
tions with a non-recourse note, thereby eliminating his risk in the transac-
tion.321  Three years later, Aironet made a public offering of shares at $11 per 
share.322  Shortly thereafter, Cisco Systems, Inc. merged with Aironet, raising 
its stock price to $82 per share and the value of the chairman’s stock to       
$66 million.323 
In deciding whether to dismiss the suit, the Court of Chancery, applying 
the objective standard of waste, evaluated whether reasonable directors could 
have expected the corporation to benefit from the grant of the stock option.324  
If not, the court reasoned, the consideration received by the corporation might 
be “so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which a reasona-
ble person might be willing to trade.”325  Ultimately, the court denied the 
motion to dismiss because the circumstances were “unusual.”326 
As in Citigroup, the facts of Telxon stand in stark contrast to the facts of 
a typical political contribution.  In Telxon, the chairman of the board, who 
already was subject to a generous compensation package, “purchased” op-
tions from the company – but the purchase was fully funded by the company 
due to the no-recourse note.327  Further, the options, once vested, resulted in a 
large windfall to the chairman.  As a result, there was a plausible argument 
that the corporation had received essentially nothing in return for the stock 
options that it provided to the chairman. 
Third, Lewis, is perhaps the paradigmatic waste case.  In Lewis, share-
holders sued the Mattel, Inc. board to challenge an “unusual,” one-time grant 
of options for 15,000 shares of common stock to the company’s outside direc-
tors; the grant was valid for ten years.328  The value of the stock grant was 
$180,000 per director.329  In denying the board’s motion to dismiss, the Lewis 
court – applying the objective waste standard – concluded that there might be 
a set of facts under which the option grant constituted waste.330 
 
 318. Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny, 792 A.2d 964, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 319. See id. at 968. 
 320. See id. at 969. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See id. at 970. 
 323. See id. 
 324. See id. at 976. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. See id. at 969. 
 328. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 329-30 (Del. Ch. 1997).  The corpo-
ration’s shareholders also ratified the grant.  Id. 
 329. Id. at 331. 
 330. See id. at 339. 
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Even more than Citigroup and Telxon, Lewis shows why a corporate po-
litical contribution is rarely waste.  In Lewis, there was a plausible argument 
that the large, one-time stock option grant was additional compensation to the 
outside directors for the same job that they were already contracted to per-
form to the corporation.  Although companies are allowed to award perfor-
mance bonuses, such bonuses must satisfy the test for objective waste.331  
That is to say, they must plausibly benefit the corporation – by, for example, 
encouraging future loyal service from the directors.  But there was no evi-
dence of such a benefit in Lewis.  Accordingly, the court concluded that it 
was plausible that the large, one-time option grant would result in essentially 
zero benefit to the corporation.332 
In contrast to each of these cases, corporate political contribution will 
only in rare instances – such as in the case of an American Nazi Party contri-
bution, as described above – offer essentially zero potential benefit to the 
corporation.  If the candidate in question has a non-zero chance of winning 
the election and if the contribution could result in the officeholder subse-
quently providing “access” to the corporation’s lobbyists – or even “open-
ness” to considering the enactment of policies that benefit the corporation – 
that is a plausible benefit to the corporation.333  The whole point of the busi-
ness judgment rule is that courts will not second-guess the board’s decision 
that the political contribution was worth the potential benefit, despite the po-
tential risk of that benefit coming to fruition.334 
V.  CHALLENGING CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
AS SELF-DEALING 
A.  What is Self-Dealing? 
“Self-dealing” occurs when a director receives a “personal financial 
benefit from a transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders.”335  
 
 331. See id. at 336. 
 332. See id. at 339. 
 333. See Winkler, supra note 101, at 1265 (“[I]t is hard to imagine any case in 
which shareholders could prove no benefit whatsoever to the corporation from [politi-
cal] contributions; management could justify almost any contribution as an attempt to 
open a candidate’s eyes to see corporate needs.”). 
 334. See In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 
1806616, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010) (“While hindsight is generally 20/20, it can-
not be used to second guess the business judgment of Delaware directors[.]”), aff’d, 9 
A.3d 475 (Del. 2010); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 
122 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[T]he business judgment rule . . . prevents judicial second 
guessing of [a] decision if the directors employed a rational process and considered 
all material information reasonably available[.]”). 
 335. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson v.      
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 
(Del. 2000)). 
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This personal financial benefit must be “material.”336  In this context, material 
means “significant enough ‘in the context of the director’s economic circum-
stances, as to have made it improbable that the director could perform her 
fiduciary duties . . . without being influenced by her overriding personal in-
terest.’”337  When an event is uncertain to occur, Delaware courts typically 
hold that materiality depends “‘upon a balancing of both the indicated proba-
bility that [the] event will occur and the anticipated magnitude.’”338 
The paradigmatic conflicted transaction is “direct” self-dealing, when    
a director herself “stands on both sides of” a transaction with the corpor-
ation.  For example, direct self-dealing occurs when a director personally 
sells goods or services to the corporation.339  However, a conflict of          
interest need not be direct in order to constitute self-dealing.  An “indirect” 
conflict of interest – that is to say, a transaction in which someone other than 
the director of the corporation stands on the opposite side of a transaction 
with the corporation – also can be self-dealing.340  “Indirect” self-dealing can 
take many forms.  Transactions between a corporation and a director’s 
spouse341 or a close relative such as a sibling or child who lives with the di-
rector342 are examples of indirect self-dealing.  So are transactions between a 
 
 336. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 337. Id. (italics omitted) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 
A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch. 1999)). 
 338. In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d 904, 938 n.149 (Del. Ch. 2004) (quoting Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988)), aff’d sub nom. In re Oracle Corp. Deriv-
ative Litig., 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005). 
 339. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 307. 
 340. Further, the personal financial benefit to the person other than the director 
must be material to the director.  See Orman, 794 A.2d at 23. 
 341. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 308; see, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 
N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (applying entire fairness standard to a transaction 
between a corporation and the spouse of the corporation’s CEO). 
 342. In Texas, for example, self-dealing encompasses “a contract or transaction 
between a corporation” and a director or between a corporation and an “associate” of 
a director.  TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE. ANN. § 21.418(a) (2011).  “Associate” is defined 
to include a director’s “spouse or a relative . . . related by consanguinity or affinity 
who resides with the person[.]”  § 1.002(2)(C).  So presumably in Texas, when a 
corporation buys goods from the sister-in-law of its CEO, and the sister-in-law lives 
next door to the CEO, this would nonetheless not constitute self-dealing. 
    Other jurisdictions, like Delaware, do not limit the definition of self-dealing to a 
specific list of “related” persons.  See infra notes 383-387 and accompanying text.  As 
such, transactions between a corporation and a director’s close relatives such as a 
sibling could in theory be deemed self-dealing even if the sibling does not live with 
the director. 
    However, a transaction between the corporation and a director’s cousin is generally 
not self-dealing. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 319 (explaining that, even under 
the current version of the MBCA, “cousins are not related persons under the statute” – 
so a transaction with a cousin does not constitute self-dealing); Mary Siegel, The 
Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 77 n.254 
(1999) (same); Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corpora-
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corporation and an entity controlled by a director, or an entity in which a di-
rector has a material financial interest.343  For simplicity’s sake, all of these 
transactions can be described as transactions between the corporation and a 
“proxy” for one of its directors. 
Finally, in order to constitute self-dealing, the director’s conflict of in-
terest must relate to a specific transaction.344  If a director faces a conflict of 
interest outside of the context of a specific transaction, courts will not neces-
sarily treat the issue as a matter of self-dealing.345 
B.  How Do Courts Review Self-Dealing? 
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that a director engaged in  
a self-dealing transaction.346  In cases of indirect self-dealing, this burden    
can be difficult to satisfy unless the proxy for the director or office is obvious 
(for example, a spouse).  This is because “[w]hile it may be possible to show 
that . . . [an] action taken by the corporation benefited [a director], it is      
extremely difficult to prove that this advantage came at the expense of the 
other shareholders.”347 
When a court concludes that a director engaged in self-dealing, the  
business judgment rule’s presumption that directors act without a conflict of 
interest is rebutted.348  As a result, the court will not defer to the board’s   
 
tion Act – Amendments Pertaining to Directors’ Conflicting Interest Transactions, 44 
BUS. LAW. 1307, 1322 (1989) (“If a plaintiff charges that a director had a conflict of 
interest with respect to a transaction of the corporation because the other party was his 
cousin, the answer of the court should be: ‘No.’”). 
 343. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2010); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE 
ANN. § 1.002(1). 
 344. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8 § 144(a) (defining self-dealing solely with regard 
to “contract[s] or transaction[s]”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2010) (defining 
directors’ “conflicting interest transaction”); 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.60 at 
8–373 (Supp. 1997) (“[T]he subchapter is applicable only when there is a ‘transac-
tion’ by or with the corporation.”); § 8.60 at 8–382–83 (“To constitute a director’s 
conflicting interest transaction, there must first be a transaction by the corporation . . . 
in which the director has a financial interest.  . . . [S]ubchapter F [has] no application 
to circumstances in which there is no ‘transaction’ by the corporation, however ap-
parent the director’s conflicting interest.”). 
 345. See, e.g., Mueller v. Zimmer, 124 P.3d 340, 352-53 (Wyo. 2005); Glad Tid-
ings Assembly of God v. Neb. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, Inc., 734 
N.W.2d 731, 737-38 (Neb. 2007).  But see Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 WL 
710199, at *13 n.39 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that Delaware’s director conflict statute 
did not strictly apply because “in this case, no transaction has occurred[,]” but apply-
ing the statute by analogy due to policy considerations). 
 346. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). 
 347. Jens Dammann, Corporate Ostracism: Freezing Out Controlling Sharehold-
ers, 33 J. CORP. L. 681, 694 (2008). 
 348. See Disney I, 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). 
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decision to enter the transaction.349  Instead, the court will review the transac-
tion itself to determine whether the transaction was fully disclosed, approved 
by disinterested persons and/or fair to the corporation.350  If the trans-       
action was approved by disinterested (and probably independent351) directors 
or the (probably disinterested and independent352) shareholders who were 
fully informed about the transaction, this may sanitize the transaction – to 
varying degrees, depending on the jurisdiction – under so-called state “safe 
harbor” statutes.353  Absent informed, disinterested approval, the defendant 
director must show that the transaction was “entirely” (or “intrinsically”354) 
fair to the corporation.355 
Entire fairness means objective fairness.356  Entire fairness has two 
components: fair price and fair dealing.357  Fair price concerns all conceivable 
“economic and financial considerations,” like whether the corporation re-
ceived fair market value;358 it means “a price that is within the range of prices 
that would be expected to result from arms-length negotiations between the 
two independent parties with relatively equal information and bargaining 
 
 349. See id.  However, a single director’s conflict will “not deprive a board of the 
protections of the business judgment rule unless . . . the interested director dominated 
and controlled the board.”  Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of 
Review in Conflict Transactions on Motions to Dismiss: Lessons Learned in the Past 
Decade, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 967, 972 (2011).  Thus, in order to rebut the business 
judgment rule with respect to the entire board, the plaintiff must show that a majority 
of the board shares the conflict of interest with, or is dominated by, the conflicted 
director.  Id. at 975.  Alternatively, the plaintiff could establish that a majority of the 
board was not sufficiently informed about the conflicted director’s conflict of interest.  
See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 667 (Del. Ch. 2006).  For this 
reason, this Article follows Professor Bainbridge’s lead in using a corporation’s CEO 
in all of its hypothetical examples.  A CEO presumably dominates any inside direc-
tors who report to her – and could plausibly, depending on the circumstances of that 
particular case, even be shown to dominate the outside directors. 
 350. See Disney I, 906 A.2d at 52-53. 
 351. See GEVURTZ, supra note 87, at 291; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 
A.2d 1156, 1169 (Del. 1995). 
 352. See. GEVURTZ, supra note 87, at 291; Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 
221 (Del. 1976). 
 353. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a) (2010). 
 354. Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering 
Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Explora-
tion, 58 BUS. LAW. 519, 523 n.31 (2003) (“Delaware courts frequently use the terms 
‘intrinsic fairness’ and ‘entire fairness’ interchangeably.”). 
 355. See Disney I, 906 A.2d at 52; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 
1156, 1163 (Del. 1995). 
 356. See Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Not 
even an honest belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to estab-
lish entire fairness. Rather, the transaction itself must be objectively fair, independent 
of the board’s beliefs.”). 
 357. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 358. Id. 
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power.”359  Fair dealing relates to how “the transaction was timed, . . . initiat-
ed, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of 
the directors and the stockholders were obtained.”360 
The entire fairness standard requires careful judicial scrutiny of the 
transaction in question.  Indeed, the entire fairness standard is often described 
as “onerous,” “exacting” or “rigorous”361 – and rightly so, when compared to 
the defendant-friendly business judgment rule.  The business judgment rule 
essentially requires courts to defer to almost any rational, good faith, non-
conflicted board decision – and requires that the plaintiff bear the burden of 
proving that a decision was irrational, in bad faith, or conflicted.362  By con-
trast, under the entire fairness standard, the defendant must show that, on 
balance, the transaction was fair to the corporation.363 
As a result, a court’s decision to apply either the business judgment rule 
or the entire fairness standard is, in many cases, outcome determinative: 
When a court applies the former, the plaintiff almost always loses; if a court 
applies the latter, management usually loses.364 
 
 359. Aaron Rachelson, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS § 9:11 (2013); see also Claire 
Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 
922 (2011); Ethan G. Stone, Business Strategists And Election Commissioners: How 
the Meaning of Loyalty Varies with the Board’s Distinct Fiduciary Roles, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 893, 932 (2006). 
 360. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. 
 361. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 
(Del. 1989) (under entire fairness review “the challenged transaction must withstand 
rigorous judicial scrutiny”); Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 459 
(Del. Ch. 2011) (“Entire fairness is Delaware’s most onerous standard.”); Robert T. 
Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v. Ritter and Adapting the 
Process Model of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 
911, 924 (2008) (“[T]he entire fairness standard is so onerous for corporate directors 
that defendants faced with an entire fairness review often move quickly to settle[.]”); 
Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the “Nancy 
Reagan Defense”: May Target Boards “Just Say No”? Should They Be Allowed To?, 
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 406 n.1415 (1990) (“The most exacting form of review is the 
‘entire fairness’ . . . standard[.]”). 
 362. See supra Part III.A (explaining business judgment rule standard). 
 363. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (“The requirement of fairness is unflinch-
ing in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the 
burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny 
by the courts.”). 
 364. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1279 (“‘[B]ecause the effect of the 
proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of 
entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial 
review frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation.’”) (quoting 
AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)). 
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C.  Romiti’s Argument for Self-Dealing and a Critique Thereof 
1.  Political Contributions to a Friend Are Not Self-Dealing 
The first derivative suit proponent, Jonathan Romiti, urges that lawsuits 
for breach of the fiduciary duty are “the best way to reduce harmful political 
spending post-Citizens United.”365  He posits that a duty of loyalty claim 
might arise “if a director designates a particular sum of corporate money for a 
political advocacy group led by a close friend.”366  By way of example, Ro-
miti points to a contribution from News Corporation (News Corp.) to the 
Republican Governor’s Association (RGA) in 2010.  According to News 
Corp.’s CEO, Rupert Murdoch, the company contributed to the RGA to sup-
port John Kasich, a candidate for governor of Ohio, because Kasich was 
Murdoch’s close friend.367  A News Corp. spokesman later distanced the 
company from Murdoch’s remarks, saying that the donation was made to 
support the RGA’s “pro-business agenda.”368 
As Romiti describes it, a shareholder’s derivative claim against News 
Corp.’s board and/or Murdoch based on the RGA/Kasich contribution would 
be premised on the theory of self-dealing: 
When directors abuse positions of power to further their own political 
or social views, shareholders could respond by alleging a violation    
of the duty of loyalty.  . . . [D]irectors engaged in making self-
interested political contributions using funds from a corporation’s 
general treasury do not enjoy a presumption that their dealings are  
fair.  Rather, it is incumbent upon those directors to prove the good 
faith of the transaction and to show that it is fair to the corporation and 
its shareholders.369 
Unfortunately, Romiti is wrong.  A corporate donation to “a political 
advocacy group led by a close friend” of the CEO is not a self-dealing claim 
subject to the exacting entire fairness standard.  A transaction is only self-
dealing when the director or her proxy obtains a personal financial benefit 
from the transaction370 that is material to the director.371  Simply advancing 
 
 365. Romiti, supra note 31, at 762. 
 366. Id. at 759. 
 367. See id. at 763; Donald B. Tobin, CEOs Shouldn’t Use Corporate Treasury as 
Personal Political Piggy Bank Roll Call (Nov. 1, 2010, 12:07 PM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/-51140-1.html (quoting Murdoch as stating that the 
contribution “had nothing to do with Fox News” because it “actually [was a result] of 
my friendship with John Kasich.”). 
 368. See Romiti, supra note 31, at 763. 
 369. Id. 760 (emphasis added).  Although Romiti uses the term “self-interested” 
rather than “self-dealing,” his reference to the director’s burden to show fairness sug-
gests that he views the above scenario as an instance of self-dealing. 
 370. See supra text accompanying note 335. 
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the director’s own “political or social views” is not sufficient unless there is a 
direct connection between the director’s political views and her pocket-
book.372  Moreover, a “close friend” is not a proxy for a director, and as such, 
a court would not attribute any material financial gain of the close friend to 
the director.373 
Romiti cites no case where a transaction with a friend was deemed to be 
self-dealing,374 and there appears to be none.375  Instead, Romiti seems to 
base his argument entirely on a quotation from an article by Professor David 
Yosifon.376  In the relevant article, Yosifon posits that: 
 
 371. See supra text accompanying note 337. 
 372. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 319 (explaining that “when a director’s 
allegedly conflicted interest grows out of nonfinancial considerations,” the transaction 
is not self-dealing under the statute); CLARK, supra note 18, at 146, 148-49 (describ-
ing “mixed motives” situations as differing from traditional self-dealing in that, in 
“mixed motives” situation, a director has “some interest in a side effect” of the corpo-
ration’s transaction with a third party, rather than a direct financial interest in the third 
party or the transaction itself); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Produc-
tion Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299 (1999) (writing before Stone 
placed the concept of “bad faith” within the duty of loyalty and explaining that “the 
duty of loyalty,” as traditionally understood – i.e., self-dealing – “does not apply” to 
“decisions that provide nonmonetary benefits to [directors] themselves at sharehold-
ers’ expense,” such as “donations to their favorite charities,” which Dean Clark called 
“‘mixed motives’” situations)(quoting CLARK, supra note 18, at 142); see also Hill & 
McDonnell, supra note 19, at 835 (“Courts recognize self-dealing . . . where a direc-
tor . . . has clearly identifiable, specific monetary interests at stake in a decision that 
puts her own self-interest at odds with the interests of the corporation.”). 
 373. Cf. Velasco, supra note 133, at 1242 (“[M]any types of conflict that a layper-
son might think would compromise a director’s objectivity are not deemed to rise to 
the level of self-dealing.  The most obvious is friendship and collegiality among the 
directors on a board.”). 
 374. Romiti cites two cases, Bellotti and Bayer.  See Romiti, supra note 31, at 760 
nn.146-49 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) and Bayer v. 
Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944)).  Neither case supports Romiti’s prop-
osition.  Bellotti, a Supreme Court corporate political speech case, addresses deriva-
tive lawsuits in passing and did not even involve an instance of self-dealing.  435 U.S. 
at 794-95.  In Bayer, the court concluded that a corporation’s transaction with the 
CEO’s wife were self-dealing.  49 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10. 
 375. A research assistant searched Westlaw for such cases, to no avail. 
 376. See Romiti, supra note 31, at 760 nn.146, 149 (citing David G. Yosifon, The 
Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility after 
Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1228-29 (2011)). 
    Romiti also makes a similar assertion elsewhere in note.  See id. at 772 (“Delaware 
law requires that directors carry out their duties free from self-interested motives.”).  
However, his citations there do not even purport to support his contention that a con-
tribution in favor of a friend is self-dealing.  The case that Romiti cites, Lyondell 
Chemical Company v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243-44 (Del. 2009), deals with bad faith, 
not self-dealing – and the second item that he cites there is a newspaper article. 
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[W]here directors spend on behalf of candidates who are family mem-
bers or friends . . . then corporate law provides a remedy through 
shareholder derivative suits that put the onus on directors to demon-
strate that “interested” transactions were entirely fair to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.377 
For support, Yosifon cites a well-known treatise by Professors James 
Cox and Thomas Hazen.378  But nowhere in the cited sections does the trea-
tise say that a corporation transacting business with friends is a self-dealing 
transaction, subject to the onerous entire fairness standard rather than the 
protective business judgment rule.379  Indeed, some jurisdictions380 and the 
most recent version of the influential Model Business Corporation Act 
(MBCA) explicitly limit the definition of self-dealing to include transactions 
between a corporation and certain specified relatives or subsidiaries of a di-
rector – i.e., “related persons.”381  Friends and pet projects are not included on 
the list of “related persons.”382 
It is true that Delaware,383 and states adopting older versions of the 
MBCA,384 use the concept of “indirect” self-dealing rather than specific statu-
tory definitions of “related persons.”385  As a result, in such states, transac-
tions with friends are not specifically excluded as examples of self-dealing.  
 
 377. Yosifon, supra note 376, at 1229 (emphasis added).  The ellipses in Yo-
sifon’s quotation above remove the language “especially where such candidacies or 
projects are wholly irrelevant to or at odds with the corporate purpose.”  Id.  Setting 
aside its tautological nature, this caveat (which is not reflected in Romiti’s summary 
of Yosifon’s point) does make it more likely that the director in question has breached 
her duty of loyalty.  However, the breach resulting due to this omitted language would 
not be self-dealing.  A corporate political contribution that is “wholly irrelevant to or 
at odds with the corporate purpose” would be waste.  See supra Part IV.A.2.  The 
transaction would only constitute self-dealing if it also resulted in a material financial 
benefit to a director (or her proxy).  See supra text accompanying notes 335-337. 
 378. Yosifon, supra note 376, at 1229 (citing JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, 
CORPORATIONS § 10.09, at 202-05 (2d ed. 2003)). 
 379. Nor did several other well-known treatises reviewed by this author.  See also 
Balotti & Hanks, supra note 164, at 982-83 (describing ways that corporate philan-
thropy constitutes “personal aggrandizement” for directors – but noting that none of 
these instances fall “squarely within what courts traditionally have regarded as a 
breach of the duty of loyalty” – i.e., self-dealing). 
 380. See, e.g., supra note 342 (Texas). 
 381. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60(1) (2010) (defining self-dealing to in-
clude any transaction in which the fiduciary has a known “material financial interest” 
or in which a “related person” to the fiduciary has such an interest). 
 382. See § 8.60(5) (defining related person only to include the fiduciary’s spouse 
and several other relatives of the fiduciary). 
 383. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a) (2010). 
 384. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 41 (1979). 
 385. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 318; FREER & MOLL, supra note 94,        
at 276. 
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Further, unlike the recent version of the MBCA,386 Delaware’s conflicted 
transaction statute does not preempt the common law.387  As a result, in theo-
ry a court could conclude that the common law deemed one friend to be a 
proxy for the other friend in the context of assessing whether a transaction 
constituted self-dealing. 
However, this author is unaware of any case from any jurisdiction where 
a transaction between a corporation and a friend of a director was deemed to 
be self-dealing by that director – i.e., that a direct material financial benefit to 
the friend was deemed to be an indirect material financial benefit to the direc-
tor.388  Indeed, a recent high-profile case – In re the Walt Disney Company 
Derivative Litigation389 – seemingly holds otherwise.  In Disney, plaintiffs 
challenged a massive severance package for Michael Ovitz, the outgoing 
president of the Walt Disney Company, who had been hired by his alleged 
best friend – the company’s CEO, Michael Eisner.390  In Disney, the plaintiffs 
proceeded on theories of waste and bad faith in large part because the court 
concluded that the case did not involve self-dealing.391 
 
 386. See id. (FREER & MOLL, supra note 94), at 150-51 (discussing MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT sup-chapter F, §§ 8.60, 8.61); Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 342, 
at 1322 (“If a transaction is not a . . . conflicting interest transaction as defined in 
section 8.60, then [it] may not be enjoined . . . [as] a conflict of interest . . . .  In that 
sense, subchapter F is . . . both comprehensive and exclusive.”) (italics omitted). 
 387. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987); Comm. on Corpo-
rate Laws, supra note 342, at 1322. 
 388. A review of cases and leading treatises reveals no such cases.  A recent de-
rivative suit against News Corp. that alleged, inter alia, that “Rupert Murdoch Ad-
vances His Political Agenda With Company Funds” recently settled before any court 
passed on the complaint.  See Kevin M. LaCroix, D&O Insurance to Fund Entire 
“Largest Ever” $139 Million News Corp. Derivative Suit Settlement, D & O DIARY 
(Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/04/articles/shareholders-derivative 
-litigation/do-insurance-to-fund-entire-largest-ever-139-million-news-corp-derivative-
suit-settlement/. 
 389. Disney I, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 390. See id. at 35-36; Hill & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 850 (explaining that in 
Disney, “[t]here was no cognizable duty of loyalty breach” because “[n]o director or 
officer was on both sides of the table, no relative of a director or officer was being 
hired, and no other classic category of self-dealing . . . was at issue”); id. at 845-46 
(explaining that according to the Disney court, “mere friendship” between Eisner and 
Ovitz “did not give Eisner a problematic interest in [Ovitz’s] compensation”). 
 391. In Disney, the court explained that bad faith was the better vehicle for ad-
dressing the situation where Eisner hired his good friend Ovitz because there was no 
“disabling conflicts of interest, such as a patently self-dealing transaction” at issue in 
the case.  Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 760 n.487 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 
(Del. 2006). 
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2.  Self-Interested Motives Are Not Self-Dealing Transactions 
In addition to arguing that political contributions to a friend constitute 
self-dealing, Romiti also argues that: 
When . . . directors exploit their positions of power to further their 
own political or personal interests, this should be a plain violation of 
their fiduciary obligations . . . .  Delaware law requires that directors 
carry out their duties free from self-interested motives.  Subordinating 
the interest[] . . . in a company’s growth in favor of a director’s own 
political or social views is not only an abuse of the trust relationship 
necessary to the proper functioning of the corporation, but it is also a 
clear violation of Delaware law.392 
However, this is simply wrong; or, at least, the problem is not an issue 
of self-dealing.  Again, self-dealing occurs when the directors have a material 
financial interest in the transaction.393  It is not necessarily self-dealing for a 
director to act with a motive other than the corporation’s best interests in 
mind.394  A director may act with mixed motives so long as she rationally 
believes that her own self-serving actions also serve the corporation’s best 
interest or so long as her primary purpose is to serve the corporation’s best 
interest.395  In sum, contrary to Romiti’s assertion, Delaware law does not 
require that directors “carry out their duties free from self-interested mo-
tives.”  Rather, Delaware law requires that directors refrain from waste, self-
dealing, bad faith, intent to harm the corporation, and the like.396 
D.  Are Some Corporate Political Contributions  
Nonetheless Self-Dealing? 
If Romiti is urging that corporate political contributions necessarily con-
stitute self-dealing transactions, he is simply wrong.  However, he may be 
arguing that self-interested corporate political spending can in some instances 
constitute self-dealing.  If so, he fails to develop the scenarios under which a 
political contribution is in fact self-dealing, because he fails to address the 
requirement that the transaction provide a material financial benefit to the 
director or proxy. 
Similarly, if Professor Bainbridge means to urge that corporate political 
contributions never constitute self-dealing transactions, he is wrong.  There 
 
 392. See Romiti, supra note 31, at 771-72 (emphasis added). 
 393. See supra text accompanying notes 335-337. 
 394. See supra text accompanying notes 379-391.  Nor is it waste.  See supra   
Part IV.A. 
 395. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 396. However, if the directors make a contribution primarily for the purpose of 
advancing their own political views rather than the best interest of the corporation, 
this would constitute bad faith.  See Leahy, supra note 43. 
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certainly are scenarios where a CEO causing her corporation to make a politi-
cal contribution does indeed constitute self-dealing.  To explore these scenar-
ios, let us return to Professor Bainbridge’s hypothetical.397 
1.  Can Corporate Giving Ever Be Self-Dealing? 
On the bare facts presented by Professor Bainbridge – a CEO causes her 
corporation to make a “massive donation” to her alma mater – there is no 
basis to conclude that the CEO engaged in self-dealing.  Even if the CEO 
receives a psychological boost from donating to the school that she holds 
dear, and even if that donation raises her standing in the community,398 courts 
simply will not recognize these emotional and social benefits as sufficient to 
overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule.399  What’s more, 
even if the donation may result in some future benefit to the CEO – such as 
an improvement in her prospects of future employment as a business school 
professor at the university – no court is likely to deem such an uncertain fu-
ture benefit as sufficiently material to render the donation “self-dealing.” 
Yet, this does not mean that self-dealing could not possibly exist in the 
context of a charitable donation like the one hypothesized by Professor Bain-
bridge.  Indeed, such a charitable contribution could easily constitute self-
dealing, depending on the facts of the situation.  This is easily demonstrated 
by adding just a few facts to Professor Bainbridge’s hypothetical. 
For instance, we could posit that the CEO has a second job as the chan-
cellor of her alma mater.  We could suppose further that, as head of the uni-
versity, the CEO’s compensation includes a bonus based on the success or 
failure of her fundraising efforts for the school.  This would render the con-
tribution a blatant example of self-dealing, because the CEO would be profit-
ing directly from the corporation’s massive gift to the university.  Of course, 
this scenario is highly improbable, as positions as the CEO of a large corpora-
tion and president of a university are both presumably full-time jobs.400 
 
 397. See supra note 372 and text accompanying notes 335-337. 
 398. These are common motivations for corporate philanthropy.  See Kahn, supra 
note 165, at 616-18 (discussing JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AN 
URBAN GRANTS ECONOMY (1985)). 
 399. See supra note 372 and text accompanying notes 335-337. 
 400. However, it is not uncommon for a non-executive director to be the president 
of a university.  See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-
VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2011) (Goldman Sachs donated 
$200,000 to Brown University while its president served on the board).  In such a 
case, the corporation’s donation to the university would be self-dealing for that direc-
tor, except in the highly unusual case that the university president is uncompensated.  
Cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998) (con-
cluding that director, president of Georgetown University, was not dominated by 
CEO Eisner, despite that Eisner had personally donated over $1 million to the univer-
sity, in part because the director, a Jesuit priest, did not keep his director’s fees), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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Since this direct self-dealing seems highly unlikely, let us imagine that 
the CEO in question has a spouse who happens to be the president of the 
CEO’s alma matter.  Now we have an obvious instance of indirect self-
dealing, since the spouse is a proxy for the CEO.  Yet, such a coincidence 
seems unlikely to occur in the real world.401 
Other, less direct (and perhaps less unlikely) scenarios also are possible.  
Suppose the CEO’s spouse is not the president of the CEO’s alma mater, but 
rather a tenured professor with an endowed chair.  Assuming that the 
spouse’s salary and benefits from the academic institution constitute the pre-
dominant portion of the spouse’s compensation, this is nonetheless arguably 
an indirect self-dealing transaction.  Here, although the CEO’s spouse does 
not have an interest in the transaction at issue, the spouse’s position at that 
academic institution certainly could be a material factor in the CEO’s deci-
sion to cause the corporation to make the massive contributions to her alma 
mater.  That is sufficient for self-dealing. 
Other indirect (and even more realistic) examples of self-dealing 
abound.  Let us hypothesize that the CEO’s son – a mediocre student – is a 
junior in high school.  The CEO’s alma mater is prestigious, and its graduates 
gain access to a network of highly successful professionals.  Admission is 
highly competitive.  Further, assume that the CEO’s status as an alumna, 
combined with her modest personal donations over the years, might have 
been sufficient to persuade the academic institution to admit Junior as a “leg-
acy” were Junior a better student; unfortunately, Junior is simply not college 
material.  On these facts, it seems plausible that the CEO’s decision to donate 
to her alma mater could be influenced by the mere possibility of helping her 
offspring gain admission to a prestigious college.  That is to say, the potential 
financial benefit to her son might be a material factor in the CEO’s decision 
to cause the corporation to contribute to her alma mater.402 
Hence, it is certainly possible that a charitable contribution would con-
stitute a self-dealing transaction, and thereby allow plaintiffs to overcome the 
business judgment rule presumption.  That is to say, it is possible that any 
particular charitable contribution will result in a material financial benefit to a 
director who causes the contributions to occur or to persons who are closely 
related to the director and therefore qualify as proxies.  However, it will de-
pend entirely on the facts. 
 
 401. Yet, it is not unheard of for a corporation to donate money to a charity head-
ed up the CEO’s spouse.  For example, the Morrison Knudsen Corporation donated 
money to The Nurturing Network, a pro-life charity founded by the wife of then-CEO 
William Agee, while Agee was CEO.  The money was funneled through the compa-
ny’s charitable foundation, of which Agee’s wife was the president at the time.  See 
Kahn, supra note 165, at 611-12. 
 402. Of course, the CEO could simply increase her own level of giving – like 
Disney CEO Eisner, who donated over $1 million of his own money to Georgetown 
University, the alma mater of one of his sons.  See In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d at 
359.  But why should a CEO reach into her own pocket when she can reach into the 
corporation’s much deeper pocket? 
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2.  Are Corporate Political Contributions Typically Self-Dealing? 
Let us now concede for purposes of argument that, even if the sit-
uations hypothesized above are not rare, there is no reason to believe that 
such instances are common, either.  Thus, absent empirical proof that       
corporate charitable contributions commonly implicate material financial 
interests of directors, let us accept that such contributions do not typically 
constitute self-dealing. 
Therefore, to be fair to Professor Bainbridge, he undoubtedly meant that 
when a CEO causes the corporation to make a charitable donation, the contri-
bution will not typically constitute self-dealing, because only in rare instances 
will a corporate donation to charity obviously benefit a clear proxy for the 
CEO like her spouse or child.  Further, Professor Bainbridge surely assumed 
that the same is true for corporate political contributions. 
But is the latter assumption correct?  Are corporate political con-
tributions like charitable donations in that they rarely implicate self-dealing?  
Or does the typical corporate political contribution differ from a charitable 
donation in that the former more plausibly constitutes self-dealing?  That is to 
say, is a typical political contribution plausibly self-dealing despite that the 
typical charitable contribution is not?  To investigate this question, let us re-
turn to Professor Bainbridge’s hypothetical, but alter it slightly to reflect a 
political contribution. 
a.  Proxies and Indirect Self-Dealing 
Assume that a CEO causes the corporation she commands to give a 
massive contribution to a Super PAC that supports a single candidate for state 
or federal office.  On the face of this bare-bones hypothetical, there is no self-
dealing.  Even if we assume that the contribution promotes the CEO’s per-
sonal political beliefs and helps her own preferred candidate win an election, 
this is nonetheless not self-dealing.  There is no reason to believe that the 
political contribution results in a material financial benefit to the CEO that is 
not shared equally by the rest of the shareholders. 
That said, we could easily add facts to the hypothetical (just as we did 
with a donation to the CEO’s alma mater in the hypothetical above), to raise 
an obvious issue of direct self-dealing.403  Yet these sorts of situations, while 
 
 403. For example, the candidate that the Super PAC supports could be the CEO 
herself.  This would be direct self-dealing.  Or, the candidate could be the CEO’s 
spouse or child – an example of indirect self-dealing.  Further, in states like Delaware, 
with less specific self-dealing statutes, the candidate could perhaps even be a sibling 
or parent or in-law who does not live with the director.  See supra notes 383-385 and 
accompanying text.  Cf. Kesten, supra note 101, at 21 (describing a donation to “the 
CEO’s sister’s campaign” as an “obvious” conflict).  Other, more realistic, examples 
of indirect self-dealing also abound.  The CEO’s spouse or child could be a salaried 
staffer for the Super PAC, or supporter of the candidate who hopes to obtain a job or 
political appointment if the candidate is elected. 
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possible, seem too fantastic to warrant much discussion.  If it is rare for a 
corporate charitable donation to result in a material financial benefit to the 
CEO or her close relative, it is probably just as rare for a corporate political 
contribution to result in such a material financial benefit.404 
b.  Political Contributions Versus Charitable Donations:  
Expectation of Financial Benefit 
The more interesting question is: Does the typical political contribution 
differ from the typical charitable contribution in that the benefits accruing 
from the former are regularly material financial benefits while the benefits 
accruing from the latter are not?  Even if political contributions do not regu-
larly result in a direct or certain material financial benefit to the contributor, 
are they regularly made with the hope that an uncertain and/or indirect benefit 
will accrue to the contributor?  If so, then when a director causes a corpora-
tion to contribute to her pet Super PAC, perhaps she does more than support a 
political candidate that espouses her own personal political views – perhaps 
she or her proxies stand, directly or indirectly, to gain a material financial 
benefit from the contribution. 
To assess this question we must again inquire how the nature of political 
contributions differs from the nature of charitable donations.  The question is 
simple: Is the typical political contribution less altruistic – and more often 
made with a personal financial gain in mind – than the typical charitable con-
tribution?  In light of some additional differences between charitable contri-
butions and political spending, the answer is quite possibly “yes.” 
i.  Charity Is Supposed to Be Altruistic; Politics Need Not Be 
First, charities are supposed to be altruistic ventures.  The word “chari-
ty” essentially means “to help others.”405  As such, it is not ostensibly possi-
ble to charter a tax-deductible charitable organization406 with the purpose of 
advancing one’s own personal financial interests, or the personal financial 
interests of one’s family, to the exclusion of the best interests of the general 
 
 404. Caveat: since political views tend to run in families and politics often is a 
family business (e.g., the Bushes, Clintons, Doles, etc.), if the CEO is active in poli-
tics the CEO’s close relatives may tend to be active in the same party. 
 405. See Definition of Charity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/charity (last visited June 15, 2014) (“1: benevolent goodwill 
toward or love of humanity; 2a: generosity and helpfulness especially toward the 
needy or suffering; also: aid given to those in need; b: an institution engaged in relief 
of the poor; c: public provision for the relief of the needy; 3a: a gift for public be-
nevolent purposes . . . “). 
 406. Such organizations are governed by Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. 
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public.407  Although one could create a charity that advances one’s own inter-
ests along with the interests of others in need,408 the point of the charity must 
nonetheless be to help the public, not just its founder and/or her family.  Fur-
ther, when one explicitly creates a “social welfare” organization409 to help 
people who are similarly situated,410 contributions to such organizations gen-
erally are not tax deductible (unless they are otherwise deductible, for exam-
ple, as business expenses).411 
The opposite is true for political parties.  There is nothing untoward 
about founding a political party solely to serve the interests of its founders 
and/or its core members.  For example, a group of workers are perfectly with-
in their rights to form a party called the “Labor Party,” the principal goal of 
which is to serve the interests of workers, not management or owners.  Or a 
party could explicitly support only those policies that benefit its own constit-
uents and explicitly reject policies that benefit the constituents of another 
party.  For example, a party whose constituents include many wealthy, rural 
farmers but few members of the urban poor could explicitly support a bill to 
provide farm subsidies without including the food stamp provisions that dis-
 
 407. See Exemption Requirements: 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS, http://www. 
irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-
Section-501(c)(3)-Organizations (last visited June 15, 2014) (“To be tax-exempt  
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must be    
organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3), 
and none of its earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual.”); Ex-
empt Purposes – Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), IRS, http://www.irs. 
gov/Char-ities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exempt-Purposes-Internal-
Revenue-Code-Section-501(c)(3) (last visited June 15, 2014) (“The exempt purposes 
set forth in section 501(c)(3) are charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, 
testing for public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports competi-
tion, and preventing cruelty to children or animals.  The term charitable . . . includes 
relief of the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of religion; 
advancement of education or science; erecting or maintaining public buildings, mon-
uments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; lessening neighborhood 
tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defending human and civil rights 
secured by law; and combating community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.”). 
 408. E.g., a cancer survivor could create a charitable organization to assist      
cancer survivors. 
 409. Such organizations are governed by Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal       
Revenue Code. 
 410. E.g., an Italian-American can create an organization to promote the interests 
of Italian-Americans. 
 411. See Donations to Section 501(c)(4) Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs. 
gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Other-Non-Profits/Donations-to-Section-501(c)(4)-Org-
anizations (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (“Contributions to civic leagues or other sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organizations generally are not deductible as charitable contributions 
for federal income tax purposes.  They may be deductible as trade or business ex-
penses, if ordinary and necessary in the conduct of the taxpayer’s business.”). 
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proportionally help benefit the urban poor (which traditionally have been 
included with farm bills).412 
Although modern political parties, wanting to win elections, often at-
tempt to justify their policies by urging that they are best for society as a 
whole, this is not required by law or logic.  Therefore, while there is no doubt 
that many candidates for office claim that their goals are quasi-charitable in 
nature, there is no legal requirement that a political party act charitably. 
Since the purpose of eleemosynary organizations is to promote the   
public welfare, any material financial gain accruing to the director of the  
corporate donor (or the director’s proxy) will be extremely indirect and tenu-
ous.  Even to the extent that management causes a corporation to donate to 
charity for management’s benefit, the indirect benefits accruing to manage-
ment from such a donation would seem less likely to be financial than the 
benefit to management from a political contribution.  While the good publici-
ty from a charitable contribution may help the corporation’s bottom line, the 
CEO and her proxies are more likely to gain in terms of prestige and social 
recognition.  While sitting on the charity’s board, being recognized with an 
award, or obtaining social approval from one’s peers are certainly self-
interested reasons to cause a corporation to donate money, they are only indi-
rectly likely to lead to financial benefits.  Increasing the company’s bottom 
line by giving to charity, and obtaining greater sales through good publicity, 
seem like far more uncertain paths to riches than investing that money in the 
corporation’s business. 
ii.  Charities Do Not Hold the Reins of Power 
Second, charities are not state actors.  They therefore do not possess the 
coercive power of the state.  They cannot raise armies (other than, perhaps, 
“salvation armies”) or command police forces.  They do not have the power 
to assess and collect taxes (as tithing is merely a moral obligation, not a legal 
one).  As a result, while donations to support a charity will make the charity 
richer, and thereby make the charity’s leaders more powerful, such donations 
do not have nearly the same effect as campaign contributions.  Political con-
tributions can lead to a candidate being elected to office and gaining power 
over the machinery of the state.  Although this power is limited by laws and 
checked by the power of other elected officials, it is potent nonetheless.  Elec-
tion to a local office – be it prosecutor, sheriff, or even dogcatcher – provides 
the candidate with the ability to determine the outcome of many local events.  
Election to statewide office – such as governor or attorney general – or na-
tional office – such as United States Representative or Senator – results in the 
ability to determine events on an even grander scale.  And election as Presi-
 
 412. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, The Farm Bill and the Common Good, N.Y TIMES 
(July 12, 2013), http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/the-farm-bill-and-the-
common-good/ (criticizing the farm bill passed by the Republican-controlled House 
of Representatives, which did not include a food stamp bill). 
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dent of the United States clothes the elected person in immense power.413  
There is simply no comparison between the power wielded by elected offi-
cials – especially those in the executive branch – and the power wielded by 
leaders of non profit organizations of similar size and wealth.414 
As a result, the stakes are much higher when a corporation makes a po-
litical contribution than when a corporation makes a charitable donation.  
When management causes the corporation to make a charitable donation, one 
charity becomes richer and its leaders become more powerful.  But when 
management causes the corporation to make a political contribution, man-
agement is supporting one candidate’s bid to become clothed in the coercive 
power of the state. 
The increased stakes for such contributions therefore magnifies the po-
tential harm that can result from such contributions.  If the agency cost prob-
lem manifests itself and management causes the corporation to make a con-
tribution to a political candidate that favors management’s interests over the 
interests of the shareholders, the harm to the shareholders could conceivably 
be worse than if management caused the corporation to make a charitable 
donation that favors the interests of management over the interests of the 
shareholders.  In the latter instance, management is simply choosing to pro-
mote the general welfare in a way that promotes management’s view of a 
better society as compared to the shareholders’ view of a better society.  But 
in the former instance, management could support the election of a candidate 
who could exercise the power of the state in a way that benefits management 
to the detriment of shareholders. 
To provide a concrete example, let us make the reasonable assumption 
that the management of a large public company consists entirely of wealthy 
men and women.  By contrast, let us assume that the individual shareholders 
(i.e., natural persons) of that company range from the very rich to the solidly 
middle class.  If the wealthy executives of the company cause it to donate 
money to so-called “rich people’s charities” – such as opera houses or art 
museums415 – some middle class shareholders might be miffed, but will suf-
fer little, if any, harm.  Indeed, people of all classes enjoy opera and art mu-
seums, so the donation may simply open the doors of a rich person’s world to 
the less wealthy by allowing the opera to charge less for performances and 
allowing the art museum to charge less for admission to its galleries.  Thus, 
while some middle class shareholders might have preferred, on balance, that 
 
 413. See Joshua Zeitz, Fact-Checking ‘Lincoln’: Lincoln’s Mostly Realistic; His 
Advisers Aren’t, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/entertainment/archive/2012/11/fact-checking-lincoln-lincolns-mostly-realistic-
his-advisers-arent/265073/. 
 414. Anyone who equates the power of the two different types of leaders is con-
fusing influence with power.  See, e.g., Caroline Howard, The 72 Who Rule the 
World, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehow-
ard/2013/10/30/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2013/ (ranking leaders of non profit 
organizations and nation-states together on list of world’s “most powerful people”). 
 415. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 437. 
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the corporation’s money be spent in a different way, the donation to the arts is 
by no means at odds with their interests. 
By contrast, if the wealthy company executives cause the corporation to 
contribute to a “rich person’s” political candidate, and that candidate is elect-
ed, the result could be far worse for the middle class shareholders.  That can-
didate might prefer policies that favor the rich over policies that favor the 
middle class.  For example, that candidate might favor raising income taxes 
on the middle class and lowering income taxes on the rich.  Or, the candidate 
might favor reduced public funding for education and large tax deductions for 
private school education, or reduced taxes on luxury goods and sales taxes on 
regular food and clothing. 
Since political contributions are by their nature intended and allowed to 
be less altruistic than charitable donations, it is therefore at least plausible that 
the typical political contribution is motivated less by altruism than the typical 
charitable donation.416  As a result, it is at least plausible that political contri-
butions are regularly made with the hope that they will result in a material 
financial gain to the contributor – or, in the case of a corporation, to the direc-
tor who causes the corporation to make the contribution. 
3.  Examples of Political Contributions that Might Be Self-Dealing 
Next, let us consider some specific examples of political contributions 
that might constitute self-dealing.  Let us start with “local” politicians who 
represent small, distinct constituencies.  Is it plausible that a CEO who causes 
her corporation to donate money to a Super PAC that supports a candidate for 
the local zoning board could obtain a material financial benefit from that con-
tribution?  Yes, certainly.  Even if we assume the contribution is not itself an 
unlawful bribe or gratuity, plausible scenarios abound where the CEO or her 
proxies might obtain a material financial benefit as a result of the zoning 
board candidate’s election.  For example, suppose the zoning board candidate 
ran on a platform of promoting a wholesale rezoning of a blighted area for 
redevelopment – and the CEO’s immediate family is in the real estate busi-
ness.  Alternatively, suppose the zoning board candidate ran on a platform of 
using zoning laws to break up “red light” districts – and the CEO’s family are 
slumlords whose properties will increase in value when the strip clubs and 
bong shops move to other parts of the cities and the neighborhoods again 
become friendly to families and upscale businesses.417  Or, suppose the city 
 
 416. Of course, the altruistic or selfish nature of any particular donation will obvi-
ously depend on the specific facts of that donation.  Some people may give charitable 
donations for entirely selfish reasons; some people might make political contributions 
for entirely altruistic reasons. 
 417. Many other possible situations exist where management’s personal financial 
interests could diverge from that of most shareholders.  See, e.g., Michael A. Behrens, 
Citizens United, Tax Policy & Corporate Governance, 12 FL. TAX REV. 589, 590-91 
(2012) (positing examples in which management and certain shareholders’ financial 
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has a zoning regulation requiring that developers set aside a substantial por-
tion of their development for parkland, and the zoning candidate ran on a 
platform of eliminating that requirement – and the CEO’s immediate family 
is in the business of developing new residential housing. 
In each case, the CEO has caused the corporation to support a candidate 
in whose positions the CEO believes – but also, from whose platform the 
CEO or her family stands to gain financially.  Thus, by causing the corpora-
tion to give money to the candidate, the CEO has increased her likelihood of 
receiving an actual, financial gain.  If the potential gains are large enough and 
the likelihood of the contribution helping the candidate win is substantial, the 
CEO’s personal financial situation could influence her decision making – in 
other words, the potential financial benefit could be material. 
Next, corporate political contributions made in support of a national   
political candidate: Could they result in (or at least increase the likelihood of) 
a financial benefit to a director?  Again, the answer is yes.  For example,  
suppose a CEO causes the corporation to give money in support of the cam-
paign of a Democratic member of Congress (perhaps even the chairperson of 
an important budget subcommittee) who runs on a platform that includes 
expanding direct government support for “green technology” – and the 
CEO’s family owns a company that manufactures solar cells.  Alternatively, 
suppose the CEO, who flies everywhere in a private jet provided free of 
charge by the corporation but who must pay for her own fuel for personal 
vacations, gives money to a Republican who opposes a proposal to substan-
tially raise taxes on jet fuel.  In each instance, the corporate contribution by 
no means guarantees that the CEO or her family will obtain a financial bene-
fit.  However, in each case, if the contribution is sufficiently large that it plau-
sibly increases the candidate’s chance of being elected, and if the candidate’s 
chance of election plausibly increases the chance of the measure in question 
being enacted, it seems fair to conclude that the CEO’s decision regarding 
whether to make the contribution would likely be affected by her own finan-
cial interests – that is to say, that her potential financial gain from the contri-
bution would be material. 
Finally, is it possible that a CEO who causes the corporation to donate 
money in support of a presidential campaign stands to gain a material finan-
cial benefit from that contribution?  Once again, the answer is yes.  Suppose 
that the Democratic candidate for president is running on a platform of sub-
stantially raising taxes on wealthy Americans – in particular, on those people 
making over $1 million per year.  By contrast, the Republican candidate for 
president is running on a platform of lowering taxes for all Americans – but 
in particular, taxes that hit the wealthy (e.g., the estate tax), who the Republi-
can candidate believes already pay more than their fair share of taxes.418  
 
interests would diverge on the declaration of dividends whether the tax on dividends 
should be high or low). 
 418. See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, Election Day Primer: Comparing the       
Obama and Romney Tax Plans, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2012, 10:39 AM), http://          
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Suppose the CEO makes many millions of dollars per year (and presumably 
will leave a large estate to her children), so she stands to gain a substantial tax 
cut if the Republican, rather than the Democrat, is elected.419  While it is pos-
sible that our CEO would support the Republican simply out of a shared be-
lief about what is best for the nation, it would be difficult to argue that the 
chance to lower her own taxes is not material.420 
The only question is whether or not the connection between a political 
contribution and the eventual election of a president – who, of course, cannot 
pass legislation by herself – is too uncertain and contingent to be sufficiently 
material.421  Undoubtedly a president has more control over the legislative 
agenda than most ordinary senators or members of Congress.  But in order to 
plausibly influence the outcome, a contribution in support of a presidential 
campaign must be much, much larger than is necessary to influence the out-
come of a congressional election.  Thus, in the probability times magnitude 
test,422 these two phenomena may be a wash – unless, perhaps, the contribu-
tion is very large and the race is very close.  Ultimately, this will be a ques-
tion for the fact-finder, since materiality is predominantly an issue of fact.423  
But it is certainly plausible that a jury (or, in the Delaware Chancery Court, a 
chancellor424) would conclude that a corporate political donation constitutes 
self-dealing by the corporation’s rich directors or officers, even if the contri-
bution also plausibly benefits the corporation.425 
 
www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/11/03/election-day-primer-comparing-
the-obama-and-romney-tax-plans/ (comparing Obama and Romney tax plans, includ-
ing proposals for estate tax and taxing income over $1 million); John D. McKinnon, 
Study: Romney’s Tax Plan Hits Middle Class, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:01 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/08/01/study-romneys-tax-plan-hits-middle-class/ 
(“A new study released Wednesday suggests that Mitt Romney’s tax plan would ben-
efit the rich and hurt the poor and middle class.”). 
 419. See Erb, supra note 418. 
 420. Many other possible situations exist where management could have a differ-
ent personal financial interest from that of certain shareholders.  See, e.g., Behrens, 
supra note 417, at 590-91. 
 421. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 72, at 307 (“[A]s the director’s interest becomes 
more attenuated, an indirect transaction may not rise to the level of a legitimate con-
flict of interest.”). 
 422. See supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
 423. See Pfeffer v. Redstone, 965 A.2d 676, 685 (Del. 2009). 
 424. The Delaware Court of Chancery is a court of equity, and as such, the chan-
cellors perform fact finding after bench trials.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., “Mediation-
Only” Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can New Value Be Added by One 
of America’s Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L.J. 585, 588 (2003).  However, the chan-
cellors may in their discretion submit factual issues to be determined by a jury in the 
Delaware Superior Court.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 369. 
 425. As this Article was being edited for publication in early 2014, Professor 
James Kwak published an article that makes essentially this same point.  See       
James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 251, 276-77 (2013) (observing that the difference between the Obama and 
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E.  The Charitable Donation Self-Dealing Cases That Weren’t 
There appears to be no judicial decision in which a director of a corpora-
tion caused the corporation to contribute to a political organization that re-
sulted in a material financial benefit to an obvious proxy like a spouse or 
child.426  Nor has there been any decision involving any of the other potential 
examples of self-dealing political contributions discussed above.427  Howev-
er, in the context of charitable giving, there are two closely analogous Dela-
ware cases – Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson428 and Kahn v. Sulli-
van429 – in which a director caused the corporation to donate money to his 
“pet” charity (although, in neither case was the court willing to admit as 
much).  These cases are instructive because in each case the court did not 
even address the issue of whether the director engaged in self-dealing. 
In Henderson, a shareholder challenged a holding company’s donation 
of $528,000 to a charitable foundation dominated by the corporation’s con-
trolling shareholder.430  The Court of Chancery first held that charitable con-
 
Romney tax plans was worth “about $600,000 per year” to a CEO with the median 
total compensation among CEOs of S&P 500 companies, and concluding                
that “[c]orporate donations that increase the chances of securing low individual in-
come tax rates . . . provide a ‘personal financial benefit’ to . . . people responsible for 
the donations.”).  Professor Kwak did not specifically address the issue of materiality.  
However, he nonetheless concluded that it is “unclear” whether Delaware courts    
will deem corporate political contributions to candidates who favor lower taxes as 
self-dealing, because such contributions are “an ancillary personal benefit [to       
directors] that is difficult to quantify.”  Id. at 278.  Subsequently, in a blog post, Pro-
fessor Kwak agreed with this Article’s conclusion that, due to the attenuated nature  
of any benefit to the board, self-dealing claims based on corporate political contribu-
tions are “likely to fail in most circumstances, given the current attitudes of” the  
Delaware courts.  James Kwak, More on Wasting Shareholders’ Money, THE 
BASELINE SCENARIO (Mar. 25, 2014), http://baselinescenario.com/2014/03/25/more-
on-wasting-shareholders-money/#comments.  Yet, Professor Kwak opined that “there 
is enough precedent . . . for the Delaware Chancery Court to uphold such a challenge, 
if one of the chancellors wants to.”  Id.  This author agrees: Materiality is essentially a 
question of fact, and the chancellors are the Chancery Court’s fact finders.  See supra 
notes 423, 425.  The issue is entirely in their hands. 
 426. A research assistant’s extensive searches on Westlaw disclosed no           
such cases. 
 427. Although the recent derivative suit against News Corp. involved alle-  
gations to this effect, there were not couched in terms of self-dealing and the         
case settled before any court passed on the complaint.  See Jeff Bercovici, News  
Corp. Shareholders in Class Action over Hacking, FORBES (July 11, 2011, 10:47 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/07/11/news-corp-shareholders-
in-class-action-over-hacking/. 
 428. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
 429. 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). 
 430. Henderson, 257 A.2d at 401.  The foundation ran a summer camp for under-
privileged boys.  Id. at 402. 
82
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/2
2014] CORPORATE SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS 365 
tributions were permitted generally under Delaware law,431 and then decided 
that specific contributions should be upheld if they are reasonable.432  In as-
sessing whether the donation at issue was reasonable, the court analogized to 
the federal income tax deduction limit (then five percent of a corporation’s 
gross income); the donation fell below this limit.433  The court also concluded 
that any loss of income to plaintiff was “far out-weighed” by the long-term 
benefit of the charitable donation, which helped “provid[e] justification for 
large private holdings.”434  As a result, the Henderson court upheld the dona-
tion.435  In so doing, the court did not address whether the contribution to the 
controller’s pet charity constituted indirect self-dealing.436 
Kahn involved the art collection of Armand Hammer, CEO of Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental), which was valued at $300 to 
$400 million.437  Occidental donated approximately $85 million to build and 
fund the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural Center,438 which was 
to house Hammer’s art collection upon his death.439  The Court of Chancery 
approved the donation, concluding that it was protected by the business 
judgment rule440 because the plaintiffs failed to prove that any of the directors 
had a personal financial interest or motive for entrenchment in the dona-
tion.441  The court concluded that “[t]he business judgment rule . . . stands as 
an almost impenetrable barrier to the plaintiffs.”442  The court “reached this 
conclusion despite the absence of any proffered business purpose for the do-
nation.”443  Having concluded that the donation was a valid exercise of the 
 
 431. See id. at 404-05 (quoting, inter alia, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9)). 
 432. See id. at 405. 
 433. See id.  The corporation’s gross income for that year was $19 million.  Id. 
 434. Id.  The court did not consider whether the donation furthered the holding 
company’s business.  See id. 
 435. See id. 
 436. To the contrary, the Henderson court rejected as dicta language from a prior 
New Jersey case stating “pet charities” might be actionable in a shareholder derivative 
lawsuit.  See id. at 404 (discussing A.P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 
1953), and reasoning while that the Barlow court “pointed out that there was no 
showing that the gift in question was made . . . to a pet charity in furtherance of per-
sonal rather than corporate ends, the actual holding of [Barlow] appears to be that a 
corporate charitable . . . gift to be valid must merely be . . . reasonable”). 
 437. Hammer II, 594 A.2d 48, 51 (Del. 1991).  The procedural posture of the case 
was somewhat unusual: the court was deciding whether a settlement (which it de-
scribed as “meager”) was “fair and reasonable” to the corporation.  Hammer I, No. 
10823, 1990 WL 114223, at *1, *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990).  Thus, the court did not 
analyze the merits of the case, per se.  Rather, the court considered the likelihood of 
plaintiffs’ success on the merits at a time when both sides had agreed to settle.  See id. 
 438. Hammer II, 594 A.2d at 54. 
 439. See id. at 51-52. 
 440. See id. at 48. 
 441. See id. at 60. 
 442. Hammer I, 1990 WL 114223, at *5. 
 443. Fisch, supra note 165, at 767. 
83
Leahy: Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
366 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
board’s business judgment, the court applied Henderson’s reasonableness 
standard and concluded that the donation was reasonable in size.444  The Del-
aware Supreme Court later affirmed the decision.445 
Scholars have sharply criticized these cases for failing to deem the 
charitable contributions at issue as self-dealing.446  Moreover, Kahn is round-
ly criticized for applying the business judgment rule rather than the “reasona-
bleness” standard used in Henderson to review charitable contributions.447  
Although Henderson and cases from outside Delaware have suggested that a 
plaintiff might successfully challenge donations to a director’s pet charity,448 
Kahn may foreclose this possibility in Delaware. 
The overarching concern of these commentators seems to be that dona-
tions to pet charities ought to be deemed self-dealing.  If a charity created 
with the sole purpose of building an entire museum dedicated to housing the 
CEO’s personal art collection is not a pet charity – then what is?  As one 
commentator put it: 
Although Kahn presents one of the more egregious cases of self-
dealing masquerading as philanthropy, the courts refused to look be-
hind the Occidental board’s superficial justification of the expendi-
tures in affording the transactions the presumptive protection of the 
business judgment rule.449 
Yet, perhaps these scholars are wrong.  Perhaps Kahn simply represents 
the Delaware courts’ implicit decision to follow the same rule (despite the 
lack of a statutory basis for it) as other states that have statutorily exempted 
corporate charitable philanthropy from the business purpose requirement.450  
If so, this simply means that charitable contributions are not subject to the 
subjective waste inquiry; such contributions should still be actionable if they 
constitute objective waste. 
What’s more, these cases – especially Kahn – may simply show         
that Delaware courts take seriously the rule that a plaintiff who alleges self-
dealing must allege the defendant director (or a proxy) received a             
 
 444. See Hammer I, 1990 WL 114223, at *6; see also Hammer II, 594 A.2d at 61. 
 445. See Hammer II, 594 A.2d at 63. 
 446. See, e.g., Kostant, supra note 117, at 425-26 (“Delaware courts [have] tended 
to define self-dealing so narrowly that the duty of loyalty provided minimal protection 
to corporations and their constituents.”); id. at 425, n.27 (“One notorious example 
occurred in Kahn[.]”). 
 447. See Joo, The Modern Corporation, supra note 19, at 72, n.425 (criticizing 
Kahn for failing to explain why the business judgment rule applies to charitable con-
tributions, particularly when Henderson reviewed a contribution for reasonableness). 
 448. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953); see gen-
erally Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives’ Pet Charities and the 
Agency Problem, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1147 (1997). 
 449. Fisch, supra note 165, at 767. 
 450. See supra notes 290-293 and accompanying text. 
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material financial benefit from the challenged donation.  Hammer, who was 
donating his art collection to the museum, arguably did not derive a material 
financial benefit from the donation.  Although the company’s donation facili-
tated Hammer’s own charitable gift to the museum, Hammer could have giv-
en his art away even in the absence of the corporate donation.  Indeed, he   
had previously planned to donate his art collection to the Los Angeles County 
Museum, only to change his mind when the museum would not display the 
art as he desired.451  Hence, the key benefit to Hammer from Occidental’s 
donation to his pet charity was psychological: He wanted the public to see all 
of his art together as a single collection, with his name on it.  On this theory, 
the board did not approve a self-dealing transaction by Hammer.  Rather, it 
approved a charitable donation to his pet charity as a favor.  This is simply 
not self-dealing.452 
Therefore, it may be that the charitable donation cases are distinguisha-
ble and do not prevent a court from deeming a corporate political contribution 
to be self-dealing in the limited circumstances described above.  In short, a 
court might plausibly conclude that a director who causes a corporation to 
make a typical political contribution in support of a candidate for public of-
fice – for example, a donation to a Republican candidate for president who 
will lower the director’s taxes – stands to gain a material financial benefit as a 
result of the donation. 
F.  Why Self-Dealing is Often a Superior Approach to Waste 
At this point, a plaintiff who wishes to file suit to challenge a corporate 
political contribution might wonder whether she should argue waste, self-
dealing or both.  While waste is a likely loser, self-dealing is no sure winner 
and will depend entirely on the plaintiff’s ability to make a plausible argu-
ment, supported by particularized facts, that the corporation’s directors or 
their proxies stood to gain a material financial benefit as a result of the politi-
cal contribution.  A brief comparison of the two causes of actions may there-
fore prove helpful to the potential plaintiff. 
Let us return again to Professor Bainbridge’s hypothetical, but modify it 
to reflect a plausible instance of self-dealing.  A CEO causes her corporation 
to make a massive contribution to a Super PAC that devotes all of its funds to 
support the Republican candidate for president.  A central plank in the party’s 
platform, which that candidate ostensibly supports, is to lower taxes on peo-
ple who make more than $1 million per year.  The CEO makes more than $1 
million per year, but not every shareholder makes more than $1 million per 
 
 451. See Robert A. Jones, Battle for the Masterpieces: The Armand Hammer-
County Museum Deal: A Saga of Art, Power and Big Misunderstandings, L.A. TIMES 
(May 22, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-22/magazine/tm-4568_1_armand 
-hammer-collection. 
 452. Contra Balotti & Hanks, supra note 164, at 984 (conflating the concepts of 
independence and financial interest, and therefore concluding that charitable dona-
tions that give rise to non-financial benefits could be self-dealing). 
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year.  Which theory should the plaintiff advance: waste or self-dealing?  To 
make the question more interesting, let us also assume that the CEO is an 
outspoken conservative (like Rupert Murdoch) who is best friends with the 
Republican presidential candidate, a former commentator for Fox News 
(someone like John Kasich). 
The answer is still clearly self-dealing.  As explained above, the waste 
standard would require that the contribution either be irrational (objective 
waste)453 or serve no corporate purpose whatsoever (subjective waste).454  
Regardless of what one thinks of the Republican Party these days, there is 
simply no colorable argument that contributing to the Republican candidate 
for president is irrational.  In the 2012 election, literally hundreds of thou-
sands of people contributed to the Republican candidate for president, Mitt 
Romney, and to Super PACs that supported him.455  Further, more than sixty 
million people, or 47.2 percent of those voting, voted for the Republican can-
didate.456  Only the most rabidly partisan Democrat would argue that all of 
these people are irrational.  There is simply no argument that a corporation’s 
management could not rationally and in good faith believe that supporting 
Romney was in the corporation’s best interest. 
Arguing that the contribution serves no corporate purpose also is a sure 
loser – even if the CEO concedes (as Murdoch did) that she caused the corpo-
ration to spend money to advance her own political ideology and promote the 
candidacy of her personal friend.  Undoubtedly, the CEO will hire a team of 
expensive lawyers to plausibly argue in court that the CEO’s own political 
ideology also advances the best interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers – i.e., a “pro-business agenda.”  The court must then decide whether to 
accept or reject the CEO’s argument. 
This is where the standard of review becomes critical.  When assessing 
whether a transaction constitutes waste, the business judgment rule applies.  
Thus, the court must defer to a decision by the corporation’s directors      
unless it is utterly irrational.  As a result, when management argues that a 
transaction served the corporation’s best interests and a plaintiff argues that   
it did not, the business judgment rule requires that the court defer to man-
agement.  That is to say, in the absence of a conflict of interest by manage-
ment that rises to the level of self-dealing, the business judgment rule requires 
that a court defer to management on the question of whether a transaction 
serves the corporation’s best interest.457  Hence, the court will defer to the 
 
 453. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 454. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 455. See FEC, OFFICIAL 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS (2013), available 
at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/2012presgeresults.pdf. 
 456. See Jeremy Ashkenas et al., The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candi-
dates, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance (last visited 
June 15, 2014) (compiling data from Federal Election Commission). 
 457. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see, e.g., Para-   
mount Communc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Marsili v.       
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (“[M]anage-  
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CEO’s view that the political contribution serves the corporation’s best inter-
est and the plaintiff will lose. 
The court’s inquiry in the context of self-dealing is different – and pos-
sibly outcome determinative.  First, the plaintiff must show that the political 
contribution was self-dealing by the powerful CEO – in other words, that she 
stood to gain a material financial benefit as a direct or indirect result of the 
contribution.  This is a difficult burden, but it is plausible that the plaintiff 
will overcome the burden under these circumstances.458  Once the plaintiff 
establishes that the political contribution is self-dealing, however, the busi-
ness judgment rule no longer applies and the court no longer defers to the 
CEO and her expensive lawyers.  Instead, absent fully-informed disinterested 
director or shareholder approval of the transaction, the CEO has the burden of 
proving that the transaction was objectively fair to the corporation.459 
This shift in the standard of review (from business judgment deference 
to entire fairness scrutiny) and burden of proof (from plaintiff to CEO) is the 
critical reason why a self-dealing claim is superior to a waste claim.  Alt-
hough the initial threshold of establishing self-dealing is difficult to sur-
mount, once self-dealing has been established it simply does not matter that 
the CEO has a plausible argument that the self-dealing political contribution 
also benefits the corporation.  In contrast to a waste claim, where the court 
must defer to any remotely plausible justification for the business decision 
proffered by the CEO, for a self-dealing claim the CEO can proffer plausible 
justifications to her heart’s content; however, she bears the burden of proving 
to the court’s satisfaction that the contribution did in fact, on balance, serve 
the best interests of the corporation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, a close review of two potential theories that shareholders 
could employ to challenge corporate political contributions via a derivative 
lawsuit leaves us exactly where we started: the business judgment rule will 
 
ment . . . [is] primarily responsible for judging whether a particular act or transaction 
is . . . expedient for the attainment of corporate purposes . . . . [A] court cannot      
determine that a particular transaction is beyond the powers of a corporation unless    
it clearly appears to be so as a matter of law.”) (internal citations omitted).  Cf. Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Philanthropy, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 28, 
2008), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2008/07/corp-
orate-philanthropy.html (“[C]orporate charitable giving typically is defended            
on grounds that it produces . . . favorable publicity.  In effect, charitable giving is 
simply another form of advertising. As such, it supposedly results in more business 
and higher profits.  Who knows for sure if that is true?  Maybe GM really does really 
sell more luxury sport utility vehicles because it sponsors PBS – or maybe not.  But 
that is not the right question.  The right question is: who decides?  The board of direc-
tors or the courts?”). 
 458. See supra notes 418-420 and accompanying text. 
 459. See supra Part V.B. 
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defeat most such suits.  In particular, waste claims are unlikely to succeed 
except in the rarest of circumstances, such as when a corporation supports a 
candidate who both cannot win and is extremely offensive to almost every-
one.  Self-dealing claims might succeed, but only when the directors of the 
corporation stand to obtain a material financial benefit that is not shared by 
the other shareholders.  Yet, even then, any financial benefit to the director or 
her proxies will be indirect and highly uncertain, so plaintiffs will have to 
show that the financial benefit was sufficiently important in order to be mate-
rial to the donor. 
As a result, a shareholder who objects to a corporate political contribu-
tion should think twice before suing derivatively to challenge the contribu-
tion.  However, if the shareholder does sue, she should consider advancing 
theories other than waste and self-dealing in order to overcome the business 
judgment rule460 – assuming, of course, that the business judgment rule ap-
plies at all.461 
 
 
 460. See, e.g., Leahy, supra note 43. 
 461. But see Joseph K. Leahy, Intermediate Scrutiny for Corporate Political Con-
tributions (working paper) (on file with author). 
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